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ABSTRACT

THEORIZING AGAINST POLITICS:

RETHINKING MAX WEBER AND THE PURPOSE OF
POLITICAL THEORY

SEPTEMBER 1999

JOHN A. GOULD I NG
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M A
•

.
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,
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Political theorists have long noted the "liberal"

dimensions of Max Weber's theory of politics.
I

In doing so

believe they overlook the anti-political overtures in hi

push for national glory, his mechanical design of
parliamentarism, and his desperate faith in plebiscitarian
leaders- -all of which constrain the prospect of human

struggle underlying his idea of politics.

Political

theorists who address Weber's works on science and

methodology have viewed them as "correlates" of his

theoretical project of politics.

!

contend that they too

ignore the degree to which Weber's
methodological works
reveal an immanent critique of
his own theory of politics in
particular and the craft of political
theorizing in general.
In this dissertation

I

confirm the anti-political

overtures that underlie Max Weber's
theory of politics.
challenge his theory of liberal
democracy insofar as he

I

anchors it to his public and quite
problematic advocacy of
German national glory. But more
important, I charge that
his scientific and methodological
works provide greater
insight into the elements that comprise
a theory of politics
in his thinking.
I believe they do so in
that Weber's

theory of scientific scholarship posits the aim
of ethical
clarity, the divide between facts and values,
and
the

conditional quality of all human values.

I

thus turn Weber

the ethical scholar against Weber the active citizen.

With this critique,

I

draw several conclusions about

the contemporary value of Max Weber's political thinking.
In clarifying the differences between his concepts of

political judgment
(Urteil)

I

(

Augenmass

and scholarly judgment

confirm that where the former succumbs to the

dictates of one conviction, the latter ultimately contests
all convictions.

Based on this contrast,

I

also affirm how

Weber's idea of scholarship invites more fruitful prospects
of political struggle,

prospects that extend outside the

"life-sphere" of the liberal institutions of politics.
viii

Finally,

from this alternative location of
politics, I
suggest that Weber's idea of an ethic
of responsibility
Verantwortungsethik includes the scholar as
much as the
politician, especially a scholar who contests
the ultimate
ends of the politician, other scholars, and
one's
(

own self

IX
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INTRODUCTION
The bulk of the scholarly literature
on Max Weber's
political thinking tends to be broad in
its volume yet quite
narrow
its theoretical focus.
For instance, the works of

m

Wolfgang Mommsen, David Beetham and Robert
Eden- -among many
others- -demonstrate a thorough mastery of
Weber's
theoretical project of politics.

In each case,

however, his

theory of politics becomes a mere validation of
the

political project of modern liberalism.
Weber's "political goals

...

Though he renders

subordinate to the [German]

nation's requirements," Mommsen still relates his
thinking
to a "defense of liberalism,

"

one "endowed with an entirely

aggressive rather than a resigned tone ."

1

David Beetham

employs another approach to Weber's liberal project, such
that he reveals a clash between Weber's "commitment to

German cultural values" and both "his emphasis on leadership
in society and his concern for liberty in an increasingly

bureaucratised age

."

2

Even Robert Eden, who rejects the

Straussian view of Weber as a perpetrator of nihilism,
contends that Weber'

s

theory of politics represents a

"defense of liberal democratic institutions

Nietzsche's nihilistic politics
interpretations,

." 3

...

against

Given these

it is apparent that they view his political

theory primarily from the standpoint of its emancipatory

gesture either to revitalize the German nation, to mend

1

Germany's class divisions, or to
sate the starved moral
space of European culture
Wish to depart from these
"liberal" nationalist
interpretations insofar as they fail
to acknowledge the
deeply flawed design of Weber's theory
of
I

politics.

flaw appears

m

That

the very liberal aims that underlie
his

political thinking: parliamentarism,
universal suffrage, and
individual autonomy.
For such aims, I
believe,

tend to

impede rather than invite the human
struggles that inform
and undergird Weber's idea of politics.
Indeed, I contend
that a more interesting and fruitful idea
of politics

derives from Weber's writings on methodology
and science.
Though much of the scholarly literature explores
the

intricate bond between science and politics in Weber's

theoretical corpus, such works approach it from a somewhat
limited perspective.
instance,

It is Peter Breiner's contention,

for

that Max Weber's social scientific works support

"his objective stance to argue for the unfeasibility of

political projects he disagrees with substantively ." 4

Dsvid Owen also seeks to reveal what he calls an "implicit
politics," a "political correlate," in Weber's notion of a
cultural science.

In fact,

Owen perceives his idea of

science "in terms of its capacity for 'breeding' autonomous
individuals" who can partake in "a political activity which
is manifest through the specification of the conditions of

autonomy in the different life-spheres
2

."

5

There is also

H.

Bruun, who argues "that the concepts
of conflict and
power, which indisputably constitute
the central core of
H.

Weber's conception of the essence of
politics, maybe
contained within the frame of reference
defined by his
various methodological reflections ." 6
Thus each thinker underscores the bond
between science
and politics.
However, where they tend to view Weber's
theory of science as an essential corollary

of his politics,

view it as both a immanent critique of his
political
theory in particular and a provocative rejoinder
I

to liberal

politics in general.

In this dissertation

I

thus confirm

the anti-political overtures that underlie Max Weber's

theory of politics.

I

challenge his theory of liberal

democracy insofar as he anchors it to his public and quite
problematic advocacy of German national glory.
important,

I

But more

charge that his scientific and methodological

works provide greater insight into the elements that

comprise a theory of politics in his thinking.

I

believe

they do so in that Weber's theory of scientific scholarship

posits the aim of ethical clarity, the divide between facts
and values, and the conditional quality of all human values.
In short,

I

turn Weber the ethical scholar against Weber the

active citizen, concluding that his theory of science offers

something his theory of politics does not: a more keen

perception into the idea of democracy.

3

find myself siding with a view
of Weber which ceases
to corner him between either
a blind defense of a particular
moral conviction or a scholarly
indifference to all
I

convictions.

Rather than further establish Weber's

intricate moral aims, however,

I

wish to explore how such

ambitions compel us to rethink his theoretical
project of
politics.
Indeed, I approach Weber's political
thinking
from the standpoint of his nationalist

convictions, which,

believe,

I

tend to constrain the possibilities of
political

struggle and, thus, undercut the very goal of
German
national glory.

Still,

this paradox of national politics is

evident in more than just Weber's political thinking.

it

also appears in relation to his concept of science
or

scholarship {Wissenschaf t)

,

such that one of the moral aims

of science is establishing "clarity" between human
values,

technical means, and any corresponding consequences.

problem is apparent in Weber's thinking,

a

Thus a

problem that

issues from a clash of multiple moral ambitions.

A

significant part of this problem manifests itself in an
ethical paradox of sorts, one that exposes the degree to

which Weber the theorist of national politics deviates from
Weber the professional scholar.

I

therefore offer an

interpretation of Max Weber's political thinking that moves

beyond explorations of the moral diversity and ethical
ambiguity in his work.

I

offer an view whereby the ethical

limits of his project confirm not simply the problem of

4

theorizing politics, but the
critical and instructive value
Of theorizing against a flawed
notion
of politics.

With regard to the concepts of
"politics" and
"political," I, much like Weber,
understand them

to signify

the possibility of a human struggle,

multitude of ultimate convictions.

one premised on a

Yet unlike Weber, who

utilizes the struggle of politics as
a means to advance the
singular end of German national power,
I also understand
politics as an end itself: a sporadic,
unanticipated, and
wholly contingent contestation of all ultimate
ends- -even
the end of politics itself.

"politics,"

I

Thus,

when

I

use the concept of

am referring to those historical and

theoretical instances in which an open-ended public

disagreement over ends and means flourishes among equally
impassioned persons.
"political," moreover,
social,

When
I

I

use the concept of

am referring to those individual,

or public circumstances which are informed by at

least the prospect of the aforementioned human struggles.

Accordingly, even parliamentary democracy becomes

contestable on the basis of its limited and finite location,
its narrow and specialized criteria for admission,

and its

closed and instrumental advance of, say, the ends of law and
order,

democratic republicanism, or liberal individualism.

As Weber himself notes, parliamentary democracy is

contestable insofar as it inevitably mandates "that things
must be emptied and made into matters-of -fact

5

(Versachl 1 chung

and the following must undergo
spiritual
proletarianization, in order to achieve
'discipline'."?
short, parliamentary democracy
is a political condition
which, ironically, threatens the
prospect of politics with
constraints on both the number and
value of ultimate ends.
)

,

m

Max Weber's desire to advance the
Wilhelmine German
nation strongly influences his theory
of modern politics.
This leverage is plain in his early
essays, in which the aim
of his theoretical project was "not
to make everybody happy
but the social unification of the nation." 8
it persists
after his emotional "breakdown" and up to
the outbreak of
the First World War, when Weber's explorations
of the

Protestant Ethic" presaged a "modern man" who is
"unable to
give religious ideas a significance for culture and
national

character which they deserve."

9

From the First World War

until his death in 1920, moreover, the impact of Weber's

nationalism on his theory of politics manifests itself in
variety of newspaper articles and public lectures.

a

These

works concern his belief that "the question of the internal

reconstruction of Germany" will determine "whether the
nation feels ready to bear the responsibility which a nation
of seventy million people has towards its descendants." 10

Clearly,

then,

though Weber's theory of politics touches on

numerous topics, it consistently mirrors his moral ambition
to advance the power of the Wilhelmine German nation.

6

What is novel about the nationalist
underpinnings of
Weber's political thought is not so
much that they bare
troublesome ties to the anti-democratic
and anti-liberal
sentiments of German National Socialism 11
Nor that they
illuminate tensions in his particular
brand of "aggressive
liberalism, « tensions which appear to
privilege democratic
institutions and charismatic politicians
at the expense of a
democratic citizenry 12 what is novel is
that the bond
between Weber's political thought and his
nationalist
.

.

convictions indicates a significant problem
involving the
marriage of morality and politics in the modern
world 13
.

The union of morality and politics is a theme
that

pervades the entire range of Max Weber's writings.

It

begins when he declares in his 1895 "Freiburg Inaugural
Address" that an "ultimate subjective core" underlies
all
moral convictions in modern politics, a core which
ensures
that

"

[e]

ven our highest, our ultimate ideals in this life

change and pass away." 14

It expands in the first two

decades of the 20th century, notably in his essays in The

Methodology—of the Social Sciences

.

There he argues that a

person's "value- judgements" are not so much conceived by

modern science as they are constructed over the course "of
an irreconcilable death-struggle, like that between 'God'

and the 'Devil'" which is endemic to modern science. 15
Finally,

this union, which is predicated on the "ethical

irrationality" of the modern world and the centrality of

7

conflict

m

social life,

saturates Weber's famed 1919

lecture on "The Profession and
Vocation of Politics." in
that lecture he submits "that the
achievement of 'good' ends
IS in many cases tied to
the necessity of employing
morally
suspect or at least morally dangerous
16

means."

these claims,

Given

it seems as though Weber is at
least equally

interested in the mix of morality and
politics as he is in
devising a theory of politics that
advances the aim of
German national power.
In the chapters which follow,

I

argue that Weber's

interest in morality and politics places him
in a

significant predicament.

it does so,

not because he

straddles a fine line between the morally "empty"
creed of
"Machtpolitik"
and Kant's dictum that "[t]he God of
1

morality does not yield to Jupiter, the custodian of
violence."

Rather,

in light of Weber's axiom that

morality and politics reflect "a tension that may erupt at
any moment into a irresolvable conflict," 19 it is a

predicament that makes him prone to the "ethical paradoxes"
that appear in his own theory of politics.

By an ethical

paradox, he means the situation in which a person, who seeks
"to save his own soul and the souls of others," discredits

his own moral end "with the diabolical powers that lurk in
all violence." 20

Machiavelli

'

s

These paradoxes, which evoke

tale of the contingencies of "fortune,"

confront the purpose of politics and the constancy of

8

morality.

They challenge those persons
who, like Weber with
nationalist ambitions, seek to
combine both while
striving for power" in the modern
world.

maintain further that Weber's
interest in morality
and politics reveals at least
two
I

types of "life-conduct"

Lebens fiihrung) that are capable of
withstanding the force
of these paradoxes.
The basis of this claim derives
from
his lectures on "The Profession
and Vocation
(

of Politics"

and "Science as a Vocation."

in the former lecture,

he

points to a conduct of politics indicative
of a person's
"passionate commitment to a 'cause'
Sache )"
(

responsibility" and "judgement."

and a "sense of

These two latter traits,

which combine to subdue the "vain" tendencies
of one's
"soul," direct a person's life-conduct "entirely
at the

service of the 'cause'" despite the modern world's
ethical

incoherence

21
.

In the other lecture,

Weber notes that a

life-conduct of science requires self-sacrifice, insofar as
"strict specialization" and

"

self -clarification" help a

person "become fully conscious

...

that he has achieved

something that will endure" the shifts of an irrational
cosmos.""

But unlike the conduct of politics, which

requires total submission to a moral conviction, the conduct
of science is "subjected" to the historical fate of

"progress," which for Weber means the "common goal" of

dispelling and surpassing the absolute design of
knowledge

23
.

Hence the distinction between these two types

9

Of life-conduct denote a
tension in Weber's political

thinking.

it constitutes a tension
in that the politician

restricts the scope of politics
by obeying one particular
moral conviction and the scholar
encourages politics by
questioning all- -even one's own-moral convictions.
These two types of conduct thus
signify the extent to
which Weber's theory of science,
more than his theory of
politics, maintains the mix of morality
and politics.
In
his theory of politics, the politician
appears to weather an
ethical paradox by fashioning both
politics and oneself into
an instrument, "a human 'apparatus,'"
that advances a moral
conviction.
This transformation, however, cannot
eliminate
the ethical paradoxes stemming from the
union of morality
and politics.
Indeed, it limits politics to
a set of

parliamentary" institutions and a code of "responsible"
conduct, whereby a person's conviction accrues power
enough
to influence the violence of the state,
of politics and,

thus,

the moral direction

the meaning of an ethical paradox.

In Weber's theory of science,

which mirrors the

conflicts surrounding his theorizing of the political, the

scholar appears to confront an ethical paradox, too.

He

does so, not by obeying a conviction at the cost of politics

and oneself, but by "clarifying" the differences between

political means and moral convictions.

The impact of this

conduct surfaces neither in the institutional design of

parliamentary politics nor in the violent enterprise of the
10

bureaucratic state.

Instead it appears in the
shape of a
scholar who "confronts" and
"forces" politicians and
citizens alike to account for
the
uue ethir^i
ecnical tensions between
politics and their moral convictions.
Hence, I am not
turning Weber's political thinking
on its head,
t

so to speak,

defending the claim that science
is more political than
politics itself.
I am simply turning

his political thinking

against itself, contending that Weber's
idea of science both
augments his understanding of modern
politics and questions
the way in which he theorizes it.
In the dissertation

I

discuss, examine,

and confirm the

different dimensions of this argument over
the course of
five chapters.
Each chapter not only discloses the

problematic tie between morality and politics in
Weber's
P°litical thinking, but specifies its impact on the

politician or political theorist who grapples with both.
I

As

will point out below, these themes issue from Weber's

theoretical and historical depictions of politics, nation,
ethics,

judgment,

and vocation in the modern world.

The dissertation's first chapter explores Max Weber's
idea of politics, an idea he posited on the assumption that

human struggle
life.

(

Kampf

is central to all forms of social

In his early work on the shifts from "in kind" to

"money-wage" labor in the rural regions of East Elbia, Weber

theorized a politics indicative of "the hard struggle of man

with man" for the creation of "elbow-room in this earthly
11

life."

4

Later, while outlining the
epistemology of the

Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft
und Sozialpolitik in 1904,
Weber noted again "that the
highest

ideals," political or

otherwise,

"are always formed only in
the struggle with
other ideals ." 25 By the time the
First World War was

ravaging both the modern nation-state
and the liberal
individual, Weber easily pledged
his

support to "the given

palaestra for the modern politician,"
which took shape in
"parliamentary conflict and the fight
for the party in the
country ." 26 Over the course of his
varied works,
therefore, works which explored the
meaning of rural labor,
scientific objectivity, and parliamentary
democracy, Weber's
idea of politics presupposed human struggle
as the

groundwork for power in the modern world.
By assuming that "all politics is essentially

struggle," and that struggle ensures an "influence
on the

distribution of power," Weber appears to theorize a politics
which acts as a means for the advance of a conviction.
However,

this "mechanical" view of politics and the human

struggle upon which it is posited poses a problem in Weber's

political thinking.

It is a problem,

not simply because a

contingent struggle over differing convictions works at
cross -purposes with a calculated design toward the

preeminence of one conviction over all others.
a problem,

too,

But it poses

insofar as Weber signifies the advance of

the German nation as that conviction which informs his

12

depiction of modern politics

He thus ignores his own

claims about the capricious
qualities of political struggle,
an omission that illuminates
a discrepancy in his political
thinking
Likewise, he narrows the scope
of convictions in
politics by virtue of their duty to
the preservation, unity,
and expansion of the German nation,
a restriction that
reveals a tension in his theory of
politics.
Each case is
evident in Weber's theoretical push
to "clear away
mechanical obstacles" that weaken Germany's
national power,
as well as
his political drive to contest those
who,
.

m

because of their "traditional," "immature,"
or "vain"
convictions, impede the path to that power.
I

thus conclude

that Weber's idea of politics both discloses
the limits of
his own political thinking and foreshadows the
extent to

which his devotion to the idea of a German nation obstructs
the theoretical expanse of each particular idea.

Weber's attempt to direct theoretically and politically
the human struggle of politics indicates the moral relevance
of his commitment to the German nation.

The second chapter

explores the multiple meanings of Weber's idea of nation,

focusing on its moral dimensions as they appear in both his

political and sociological works.

Though the advance of

German national glory marks the chief moral aim of Weber's
theory of politics, and that such an aim undergoes various

transformations over the course of his intellectual career,
the idea of "greatness" or glory still remains an ill-

13

defined concept in his thinking.

if there is a substance
to

Weber's idea of nation, it reveals
itself most clearly in
his desire both to distance himself
from the archaic
national aspirations of his Wilhelmine
contemporaries and
envision a more robust and liberal
concept in the future.
In early contrast to Treitschke's
Idealist view of a

German nation "shrouded in mystical
obscurity," Weber
conceives of it as a "worldly organization."

Indeed he

renders it-

"worldly organization," the "economic and

political -power interests" of which confirm its
"decisive,
"final," and "enduring" disposition. 27 Between

"

1910 and

Weber perceives this historically distinct yet
morally
absolute idea of nation as such from a more analytical
1914,

perspective.

As he notes in Economy and Society

,

the

meaning of "'nation' is usually anchored in the
superiority ... the irreplaceability

,

of the culture of

values" central to a peculiar group. 28

By 1917, as the

value" of a war-torn German nation took center stage in his
thinking, Weber found it easy to assert "that the vital

interests of the [German] nation take precedence even over

democracy or parliamentary rule." 29

Rejecting the dying

"traditions" of Prussia, the "ethnic" focus of German

Machtpolitik, and the "immaturity" of the Supreme Command
and the Munich soviets, Weber's view of both the German

nation and the nation as such evokes a multitude of meanings
reaped in opposition to his own times.
14

They also evoke his

desire to verify a moral conviction
capable, not only of
unifying a nation as diverse as
Wilhelmine

Germany, but of

guiding it beyond the earthly tedium
of the present toward
the prospect of national glory
in some other-worldly future.
Weber's moral commitment to the nation,
however, and

its expression as the aim of German
politics,

tends to

narrow rather than expand the diversity
of convictions in
modern politics. By defining a single
moral purpose in
terms of training national leaders,
reforming national

institutions, and unifying a national citizenry,
Weber's
idea of nation represents a barrier to the
political

struggles which promote such goals.

His idea of nation

hinders them insofar as it excludes alternative
interpretations,

public deliberations, and broad

participation in the human struggle of politics.

Rather

than spurring national power in the future, his idea
of

nation thus reveals an "ethical paradox" issuing from

a

tension between the moral absolute of nation and the earthly

character of political struggle.

Again,

this paradox

ensnares not only Weber's idea of nation, but his theory of

politics tgo.

It confirms the degree to which the nation

constricts the prospects of human "struggle" in politics,
and how politics unmasks the moral "'good'" of the nation.
The appearance of an ethical paradox between Weber's
ideas of nation and politics requires an examination of his

theory of political ethics.

I
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do so by tracing, not only

Weber's interpretation of political
ethics, but the
theoretical and political problems
allied with

his inability

to meet the very ethical criteria
he envisions for others.

This examination represents the
focus of chapter three.
The issue of political ethics is
one which Weber
approaches most thoroughly only late in
his life.
Yet, when
he does approach it, it is always
within the framework of
the potential for political leadership
in the German nation.
In his lecture on "The Profession and
Vocation of Politics,"
Weber notes that "to ask what kind of human
being one must
be... to seize the spokes of the wheel of history
is to pose
an ethical question ." 30 From this claim about
the ethical

ground of leadership, Weber surveys various notions
of
political ethics in post-World War

I

German politics.

He

contests the political ethics of the Allied Powers as
ignoble,

those of Pacificism as self-defeating, and those of

Syndicalism, Spartacism, and Bolshevism as irrational

These

ethics of conviction"

(

Gesinnungsethik

,

31
.

which focus

exclusively on advancing the moral purity of an ideal, are
viable only insofar as they reject the use of "morally
dangerous means."

Given that "the use of violence" is the

"decisive means of politics," Weber holds little hope for
the political sustenance of such ethics in the modern world.

Only an "ethic of responsibility"

(Verantwortungsethik)

,

which focuses on the conviction as well as its paradoxical
bond with violence, allows a person "to look at the
16

realities of life with an unsparing
gaze, to bear these
realities and be a match for them
inwardly." 32
It is important to note,

however,

that the ethic of

responsibility entails more than a way
of acting in the
realm of politics, more than just a
qualification for
assuming political leadership in Wilhelmine
Germany.

I

believe that it also reveals a substantive
sense of the
political in Weber's thinking.
it does so inasmuch as the
ethic of responsibility, one, reflects the
chief criterion
of success in modern politics; two,
necessitates

a struggle

with opposing persons and convictions; three,
underscores
the tragic violation and thus limit of one's own
actions;
and,

four,

derives from Weber's public critique of the other

ethical positions in German politics.

But the chief problem

with his notion of political ethics is that, as

a

political

theorist, Weber fails to measure up to his own self-imposed

"responsibility before history ."
1895,

That duty, he says in

is to find for the nation of Wilhelmine Germany a way

"to become something different: the precursors of an even

greater epoch." 33

Spurning the anachronisms of the

Prussian aristocracy, the passivity of the bourgeoisie, and
the divisive interests of the working class, Weber believes
the "responsible" path toward national glory leads Germany

through a network of parliamentary institutions.

That is

where he thinks a political fight over the values of the

nation occurs and fosters active political judgment
17

(

Augenmass

)

as much as collective
unity.

before his death in 1920, however

Some four months

Weber was no longer

concerned with educating the German
nation in the ways of
political judgment and participation.

By then he was simply

searching for a leader who, as "a
hearer of the principle of
the unity of the Reich, " could
"create a dam" against a wave
of fragmented interests. 34
Thus the problem is not so much
that Weber fails as a
German citizen to expand the possibilities
of politics and
national power. What is troublesome
is that Weber's idea of
an ethic of responsibility reveals
how his political theory
seems to fall outside his own prescribed
set of ethical
standards.
His inability to recognize, first,
that his

moral concern for the German nation limits
the possibility
of politics and,

second,

that his mechanical design of

politics violates his ideal of the German nation,
highlights
his failure "to be conscious of these ethical paradoxes
and
of his responsibility for what may become of himself
under

pressure from them." 35

For this reason, Weber's idea of

political ethics stresses the "ethical paradox" facing, not
just the political leader in his theory of politics, but

Weber himself as a theorist of politics in the late-19th and
early-20th centuries.
These ethical limits reflected in Weber's theory of
politics, and in the politics that surround his theorizing,

presuppose at least two notions of judgment.
18

On the one

his idea of political judgment

(Augenmass)

points to a

person who estimates within an
historical moment the
differences between his own moral
conviction and such
external parameters as other people,
things,

and even one's

own vanity.

On the other hand, though, his
notion of
scholarly judgment (Urteil) mandates
a more thorough,
sobering, and on-going account of
such distinctions, such
that it anticipates a reconfiguration
rather than a

protection of one's ultimate convictions.

In short,

where

political judgment succumbs to the dictates
of conviction,
scholarly judgment inevitably unsettles them.
Like so many other themes in Max Weber's
thinking, his
idea of scholarly judgment

(

Urteil

)

derives from a number of

battles with other influential schools of thought at
the
time.

If Weber was not positioning himself against

scientific positivists," who, like Gustav Schmoller,

believed judgment generated moral ends on the basis of
empirical evidence, then he was situating himself contrary
to "cultural subjectivists," who,

like Stefan George and

even Georg Simmel, considered judgment as a way to infuse

personal values into historical events

36
.

In each case the

problem was not one chiefly concerned with judgment per

se,

but one concerned with the degree of "distance" between a

person's judgment, his or her convictions, and the empirical
constraint? of history.

Weber thus argued that the notion

of judgment expressed by positivists betrayed too much
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distance, whereas the notion of
judgment expounded by
subjectivists betrayed too little. He
himself viewed
"
judgement " in terms of "the ability to
maintain one's inner
composure and calm while being receptive
to realities, in
other words distance from things and
people ." 37

Max Weber's two notions of judgment,
however, is not
without its theoretical and political flaws.
In one

instance, he identifies political judgment

(

Augenmass

as a

person's capacity "to overcome... the mortal
enemy of all
dedication to a cause, " which for Weber means the

"all-too-

human enemy" of "common vanity ." 38

The problem is not so

much that Weber's notion of judgment perceives a
person

potentially "detached" from worldly things, other persons,
and even oneself.
Nor that it seeks to rid human excess

and

folly from modern politics, nudging Weber close to

positivism.

Rather,

the problem with Weber's theory of

judgment derives from its technical purpose in "clearing
away" the obstacles which impede one's moral conviction,
thus subsuming human judgment beneath the auspices of that

specific conviction.
In another instance,

judgment

(

Urteil

Weber's notion of scholarly

reveals how he, as a political theorist,

fails to judge the shortcomings of his own theoretical

project, one that marches politics toward the goal of German

national power.

It divulges a political problem,

moreover,

in that a lack of "distance" blurs the line between his
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devotion to German nationalism and
his commitment to
theorizing politics, thus pushing
Weber close to
subjectivism.
This is evident in his battles
with the
positivists, subjectivists, and even
the reign of
bureaucratic "officialdom," whereby
Weber's own lack of
judgment "tempts him to strive for the
glittering appearance
of power rather than its reality." 39
Given
these problems,

which feature Weber's want of "responsibility"
before the
"paradoxes"
his political thought, judgment unveils
him
to be both a political actor fated to
surrender

m

himself to a

moral conviction and a political theorist
destined to thrust
himself into the struggle of politics.
The "ethical paradoxes" in Weber's political
thinking,

and the limits of judgment in his theorizing of the

political

,

demand an exploration of what Weber means by

life-conduct

(

Lebensfiihrung

)

in the modern world.

a

Unlike

his scholarly probes into world religions, Weber's political

writings show little interest in exploring a notion of
"life-conduct," political or otherwise.

In fact,

his early

political thinking only alludes to a vague idea of lifeconduct.

At that time,

in opposition to the conduct of the

German bourgeoisie, he states that his chief concern was
"not the well-being human beings will enjoy in the future

but what kind of people they will be." 40

rebuke of an "eudaemonistic outlook,

"

Continuing his

Weber attacks the

Prussian Junker in a 1904 speech on "Capitalism and Rural
21

Society in Germany," arguing
that such a "traditional"
conduct will only decline when
faced with the "countercurrent" of "modern capitalistic
competition."- Later, in
1917, he questions Germany's
penchant for "unpolitical"
conduct,

challenging the bureaucratic rule
of officialdom on
the ground that it champions a
person who "must remain
outside the struggle for power of his
42
own."

then,

it appears,

that' though Weber never explicitly
theorizes a conduct

of politics,

he derives from his quarrels with
groups in

German politics an idea of conduct that
mirrors a struggle
over the role of moral convictions in
modern politics.
Yet my concern with Weber's idea of a
political lifeconduct is not focused on its failure to achieve
a prominent
place in his political thinking. The more
significant

problem,

I

think,

stems from there being at least two

different sources of a life-conduct of politics in his
theoretical projects of politics.

On the one hand, his

theory of politics features a life-conduct predicated

on,

not only a person's ability to endure human conflict while

advancing an ideal, but one's capacity to judge responsibly
the ethical distance between the two.

On the other hand,

the politics that corresponds to his theoretical enterprise

displays a conduct based on the above criteria as well as on
those of a "scientific" nature.
as a Vocation,

"

As Weber notes in "Science

the scientific criteria of a scholarship
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tend to "chain

person "to the course of progress"
in a
way that "raises new 'questions'"
about all convictions 43
Max Weber's two notions of a
political life-conduct
indicate an ironic situation in his
political
a

.

thinking.

They do so

m

that the politician in Weber's
theory of

politics represents a person who
circumscribes politics by
using it to advance a moral conviction,
while the scholar
who surfaces in the politics of Weber's
theorizing depicts
person who commingles morality and
politics,

a

if only to

contest both with "the inescapable historical
situation" of
modern science. Thus, the conduct mirrored
in the politics
of Weber's scholarly theorizing tells
us more about the hope
for politics than does the conduct he
attempts to portray in
his theory of modern politics.
It confirms that, though a

theory of politics may promise power at the cost of
morality
and politics,

the task of theorizing the political promises

the chance of mixing the two.

This chance, however, comes

ut the cost of yielding lasting political power.

Morality and politics represent a vital yet destructive
iu.

Max Weber

s

political thinking.

This mix is vital,

not just because it points to a dimension in Weber's work

more theoretically expansive than his devotion to the ideal
of the German nation.

It is vital because it marks both a

wellhead of differing perspectives in politics and
vehicle for the advance of moral convictions.

a worldly

It is

destructive, however, not only on account of the ethical
23

paradoxes it imposes on the politician
in Weber's theory of
politics, paradoxes which challenge
a person's advance
toward and maintenance of political
power.

it is

destructive, too, on account of the
ethical paradoxes it
imposes on. the political theorist.
For they impel a person
outside the politician's domain to
engage in a type of
politics marked by a conflict over the
value

of convictions,

the "intellectualization" of the world,
and, thus, the moral

uncertainty of one's life and worldly enterprise.
If this mix of morality and politics
tells us anything

about Weber's political thought,

it is that he was after

something more than the advance of German
nationalism.

Even

more than gaining knowledge about morality and
politics as
such,

I

believe he was after insight into the worldly

consequences of such a problematic bond.

He wanted insight

into the consequences that challenge not only a person's

capacity to advance a moral conviction in politics, but
one's sense of responsibility, judgment, and life-conduct in
an ethically irrational world.
course,

These consequences, of

surfaced as paradoxes in both Weber's theory of

politics and the politics that correspond to his theorizing,

confirming how they impact the lives of politicians as much
as political theorists.

While the impact is more direct and

perilous for the politician, mainly with regard to one's
office, prestige,

and power, the political theorist bears

the weight of such paradoxes with distrust for the earthly
24

longevity of moral convictions.

The theorist carries this

weight in contrast to the
politician's unwavering quest for
power and for the scholarly sake
of maintaining the mix of
morality and politics. As long
as Weber's political

thought

maintains this distinction between
scholars and politicians,
I believe it reveals
differing locations of politics beyond
those defined by his commitment to
German national glory.
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CHAPTER

I

POLITICS AND "THE HARD STRUGGLE
OF MAN WITH MAN"
Introduction
In his well-known work
"The Prince," Niccolo

Machiavelli conveys to Lorenzo
de Medici, heir apparent to
the Florentine throne, that
the goddess of Fortune (fortune)
rules only half of our actions.
She allows the other half
to be ruled by our own volition.
Those actions ruled by
fortuna, he says, require a prince
to confront her

contingent furies with vigor, or
otherwise face personal and
political ruin. Yet despite a person's
calculated response,
Machiavelli believes fortuna "shows her
force where there is
no organized strength to resist her."
This unruly force
takes on a different character in Machiavelli
s other work
of political theory, "The Discourses."
in that
1

'

work,

his

task is not to admonish princes who seek
power in the face
of fortuna, but to defend republican
government against the

contingencies brought on by fortuna.

Machiavelli advises

republics to busy themselves with the creation of "good
laws," for "good laws bring good fortune, and from good

fortune results happy success in all enterprises." 2

Together both works signify a tension in Machiavelli

'

s

thinking, one between a politics posited on historical

chance and another based on human design.

It is a tension

that underlies his idea of politics in 16th century Italy.
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3

In a similar way,

Max Weber's theory of politics

reflects a tension involving the
meaning of politics in 19th
and 20th century Germany.
From his infamous "Freiburg
Inaugural Address" of 1895 to his
celebrated lecture on the
"The Profession and Vocation
of Politics" in 1919, Weber
assails just about every significant
interpretation
of

politics.

He contests the political aims
of Utilitarian

liberalism,

scientific Positivism, the Prussian
Junkers, the
German bourgeoisie, the youthful pundits
of cultural
"experience," the German Supreme Command,
and the universal
proletariat. 4 if Weber achieves any influence
in these
battles, it appears in something more than
a brief conquest
over his opponents.
It appears, too, in a theory
of

politics indicative of struggle (Kampf

)

,

denoting a person

who is "at all times" subject to "multiple
sets of values,
each of which ... seems to impose an obligation on
him." 5

In contrast to this fortuitous element in
the human

struggle of politics, Weber also theorizes a notion of

politics characterized by a collection of modern
institutional structures. 6

These structures, which he

derives from the philosophical wellhead of liberal
democracy, guide human conflicts through the "machinery" of
-

labor unions, party organizations, universal suffrage,
parliament, and the administrative state. 7

They also

cultivate "professional" politicians who, by way of a

parliamentary struggle, simultaneously confront
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a myriad of

moral convictions and induce
their opponents to support
one
specific conviction over all others.
This duty to a
singular "cause" (Sache) corresponds
to Weber's view of
parliamentary institutions, the purpose
of which is to
provide "the elements of mass
discipline" for a German
nation replete with contending
interests.
"By contrast," he
writes in a 1917 issue of Frankfurter
Zeitung,

"as far as

national politics are concerned, the
unorganized mass, the
democracy of the street, is wholly irrational." 8
Weber's
theory of politics signals, therefore,
the gravity of
a

human struggle between ultimate convictions,
but only
insofar as the contingencies associated with

such struggles

conform to the discipline of modern institutions.
Though distinct, these two views of political
struggle
nevertheless admit the importance of power in Weber's

theory

of politics.

"Anyone engaged in politics," he claims in his

"Vocation" lecture,

"is striving for power,

a means to attain other goals.

sake'"

J

.

either power as

.or power 'for its own

Like Machiavelli, Weber sees politics as a

struggle for power, one involving

a

relatively autonomous

person hindered by historical chance and human institutions
designed to order life's irregularities.

Contrary to

Machiavelli, though, who views this struggle as a means to

advance the interests of "one man alone" or the "original
principles" of republicanism, Weber renders it as a vehicle
for the defense, unity, and expansion of the German nation.
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Though he shares Machiavelli

s

view of struggle and the
rift

between its source and design,
Weber still departs from his
predecessor when he subsumes
persons,

institutions, and

ideals beneath the aim of German
national glory 10
By assuming that "all politics
is essentially
struggle," and that such a struggle
promises an "influence
on the distribution of power,"
Weber theorizes a politics
that acts as a means toward the
advance of one conviction.
I argue in this chapter,
however, that this "mechanicalnotion of politics and the human
struggle upon which it is
posited represents a problem in Weber's
political thinking.
.

It is a

problem to the extent that a contingent
struggle
over convictions works at cross-purposes
with a

calculated

political plan that imposes one conviction
upon all others,
notably the advance of German national power.
Thus he

overlooks his own claims about the capricious
qualities of
the human struggle of politics, an oversight
which I

believe

highlights a serious discrepancy in his political thinking.
Moreover, by limiting convictions in politics on the
basis
of their allegiance to the German nation,

Weber expels his

opponents from any fruitful theoretical discussion on German
national politics.

This expulsion reveals,

I

think,

a flaw

in his approach to the political conflicts that influences

the way he theorizes in the modern world.

Each shortcoming is evident in Weber'

s

theoretical

desire to "clear away mechanical obstacles" that impede
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Germany's quest for national
greatness.

They are evident,
in his political desire
to challenge those thinkers
who, because of their
"traditional", "immature", or
"vain"
ideals, obstruct the path
towards national power.
light
of these events, I submit
that Weber's idea of politics
too,

m

reveals more than the limits of
his political thinking.
it
foreshadows the degree to which his
devotion to the idea of
nation hinders the theoretical
expanse of both politics and
the German nation itself.
As a first step in confirming
these clarms, I begin with three
questions: What does Weber
mean when he refers to the term human
struggle? How does it
correspond to his theory of politics?
And what, if
anything, does it say about Weber's
impact on the enterprise
of contemporary political thinking?

Freedom and

Nation-St-.at-P

Over the course of 54 years, Max Weber's
intellectual
life was swayed strongly by a variety of human
struggles.
As Marianne Weber notes in her husband's biography,
he

witnessed debates between Wilhelm Dilthey, Theodor Mommsen,
Levin Goldschmidt, Heinrich von Trietschke, and Heinrich von
Sybel
Sr.,

,

all of whom frequented the Berlin home of Max Weber

a one-time National Liberal Party member in the

Reichstag.

11

His life also documents methodological

battles within the Verein fur Sozialpolitik

;

personal frays

with his own emotional state; ideological tussles with
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Marxism; ethical disputes
with German militarism and
Pacificism; and political
fights with the Prussian
bureaucracy, the German Supreme
Command, and the
Hohenzollern crown.- These
events may not reveal Weber's
exact interpretation of human
struggle, but they do reveal
how its historical specter
loomed over his rendering of the
term and its place in his
political thought.

Beginning with his earliest
academic forays, Weber
approached the notion of human
struggle from a decidedly
economic point of view. As a scholar
at
the Verein,

a

relatively conservative policy
institute established by,
among others, Gustav von Schmoller,
he found himself
absorbed
the fight "for an improvement in
the situation
of the working classes." 13 During
one portion

m

of his 33-

year tenure at the Verein, Weber focused
his investigative
gaze on the conditions of agricultural labor
east of the

Elbe River.
of

He was concerned with the recent introduction

"the principle of economic rationality into
the wage-

forms" of farm workers, who prior to the late 19th
century

laboured for feudal Prussian estate owners in return for
small land holdings and a share of the estate's product.

14

From these investigations, all of which stressed the

increasing divide among differing economic classes, Weber

gradually fashioned

a theoretical

notion of human struggle.

Originally a request on behalf of Prussian estate
owners, who,

in the early 1890s, were seeking cause for
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state-imposed grain duties, Weber's
probe of East Elbian
labor relations urged something
altogether different.
Rather than affirm the traditional
authority of the estate
owners, he argued that the
"modern development" of the
"'free labour contract'" gave
workers the chance to flee
such "brutal personal domination,
»
freeing them to fend for
themselves "in a struggle of interests "> s
it was this
.

human migration off the estates
and into the capitalist
market that gave Weber insight into
the meaning of human
struggle
late 19th-century Germany.
He documented the
intransigence of Prussian traditions, the
impersonality of
market relations, the rift between a
dying landlord class
and a growing proletariat, and the
infusion of Slavic

m

immigrants into newly-vacated jobs on the
Elbian estates.
These effects, and others, moved Weber to
conclude

in his

Freiburg Address that in such an "economic
struggle for
life... there is no peace to be had." 16

As landlords and laborers moved in accordance
with the

"increased capitalization" of the estates, the latter did
not necessarily struggle for increased wages.

What was

unique about their struggle, says Weber, was "the urge for
personal freedom" that lead them away from the feudal

domination of Prussian landlords.

He highlights how

"

[t]hey

sacrifice their accustomed conditions in their aspiration
for emancipation: their apathy is shattered." 17
its ties to the estates,

Severing

economic sustenance, and cultural
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tradition,

this emergent class of
laborers turned over its
duties to a mass of Slavic
workers willing to accept
the
despotic circumstances east of
the River
Elbe.

These German laborers were not
thrown off the estates
by spiteful landlords, nor
were they drawn to the cities
with material guarantees of
factory employment. According
to Weber,

they believed in the "magic of
freedom," by which
he meant the chance for each
person to labor by the tolling
of one's own estate bell.
However, it was also a belief
that lead them into "a silent and
bleak struggle
for

everyday economic existence

...

they [were]

leaving their

homeland and [were] about to submerge
themselves in a dark
future.
Thus the lives of German laborers
convinced
Weber that human struggle, despite its
role in the death of
feudalism and the birth of capitalism, culled
its

theoretical ground from such liberal ideals as
human
freedom, commercial ambition, and self-determination.
In addition to depicting the ideals involved
in a

laborer's fight for freedom, Weber was perceptive enough
to
note the contingent qualities reflected in such a struggle.
His youthful theoretical renderings go beyond mere vague

allusions to some "dark future" facing German workers in the
impersonal market place of modern capitalism.
_

too,

They evoke,

a sobering perception of East Elbian labor relations,

one that deters Germans "from imagining that peace and

happiness lie waiting in the womb of the future, and from
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believing that anything other
than the hard struggle
of man
with man can create any
elbow- room in this earthly
life ." 19
Hence his notion of human
struggle appears to promise
persons neither human well-being,
material
security, nor

even human happiness.

On the contrary, it secures
a person
nothing more than a chance
to advance these and other
ultimate convictions, and only
then while remaining engaged
in a human struggle with
other individuals.

Much like Machiavelli

'

s

view of fortune, then, Weber's

rendering of human struggle
presupposes a person who, with
desire, calculation, and conviction,
embraces the mere
possibility of furthering some ultimate
goal.

Indeed, it is
a person composed of what Weber
calls "those characteristics

which we think of as constituting the
human greatness and
nobility of our nature ." 20 But this person
represents only
one side of his rendering, for, again
like
Machiavelli, he

denotes an institutional device capable of
countering the
uncertainties that come with human struggle. Where

Machiavelli finds order in legal, religious, and military
institutions, Weber instead finds it in the nation-state,
an

institution that "should have the final and decisive say in
all questions of German economic policy ." 21

As rifts

between Prussian tradition, modern capitalism, and Slavic
immigration became more evident, he thus qualified the

nation-state as a mitigating force in all struggles

befalling Wilhelmine Germany.
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In one particular instance,

Weber prompted the German

nation-state to mitigate vigorously
another facet of the
human struggle unfolding in
East
Elbe.

That facet involved

"itinerant Polish workers,- who,
because of the -economic
death throes of the old Prussian
Junkerdom" and the workers
new-found -magic of freedom,were able to amass available
German farmlands. Their ability
-to adapt- to subservient
living conditions in return for
a share of East Elbian land
induced a situation in which,
according to
Weber,

"one

hundred thousand peasants relate to
their home soil in a
different way than a hundred thousand
workers ." 22 Given
its potential threat to German
unity,

greatness,

expansion, and

this discord lead Weber to interpret
the nation-

state as sole adjudicator on "questions
of whether, and how
far, the state should intervene in
economic life,
or of

whether and when it is better for it to free
the economic
forces of the nation from their fetter and to
tear

down the

barriers in the way of their autonomous development

."

23

Whether that meant the "interior settlement" of estates,
the
"opening of new markets" for Germans, or the "closing of the

eastern frontier" to Poles, Weber matched the ill effects of
human struggle with the imposing will of the nation-state.
By positing the nation-state as arbitrator of human

disputes and creator of capitalist markets, Weber signals
the chief instrument of German unity, expansion, and power.
He explains this position in his 1897 lecture entitled
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"Germany as an Industrial
State."
Evangel isch-soziale KongreB

Speaking before the

in Leipzig,

Weber argued that

though the state can easily
quell those struggles which
impede the nation, Germany
must not pursue a "policy
of
national comfort but rather
one of greatness." 2 * By
"greatness" he meant a policy
through which the nation-state
alters the "vain and hopeless
combat" between landlord
and

working classes into an accord
that combats the influx of
immigrants and the feudal traditions
which draw them on to
German soil.
in this way, the nation-state
rids itself of
those internal divisions that
obstruct Germany's chance to
compete for power with the world's
other "Great Powers ." 25
Weber concludes "that the gospel of
struggle is a national
duty,

an unavoidable economic task for
individual and for

the collectivity of which we are
not 'ashamed' and

represents for us the sole path to greatness

."

26

This depiction of the German nation-state
reveals the
extent to which Weber not only banishes "the
urge for

personal freedom" to the realm of self-interest but
modifies
its "element of primitive idealism" into a national
fight

for greatness.

In fact,

the struggle for national greatness

was his way of bringing human design and order to the

unpredictable class and ethnic struggles unfolding east of
the Elbe River.

However,

insofar as Weber anchors his idea

of struggle to this end of German national greatness,

a

theoretical rift surfaces in his political thinking.

In one
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sense, his explorations
of East Elbian labor
relations posit
notion of human struggle
based on a person whose
quest for
freedom derives from -the most
elemental drives in the human
breast
In another sense, they
postulate an idea
of

human struggle that, in contrast
to the quest for personal
freedom, presupposes the supremacy
of the German nationstate, the aim of which -is not
to make everybody happy but
the social unification of the
nation."- Judging from this
contrast, Weber's view of human
struggle marks more
than a

mere theoretical problem in the early
stages of his
political thinking.
it also suggests a political
problem,

m

chat the struggle for freedom becomes
the means rather
than the goal of Germany's struggle for
power.

This divide between a person's struggle for
freedom and
the German nation-state's struggle for
power points
to a

paradox in Weber's early theoretical depictions of
politics.
Insofar as his East Elbian scholarship accentuates
a
person

whose ability to struggle derives from a "primitive"
site in
the "human breast," Weber hinges German national greatness

on a person's ultimate goal of human freedom.

Put a

different way, the advance of the German nation-state
depends on persons whose ideals shift between such desires
as economic liberty,

political opposition.

ideological autonomy and, possibly,
Conversely,

in that his same works

designate the nation-state as the "final and decisive" judge
of all struggles,

Weber defies the very persons and ideals
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on which the nation-state
pivots for power. Accordingly,
the struggle for freedom
succumbs to the nation-state's
project of unity, expansion, and
power, a project utilizing
persons for the goal of greatness
rather than exalting them
as goals in and of themselves.
His theory of politics

portends,

therefore, a situation in which
either the nationstate limits its chief means towards
greatness or a person's
struggle for freedom disrupts the
aims of the nation-state.
Likewise Weber's early interpretation
of politics
suggests a problematic situation involving
the political
disputes that impact his theorizing.
His scholarly approach
to the labor situation in East Elbe
symbolized something
more than a detached analysis of Wilhelmine
Germany's

shifting class structure.

It also signified his passionate

dismissal of Prussian Junkerdom's claim to
political
authority, the bourgeoisie's selfish aspiration

toward an

unpolitical future, and the German proletariat's desire
for

political leadership

29
.

Moreover, Weber's youthful

approach to theorizing politics marked his own desire to
distance himself from the conservative views of the Herein,
views which he thought simply bolstered the tradition of the

Prussian state at the expense of the German nation

30
.

The

politics of his theorizing thus imparts the weight of human
struggle in the theoretical enterprise itself, but only

insofar as it discounts contending views of politics that
impair Germany's prospects for national power.
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Rather than

augment the dialogue between
these differing views,
Weber's
task tends to narrow the
theoretical views of politics,

presaging the alteration of
political theory into an agent
of German nationalism.
These early works suggest, in
part, that Weber's notion
of struggle marks a dividing
line between passionate persons
seeking freedom and the absolute
authority of the German
nation-state.
In turn, this division reveals
a paradox at
the heart of his theory of
politics, such that the

passionate persons who were suppose to
elevate the nationstate were the very persons whose
passions the nation-state
sought to subdue.
This division reveals,
furthermore, a

paradox in the way Weber engages in the act
of theorizing.
It is a paradox indicative of his
public rejection of

those

human convictions that are central to the very
idea of the
German nation he sought to advance. These flaws
in both his
theory of politics and his approach to the task of

theorizing exhibit the degree to which the idea of human
struggle points to the first problematic trait of Weber's

theoretical enterprise.

Asceticism and Revolution
Max Weber's studies of the East Elbe "situation"

between 1893 and 1898 demonstrate how his theory of politics
entails both an individual struggle for human freedom and

national struggle for social order.
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It was a period that

a

paralleled, his own personal
struggle to come to terms
with
both his growing influence in
the herein and the demise
of
Germany's archaic political
traditions.
Soon after this
fruitful stretch, Weber faced a
struggle unlike any he had
ever experienced: his "emotional
breakdown," that was
accompanied by "the psychological
pressure of [an] 'unworthy
situation' in which he draws a
salary and will not be able
to accomplish anything in the
foreseeable future." 31 From
1898 until 1902, Weber fought off
this crisis with trips to
the North Sea and Italy, stays at
a Lake Constanz
sanatorium, and infrequent ventures into
abstruse scholarly
33
projects.
Finally, in 1903, he returned to
intellectual
tasks which reflected, not only his earlier
commitment to
the individual and the nation-state, but
his insights into
the role human struggle may play in a theory
of politics.

At least three works represent this period of
Weber's

combined intellectual and emotional rejuvenation.

The first

work is The P rotestant and the Spirit of ranitaiiam

a

series of essays first published in the Archiv fur

Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik between 1903 and
1905.
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The other two works were his chronicles of the

1905 Russian Revolution,

"Bourgeois Democracy in Russia" and

"Russia's Transition to Pseudo-constitutionalism," both of

which appeared in the Archiv in 1905 and 1906,
respectively.
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What all three texts share with Weber's

earlier projects is a keen perception of the historical
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impact of modern capitalism
and its intrusion upon
and
challenge to the cultural
traditions of individuals and
nations alike. However,
these later works depart
from the
earlier ones not because they
focus on the intransigence
of
tradition nor the cultural
weight of capitalism. As
will
become obvious, these later
works depart in terms of the
philosophical groundwork and the
political aim Weber
ascribes to the concept of human
struggle in his theory Of
modern politics.
In the

—otestan

t

Ethic essays, Weber begins by

challenging the conventional axioms
of late 19th and early
20th century Marxism, suggesting
that capitalism may, in
part, derive from sources other
than those
of an economic

nature.
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He argues that the development of
modern

capitalism, marked by its penchant for
material acquisition
and methodical self-control, corresponds
instead
to "the

influence of certain of religious ideas... In
this case we
are dealing with... the rational ethics of
ascetic

Protestantism." 36

Specifically, he notes that Calvinism

and its belief in "predestination" exemplify a
person whose

doubtful destiny before an unfathomable God leads him to
create a conviction of spiritual certainty.

He does so by

ordering the material world in a way that utilizes the
"objective results" of his labors as "proof" of possible

salvation from God.

Weber explains,

"The moral conduct of the average man,"

"was thus deprived of its planless and
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unsystematic character and
subjected to
for conduct as a whole ." 37

a

consistent method

Weber claims that such religious
beliefs unveiled
before the world more than an
ascetic person who, by melding
labor and ethical limits on
consumption, spurred the
'productive investment of capital."
Ascetic Protestantism
also revealed "an historical
individual,"

one who "had grown

up in the hard school,

calculating and daring at the same
time, above all temperate
and reliable, shrewd and

completely deovted to ... business
opinions and principles

."

38

,

with strictly bourgeois

The location of this

"individual" at the crux of Weber's
argument in no way
diminishes the historical gravity of
either ascetic
Protestantism or the development of modern
capitalism.
Rather, it both confirms the multi
-dimensional quality of
the "Protestant Ethic" essays and
highlights the role of

struggle in cultivating an individual within
what Weber
calls "the tremendous cosmos of the modern
economic order."
The underlying struggle is evident when Weber
denotes
[t]he most important opponent" of a person
to be "that type
of attitude and reaction to new situations
which we may

designate as traditionalism ." 39
any person who,

By traditionalism he means

"'by nature,'" wishes "simply to live as he

is accustomed to live."

This includes Martin Luther and his

authoritarian notion of "Beruf," Catholics and their faith
in the Church's lax control of human conduct,
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the feudal

patriarch and his tendency
to privilege contusion
over
production..
According to Weber, the
ascetic who battled
tradition thus cultivated
"an unusually strong

character"

defined by "clarity of vision
and ability to act," a uni
que
character that "acted powerfully
against the spontaneous
enjoyment of possessions ... the
irrational use of wealth.-"
In this sense, the source
of human struggle corresponds
to

the formation of an historically
specific individual, and
its purpose is to contest
the cultural traditions which
impede the individual's
self-regulated and calculated

conduct
As this historical struggle
continued, however, the
individual who was so integral to
the advance of modern

capitalism developed a more "formalistic,
hard, correct
character." The individual's regulation
of passions,

appetites, and the natural world for the
sake of producing
evidence of divine election led him to
renounce, ironically,

even religion itself "as a means of drawing
people away from
labour in this world ." 41 For this reason,
Weber's

illustration of the struggle against tradition uncovers
the
conditions for the possibility of the material advance
of

the modern individual.

But insofar as this fight with

tradition results in both the increase of material wealth
and the decrease of religious convictions, it also discloses
the conditions which make possible the spiritual demise of
the modern individual
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With this latter development,
the Protestant
essays indicate another source
of human
struggle.

Rt

-h^

In

addition to the challenges posed
by tradition, the ascetic
Protestant had "to combat" both
"a feeling of unprecedented
inner loneliness" and a
"dependence on external
things."

On
these psychological battles
allowed him to
order the natural world, not for
his own vain indulgences.
but for God's glory and the
prospect of salvation in an
after-life.
On the other, they provoked a
conduct capable
of producing and accumulating
an enormous sum of material
possessions, which, according to Weber,
gradually lured the
Protestant's attention away from his
belief in divine
predestination.
Such tensions defined a "continual
struggle
with the problem of the secularizing
influence of wealth, »
the one hand,

one evident in the banishment of
religion's "irrational"

beliefs for the individual's "rational
planning" of the
natural world 42
.

Finally,

as a result of this spiritual renunciation,

Weber foresees the possibility of a human struggle
aimed at
modern machine capitalism. His view of this "cosmos"

posits

an historical condition by which an individual's
conduct

cannot directly be related to the highest spiritual and

cultural values, or when... it need not be felt simply as

economic compulsion, the individual generally abandons the
attempt to justify it at all

." 43

The individual, who first

spurred modern capitalism with a religious desire for
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objective results" and
"temperate self-control,"
loses his
ethical orientation in
relation to capitalists
increasingly
productive technical prowess.
"

"The most important
functions
of everyday life of
society," Weber notes,
"have come to be
in the hands of
technically, commercially,
and above all

legally trained government
officials."**
if one hopes tQ
buck such a trend towards
"disenchantment" and gain back
a
degree of cultural vigor,
clarity of vision, and a
modicum
of autonomy, then one
must reorient one's conduct
toward a
value other than that of
economic
compulsion.

Weber in no way advocates,
therefore, a specific type
of struggle against
capitalism, especially
not a class

struggle pitting workers against
the owners of capital.**
He merely suggests that if
individuals fail to infuse their
lives with ideals as provocative
as those of ascetic
Protestantism, then of the modern
world "it might well be
truly said: 'Specialists without
spirit, sensualists without
heart.

'”**

'This forewarning stresses more than
just the

historical sustenance of an individual
whose normative
aspirations inform the rational design of
his earthly
conduct.
It further implies a possible source

of contention

between individuals guided by spiritual ideals
and economic
institutions fueled most effectively by well-disciplined

and

mechanical procedures
Though his Protestant Ethic essays fail to describe
how
an individual combats the dehumanizing attributes
of
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capitalism, a year later
Weber illustrated such
a deed in
his writings on the 1905
Russian revolution. Weber
was an
active observer of Czar
Nicholas II- s leadership
of the
Russian nation, for, as
Marianne Weber notes, he
was
concerned with "the possible
consequences of the Russian
Struggle for liberation for
his own people.""
two
separate essays he chronicled
the events, the participants,
and, most important, the
ideas comprising Russia's
attempt
to change from a provincial
autocracy to a constitutional
democracy built on Western European
ideals.
Besides his
attention to historical detail,
what is apparent in both
essays is Weber's interest in
the Russian "freedom struggle"
(Freiheitskampf)
which took on both the tradition

m

,

of

agrarian communism and the advances
of modern capitalism.
In his first account,

"Bourgeois Democracy in Russia,"

Weber contends that if Russia hopes
to succeed in
revolutionizing its national culture, it

first must be

willing to fight for the ideals underlying
such a project.
He assumes those ideals to be the
liberal concepts
of

democratic individualism, the once-universal
convictions
with which. he believed Western Europe had grown

sated and

bored.

With Russia, however, he views the mix of such

archaic'" traditions as "agrarian communism" and Czarist

police absolutism" with the unsettling advances of

capitalism as a formidable barrier to the cultivation of
these ideals.

According to Weber, Russian tradition sought
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to

perpetuate "the village commune
-ideal,-., obtaining i„
varrous ways "not economic
selection of the efficient
in the
'business-

sense, but -ethicalequalization of

opportunity

Russia's commitment to the
ideal of
community symbolized the
primary obstacle hindering
democratic, individualism, and
for that reason the former's
demise was the primary task
of any proponent who
championed
the latter's ideal.
In addition to this communal
conviction,

Russia's
experience with modern capitalism
promised "uniformity of
the external life-style by
means of
'

standarization' of

production.

Weber criticizes this development
on the
grounds that "[e]very precaution has
been taken to ensure
that democratic individualism does
not enjoy unrestricted
growth.
The case for democratic individualism
required
a vigilant fight to fracture what
Weber saw as "the empty
shell for new serfdom, » a phrase referring
to the modern
proclivity to pacify persons through the
dispassionate ranks
of bureaucracy.

Given such obstacles, therefore, he affirms

"the struggle for such 'individualistic' values"
as a

countermeasure against both the despotism of agrarian
traditions and the material abyss of modern capitalism.

Weber also argues that the thrust of a "freedom
struggle" ought to target at least two manifestations of

tradition and capitalism in Russian political life.

The

first involves "fighting against both bureaucratic and
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Jacobin centralism

while the second entails
"working at
the permeation of the masses
with the old individualistic
,

"

basic idea of the 'inalienable
rights of man.'"- Battling
the Russian bureaucracy, which
gained its force as the
Czar's administrator and fortified
itself with rational
techniques, necessitates a degree
of human idealism able to
endure bureaucracy's affinity
for "outward violence" and
oppose its myopic fixation on
"material interests." The
same is true regarding the cultivation
of differing ideals,
insofar as Weber posits that "'
[democracy' and
'individualism'

..

.point as clearly as they can in
the

opposite direction" from the "'material
condition' of the
environment" which "renders the masses
51
'compliant.'"

in

both cases, he specifies a notion of
struggle that not only
sustains the prospect of democratic and
individualistic
ideals in Russian politics, but generates a
durable force
that can oppose Russia's brush with bureaucratic
capitalism.

With his follow-up account of the 1905 revolution,
however,

"Russia's Transition to Pseudo-constitutionalism,"

Weber is quick to point out the hardships hindering the

possibility of such "freedom struggles" in Russia.

Noting

rampant police crackdowns and the Czar's gift of mere

nominal liberties, Weber argues that Russia's fight for

democratic individualism mutated into a conflict defined,
not by idealism, but by violence for the sake of violence.
He designates Czar Nicholas II'

53

s

"October Manifesto," which

affirmed civil liberty, an
extension of the vote, and
legislative power for the
Imperial
Duma,

behind this alteration.

it

as the catalyst

was not the quality of
the

ideals espoused by the
manifesto, but the way the
Czar
Played "a game of tag with a
nation's political liberties
by holding them out to it
as one holds out a ball
to a child
and, when it reaches for
them, making them disappear
behind
your back."
Such political "insincerity,"
notes
Weber,

along with the police repression
aimed at resentful Liberal
Democrats, Socialists, and peasants,
exhibited a total lack
of ideals beyond that of
the "self-preservation" of the
Russian police state.
It confirmed why Weber thought
Russia's "freedom struggle" had become
"a continuous,

unrelenting struggle, with the wild deeds
of murder and
merciless acts of tyranny in such numbers

that even these

horrors finally become accepted as normal." 53
What becomes apparent in this latter analysis
of
Russian reform is Weber's attempt to draw a
distinction

between two types of human struggle.

In one case,

he

maintains that Russia's fight for freedom, its
"uncompromising 'idealism" and "relentless energy," mirrors
such great struggles in history as the age of Charles

I

the 1848 Frankfurt Parliament.

Weber

Yet,

in another case,

or

declares that "the Russian freedom struggle reveals few of
the features of 'greatness', as usually understood,

to

arouse the emotions of the uncommitted observer." 54

He

54

justifies this claim in two
ways: first, by virtue
of the
Russran state's quashing
of democratic and
individual
ideals; and, second, by
reason of the lack of
"really -great
leaders'" on both sides
of the Russian freedom
struggle.
Indeed, by fighting
against "police absolutism"
rather than
for "individual 'liberties,'"
the nation "had inevitably
to
consume so-much strength in
mere 'tactics', and place
so
much emphasis on 'technical
party considerations',
that

scarcely any room was left
for 'great leaders'.
One cannot
accomplish great' deeds against
vermin." 55 i n the
aftermath of the Russian revolution,
Weber thus perceived a
human struggle noted for its
leaderless and wholly
instrumental drift, a fight far
different from the one
guided by individual convictions,

calculations, and freedom.

These chronicles of the 1905 Russian
revolution say
many things about Weber's notion
of human struggle and its
place
his theory of politics.
The

m

same is true of his

P rotestant Ethic thesis,

which points to the possible

religious origins of modern capitalism but
uncovers, too, an
individual's constant battle with tradition
as much as

machine capitalism.

in both projects,

Weber's idea of

struggle presupposes the existence of the modern
individual,
a category derived from neither the traditional
a priori

foundations of divine right or natural law nor the economic
axioms of modern capitalism.

Instead,

such an individual

emerges from a constellation of historical transformations,
55

the most pivotal of which
is the incongruous mix
of a
person's spiritual disposition
with the world's material

institutions.

This depiction of the
individual, which
corresponds both to the ascetic
Protestantism

of the West

and the revolutionary deeds
of the Russian nation,
marks the
philosophical ground of Weber's
notion of human struggle.
nlike liberalism s fixation
on natural origins, Marxism's
fetish for material interests,
and even his own youthful
belief in "primitive" idealism,
Weber's individual departs
from a desire to change one's
personal beliefs and worldly
institutions.
Conversely, it suggests an apparent

lack of
any clear teleological aim in
his notion of human struggle.
If an aim underlies Weber's
notion, moreover, it
appears
the political possibilities human
struggle
affords an individual in the modern
world.

m

First,

P rotestant Ethic and

in the

Russian revolution essays, the

political aim of human struggle corresponds
to the
cultivation and maintenance of "'individualistic'

values."

But more than just aspiring towards a
set of ideals, human

struggle directs its energies against the
institutions of
tradition and capitalism, defying the "leisureliness"

of the

former and the despiritualized "iron cage" of the
latter.
This melding of human ideals and institutions indicates
more

than Weber's ties to the intellectual legacies of

Christianity and European Liberalism.
well,

It discloses,

as

his view of the location of politics, a place in which
56

power and greatness can be
gained only by those
individuals
who struggle to advance
their ideals wrthin
institutions
that, in turn, threaten
such ideals with annihilation.

Maintaining this intersection
between a person's ideals
and
institutional means represents
one aim of Weber's idea
of
human struggle, an aim meant
to promote only the
possibility
rather than the certainty of
democratic
individualism.

From 1902 until 1907, Weber
thus theorized a notion of
struggle posited on a belief in
the individual, altering his
earlier perception of the term by
placing the individual
within the theological context of
ascetic Protestantism. At
the same time, his concept of
struggle underscored the
historical weight of tradition and
capitalism, allowing him
to augment his initial identification
of struggle vis-a-vis
the German nation-state to include
political parties,
trade

unions,

and other types of bureaucratic
organizations.

The

significance of these theoretical shifts
lies not so much in
Weber's concern for individuals and institutions,
for these

ideas,

as such,

carry over from the East Elbe studies.

More

significant is the extent to which his idea of
human
struggle marks both a broadening of the philosophical
ground
of individuals and a narrowing of its political
direction to

the rational confines of institutions.

In this way,

Weber's

idea of human struggle foreshadows a formidable tension in
his theory of politics, a tension between individuals and
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institutions as the chief
source and purpose of
struggle in
the 20th century.

L eadership and Res
p onsi

h-i

l

-i

i-y

During the last few years
of the 19th century
and the first
several of the 20th century,
Weber fixed his gaze on
the
lunctures between individuals
and rationally organized
institutions.
He even went so far as
to include
himself

among "'individualists' and
supporters of -democratic
institutions" whom he believed
"must swim -against the tide'
of material constellations."This battle with the
impersonal techniques of machine
capitalism stems from
Weber's views of both the widening
expanse of individual
ideals and the narrowing domain
of political
institutions.

Consequently,

these two perceptions not only
buttressed his
theory of human struggle; they
demonstrated, too, the extent
to which he understood both as
being equally important in
sustaining the prospect of politics in
the modern world.
In the ensuing years,

however,

those following the

outbreak of the First World War, Weber
shifted his gaze away
from the tension between individuals and
institutions,

focusing instead on the latter half of this
couplet.

Leading him in this direction were disputes he
had with the
German bureaucracy, the German Supreme Command,
and the

Hohenzollern monarchy

.

The source of such disputes

concerned the inability of each particular group to provide
58

"

Wilhelmine Germany a leader
who could promise the nationstate an opportunity for
greatness in its struggle with
the
world s "Great Powers
.

Regarding the bureaucracy's
active role in foreign
policy, Weber contended in
his Frankfurter Zeitung
articles
that any such official "must
remain outside

the struggle for
power" since "his sense of duty
to his office overrides his
individual wilfulness."” In his
1919 "Vocation" lecture,
moreover, he contested the leadership
of the German Supreme
Command, arguing that their ultimate
aim of European

domination- "has shown us just how
much inner weakness and
ineffectuality are concealed behind this
grandiose but empty
58
pose M
Lastly, in his 1917 brochure "Suffrage
and
Democracy in Germany," Weber challenged
the "emotional
qualities" of Wilhelm II 's leadership, a
monarch who
"compromise [d] the nation's political position
for decades
to come by excited and incautious telegrams
and

speeches." 59

Given these "inner" limits of German

leadership, at a time when it had "to resist the
inundation
of the entire world" by England and Russia, Weber,

like

Machiavelli in The Discourses, relied on the institutional
rather than individual traits of human struggle.
It is important to note that this change in Weber's

view in no way represents a conscious disregard on his part
for the principles of democratic individualism.

As his

writings from this period indicate, Weber still acknowledged
59

.

an individual who "can
only feel himself subject
to the
struggle between multiple
sets of values.- what
changes
is the degree to which
he perceives an individuals struggle
from the angle of Germanys leadership void,
allowing him to
claim that. "the only persons
with the training needed
for
political leadership are those
who have been selected in
political struggle " 61 Granted,
Weber was always
interested in the sources of
German national leadership, at
least as far back as his East
Elbian investigations. But
after 1914 his works tend to
neglect the "primitive
idealism" and "the complex interaction
of ... historical
factors" which he believed, previously,
qualified
individuals to assume leadership of
the German nation.
They
note, instead, Weber's belief
that human struggle ought not
to occur between individuals and
institutions but solely
within the political institutions of
the nation-state,

restricting individual aims within a
parliamentary design.
It should come as no surprise that
this variation
in

Weber's understanding of human struggle
occurs during the
last years of Germany's disastrous involvement
in

the First

World War.

Again in "Suffrage and Democracy in Germany," he

argues on behalf of democratic individualism, asking
the

war-weary nation-state to relinquish its attachment to the
Prussian three-tiered voting system and grant "equal voting
rights" to all individuals

62
.

The reasoning behind this

claim rests on Weber's belief that an individual "for once,
60

IS not

.considered in terms of the
particular professional
and family position he
occupies, nor in relation
.

.

to

differences of material and
social situation, but
purely and
simply as a citizen
He thus inscribes all
individuals
with "the equality of certain
fates," the benefit of
which
plays itself out in the reform
of aristocratic party
structures, the arrest of an
encroaching
bureaucracy, and

the selection of national
rather than class-based
political
leaders.
As Germany faced defeat
by the Allies and strife

among its citizens, Weber
pushed democratic individualism
in
the guise of equal suffrage,
believing it "expressed] the
political unity of the nation
(StaatsvolJc) rather than the
dividing lines separating the various
spheres ." 64
Underlying this defense of equal voting
rights,

however,

is something other than Weber's
advance of

democratic individualism.

As his argument unfolds,

it

becomes apparent that the individual
also represents an
instrument designed to advance the unity
of the German
nation-state
its time of military and political ruin.
Weber posits an individual who neither

m

"demand

[s]

only

freedom from the state" nor "intervenes directly
in
politics."

In fact,

he posits an individual whose

"equality" derives directly from the modern state, which

grants individual citizens "sheer physical security" in

return for "the battlefield on which to die

."

65

By

entrusting individuals with the vote, he promises them at
61

least -a minimal right
of codetermination
in the af£airs
the C ° mmUnity " 3 C
the institutional
confines of the German
nation-state. But more
explicitly
"
lnte9rati ^"
^to these confines, Weber
promises'
Germany the means by which
individuals ar0
'

—

^

-

^

utmzed

^^

purposes of regulating
human struggles and
advancing
national unity.
If Germany chose to
do otherwise, he
concluded, -the energies
of the masses would
then be engaged
111 3 StrU39le
gainst a state in which they
are mere objects
which they have no share. 1,66
Insofar as Weber would
transform individuals into
agents of German unity with
the
ne balTnty
Dallot he thus situates the
prospect of human struggle
within the institutional
parameters of democratic
parliamentarism.
Between April and
June of 1917, Weber explained
this position further in his
Frankfurter Zeitung articles,
together entitled "Parliament
and Government in Germany
under a New Political
'

Order."

argues many points in these five
essays.
them is his claim that Germany's

He

Prominent among

"prime task... is to ensure

that the soldiers come back to
find that it has already been
made possible for them to elect their
own representatives at
the ballot box and through them
build anew the Germany whose
existence they preserved." 67 Hence he
failed to locate a
struggle among individuals in the East
Elbian estates, in
the market place of machine capitalism,
or on the streets of

62

revolutionary Russia.

if anywhere,

he believed it raust
occur within the narrow
confines of parliamentary
politics.
In support of this
claim, Weber first
attacked
"Bismarck' s Legacy- on the
grounds that it perpetuated
-a
nation accustomed to submit
passively
He again castigated
the "Mule by officials"
for having "failed utterly
whenever it dealt with
political questions." And
he
contested the Prussian Diet by
virtue of its desire to
"obstruct the development towards
parliamentarisation.
.

••

"

But

more directly, Weber bolstered
his claim by establishing
"parliamentary conflict" as "the
given palaestra" of modern
politics, noting "there is nothing
of equal value which can
replace such struggle."” This
notion of parliamentary
politics- -with its electoral,
committee, and leadership
struggles- - represents Weber's challenge
to Germany's
traditional political arrangements,
ones that hindered any
prospect of universal suffrage.
It also demonstrates how he
invites all individuals, regardless of
tradition,

modern arena of human struggle, underscoring

into the

a belief that

they are "actively involved in shaping
the politics" of
post -World War I Germany.

Weber's thesis in the "Parliament and Government"

project continues to stress, therefore, his undying
commitment- to the modern individual.

Yet,

more than pushing

individual voting rights, Weber's argument champions

political institutions based on a parliamentary design, in
63

which "great problems
are not only discussed
but are
conclusively decided there."one result of such
institutionalized struggles,
in which people are
exposed to
discordant interests,
ideals, and strategies,
is the
development of a "training"
ground for the purpose
of
producing national political
leaders.
Conversely,
the

trained in parliament
must measure up before
the
voting masses, whose
function it is to "select"
the
politician most capable of
leading Germany out of its
own
anti -democratic morass.
The individual's task
of selection and
parliament's
function as the site of human
struggle together reveal the
“machinery" by which Weber
sought to avert "the possibility
that emotional elements
become predominant in politics."™
With these tools, he advances
both individualism and
parliamentarism, but only insofar
as the latter harnesses
the former by virtue of
universal suffrage, squelching
any
vam or selfish impulse that derives from
the human
struggle.
Each function verifies, as well,
the extent to
which Weber believed, especially
near the end of the First
World War, -that the vital interests
of the nation take
precedence even over democracy and
parliamentary rule ." 71
Neither the advance of the modern
individual nor the push
for parliamentary democracy marks
the ultimate conviction
informing Weber's theoretical project
of politics.
Instead,

such "technical changes" formed a
restraint on "street
64

^

democracy" and a
consolidation of "the
struggle for power "
fueling his oonviction
the German
ltS lmPSndln3 defe
«' "has a decisive say" in a
world with
other great nation-states.

^

By anchoring the
individual to parliamentary
institutions, Weber
circumscribes the range of
human
struggle within the German
nation-state.
The struggle of
persons against or outside
of such an organization,
he
surmises, signifies a blend
of politics comprised
of civil
"'anarchy, » an "'authoritarian
state,'" and a "democracy
without a leader."
January of 1919, Weber
lectured in
Munich on the "qualities"
required of those persons who
chose to struggle within
the institutional confines
of the
nation-state, titling it "The
Profession and Vocation of
Politics." Before an audience
of the Freistudentische
Bund,
a group of leftist
students whom he had first met
at the
1917 Lauenstein congresses 72
Weber argued that "to feel
passion" for an ultimate cause
"is not sufficient to make a
politician unless
.responsibility for that cause becomes
the decisive lode-star of all
action." 72 His support for
this claim stems as much from
an aversion to the irrational
drifts of the masses as it does
from a desire for leaders
capable of advancing a cause like
German nationalism.

m

,

.

.

First,

Weber defends his claim concerning
"responsible"
leadership by positing a division between
individuals
who

live "'from'" politics and those who
live "'for'" it.
65

He

regards the former, a
party boss who struggles
politically
for monetary reasons,
as "an absolutely
sober man" lacking
"firm political 'principles,'"
whereas the latter takes
part
rn the struggle with
"passion, a sense of
responsibility
judgement
Based on this distinction,
he affirms the
qualities of the politician
rather than the party boss,
because the politician links
his passion for a cause
to a
perception of himself as burdened
with any consequence that
corresponds to the advance of
that cause.
By using
"judgement" to discern passion
from responsibility,
the

politician is also better apt
"to overcome a quite trivial,
all-too-huraan enemy which threatens
him from

within: common

vanity,

the mortal enemy of all
dedication to a cause and
of. .distance to oneself."insofar as an individual
unites as well as discerns
passion and responsibility, Weber
thus concludes that one can
"achieve that powerful control
over the soul which distinguishes
the
.

passionate politician

from the 'sterile excitement' of
the political amateur ." 76
In addition to differentiating
the politician from the
party boss, this quality of responsibility
allows Weber to
underscore another, more problematic division
between
leaders and citizens. Without a sense of
responsibility,
and enough judgment to detach one's ideals
from "the

realities of life," a person's "striving for
power.

.

.becomes

matter of purely personal self-intoxication
instead of
being placed entirely at the service of the
77
a

'cause'

66

II

Responsible leadership in
a struggle is
quite distinct from
hat Weber terms as the
"'occasional' politician,"
the
majority of individual
citizens whose profession
and
disposition precludp
j
__
fj
vq
P eciude fixed commitments

to some cause.
«
We
are all 'occasionalpoliticians," he says, "when
we post
our ballot slips or
express our will in some
similar way,
such as voicing approval
or protest at a 'political'
meeting, making a 'political'
speech and so on.’* The
implication of this difference
between leaders and citizens
is not that the latter
are necessarily "irresponsible"
and,

thus,

incapable of partaking in the
human struggle of modern
politics.
it is that they, unlike
"responsible" leaders,
are ill-prepared to accept
the "paradoxes" issuing
from a
mix of ideals and deeds, and
thus are incapable of enduring
"the diabolical powers at
work" in any political
struggle.

Given this rendering of responsibility,
it appears as
though Weber views human struggle
as involving only a
limited number of individuals
within the political
institutions of the nation-state.
Indeed, from the First
World War until 1920, he viewed the
prospects of human
struggle largely in terms of its capacity
to foster a
"nation of masters" Herrenvolk who
can
(

)

"thrust their hands

into the spokes of the world's
development." 79

question concerning that which constitutes

a

But the
"master"

capable of battling others for the destiny
of a nation-state
goes to more than just the issue of responsible
leadership
67

in modern politicc:

T

t-

3°es to the issue of
politics
WSber S thSOretiCal
Project, a politics
employed by
select persons to
advance neither the
ideals of human
freedom nor the chances
of human struggle,
but mainly the
power of the German
nation-state.
'

“

'

tension first became
obvious in "Suffrage
and
Democracy in Germany, when Weber modified
what was an
historically derived individual
into a state-designated
agent of national unity.
Here was an individual
whose
ballot slip" promised
German social order in
return for
limited access to the
struggle of politics.
in his
"Parliament and Government"
essays, too, Weber's
allegiance
the German nation-state
was apparent insofar as
"the
given palaestra for the
modern politician" marked
the
institutional boundaries of
human struggle.
Human struggle
was to function like a
"machine, « he said, producing
national political leaders
within a highly disciplined
and
hierarchical parliamentary design.
By the time he arrived
at his position in the
"Vocation" lecture, Weber's notion
of
human struggle revealed an unique
individual.
Unlike the
"emotional" masses or the "unprincipled"
party functionary,
this individual was "responsible"
enough to lead other
individuals through the ethical labyrinth
of politics in the
name of some ultimate cause. What
these works confirm,
therefore, is a pattern of thought
by which Weber alters the
individual and institutional components
of human struggle,
68

transforming a once-contingent
battle between both
components into a political
tool or
of German national
^
order.
During the last six
years of his life,
Weber's
Political thought also
signified the extent to
which he
gradually ignored the
individual as the chief
source of
human struggle.
By positing both the
indrvidual conceived
by the modern state
and institutions
contrived to marshall
human struggle, his
theory of politics leaves
little chance
individuals- -other than
those capable of
"responsible"
leadership- -might advance
their convictions in a
political
struggle.
Hence his theoretical
project of politics

exemplifies what he himself
called the "'principle of
the
small number'
suggesting a notion of struggle
limited to
select persons within
specific institutions,
persons who
adhered to particular ultimate
convictions.
In these later
works, Weber made it clear
that such convictions
concurred
with the German nation-state's
want of unity,
power, and

greatness rather than the
Enlightenment aims of liberal
individualism and parliamentary
democracy.

Politics an d Political Thpnry

Max Weber

s

references to the term human struggle

between 1895 and 1920 reveal the
many-sided meanings it
assumed at different points in his
political thinking. His
Elbian labor studies display a notion
of human struggle
defined,

on the one hand, by an individual
who aspires
69

.

toward the ideal of
freedom and, on the
other, by the German
nation-state' s quest for
historical greatness,
when he
surveys the theoretical
designs of ascetic
Protestantism and
ssian revolution, his
view of human struggle
again
Punctuates the relevance
of the individual
and the nationonly this time he clearly
acknowledges
the inimical

link between the two.

By the time Weber
ponders the
prospects of responsible
leadership in politics,
his idea of
Struggle admits neither
the relative autonomy
of an
individual nor the constant
discord between individuals
and
the institutions of
the German nation-state.
it bares,

instead,

the submission of
individuals and institutions
alike to the aim of German
national greatness, leaving
the

struggle of politics to
those few leaders responsible
enough
to achieve such a goal

Despite these historical
variations, however, Weber's
interpretation of human struggle
maintains a devotion to the
theoretical troika of individuals,
national institutions,
and ultimate convictions.
His idea of struggle assumes
the
existence of a person who, by
nature, history, or the modern
state, is capable of perceiving
as well as promoting a self-

defined ideal in a world increasingly
devoid of values
beyond those of an economic design.
Juxtaposed to this
individual is a web of political
institutions, which Weber
presumes to be rationally organized
for the purpose of
consolidating and selecting individuals
who wish to champion
70

their ideals in the
world.

^

Both

-lent

^

to which his
perception of stru i e
gg
presupposes the
necessity of convictions,
whether they derive
from an

"inarticulate, half
-conscious ur g e" of the
individual or
bend to the "spiritual
proletarianisation" of modern
institutions
In any case, they
reflect the immeasurable
prospects as much as the
material limits of human
stru gg ie,
thus presaging a divide
in Weber's political
thinking.
This divide appears
at those points where
his idea of
human struggle situates
a willful and
passionate individual
relation to the institutional
confines of the nationIt is problematic
in that Weber, over
the course of
some 25 years of serious
political thinking, divulges
a
shifting strategic position
on the theoretical
source and
purpose of human struggle
in politics.
Early on he locates
an individual who,
despite a "political instinct"
that in
"normal times ... sinks below
the level of consciousness,"
typifies a "primitive idealism"
that guides one towards
"the
magic of freedom" and, thus,
the prospect of struggle
against any limit on human
freedom.*” Yet several years
later, Weber tempers this
idealism by requiring the
individual to "take account of
the 'material' condition of
the environment at every
step" and, in turn, qualify
the
contingencies of a "freedom struggle"
with the "permanent
apparatus" of democratic institutions.*
Eventually, with
revolution looming in Germany's
post-war future, Weber grows

m

1
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s

ever-more distrustful
of individuals,
their
convictions, and their

^

9htS f ° r hUman frse
dom.
He th„, WOr u S t0
Secure human struggles
within the

parliamentary rnstitutions
of the German
nation-state
declaring that "popularly
persons who can "create
e a
"

elected" leaders are
the only

riam
clam

to prevent" such

articularism" from
r °m "non-in
getting out of hand ." 82
The problem with
Weber's idea
idee of uhuman
struggle, then,
is not so much
that it fp-iio
^
fails to admit
the political validity
of class conflict,
revolutionary reform
movements or
radical street democracy.
It is that his idea
privileges
over time, the quest
for social order and
German national
unity, despite assumptions
to the contrary about
a
passionate. individual whose
actions and ideas add a
fortuitous quality to thee nni hi n-,i
y
political equation.
Hence Weber
sounds like Machiavelli,
when, near the end of
"The
Discourses," he states "that
all the things of this
world
have a limit...; but those
only run the entire course
[p]

*-

•

i

ordained for them by Heaven
that do not allow their
body to
become disorganized."” The
significance of this problem
shows itself, therefore,
in the way Weber theorizes
human
Struggle with an ever-increasing
nationalist and

authoritarian purpose.

He seems to forget Machiavelli

-

earlier warning in "The Prince"
that fortune "directs her
fury where she knows that no
dykes or barriers have been
made to hold her."”

Though Weber's theoretical project
of
72

politics increasingly
busies itself bv ffa h
y
shlonin 9 national
ideals ar,a
and institutions,
he cannot rid it
of the chief
source of human
struggle--** fortuitous
passions
individual citisens,
politicians, and
political
1S UntlmelY
fSatUre ° f
s ^ ru 99lo also
points to
a probl
Weber- s theory of
politics.
insofar as he
understood early on
that the struggle
•

•

^

“

for freedom, was

tantamount to fostering
the German peoples- "
political
maturity," Weber's thpnrv
politics questioned
y
sp Of the nation-

"their

economic and political
power interests
and their ability...
to place these

considerations

s

In the

^^^

Protestan^thic essays,

too,

when he viewed human
struggle as a check on
tradition and
capitalism, Weber- s
approach to politics found
an individual
whose fight for
possessions left one unable
to give ideals
other than -purely
eudaemonistic self-interest"
the
"significance for culture
and national character
which they
deserve.
Finally, by limiting
struggle to the

institutions of the German
nation-state, his theoretical
project affirmed the extent
to which such institutions,
"in
their function as places
where mass leaders are
selected and
have to prove themselves
as statesmen, are fundamental
requirements of stable politics.-’
each

m

erefore, Weber

case,

theory of politics presupposes
the
historical necessity of human
struggle as well as the moral
s
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instability of modern
individuals
uividuals, the
n,
combination of which
marks a significant
problem.
His theory Of
politics is problematic
in that it hinges
human struggle to
advance the goal of
German national
power, yet it discounts
the multitude of
individuals who can
Possibly constitute that
struggle.
On the one hand,
Weber's
theory of politics
admits struggle by virtue
of its capacity
to elevate individual
convictions, to merge
individuals
within the nation-state,
and to utilize them
for the
selection of national
leaders.
Hence
ce noli,ire operates on
politics
the ground of human
struggle for a specific
purpose, that of
unifying a multitude of
citizens behind the advance
of
German national power.
On the other hand,
his theory of
politics gradually ignores
the source of human
struggle,
insofar as individuals
relent to a self-interested
eudaemonism, conform to the
procedures of parliamentary
institutions, or submit to the
convictions of a select
circle of political leaders.
Hence politics mirrors a
distrust toward the foundation
of human struggle, a
foundation rippled by either
apolitical, indifferent, or
irrational individuals who can
obstruct Germany's prospects
for greatness.
This tension, then, between
the source and
purpose of struggle, exposes the
extent to which Weber's
theory of politics obscures its
aim by equating the advance
of the German nation-state
with the bridling of individuals
and their ultimate convictions.
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^^^

The signif icance of
this problem is
the elitist, specialized,
and undemocratic

theory of politics.

In addition,

^

qualities of his

it manifests

^

_

theoretical disposition
that is anti-political
insofar as
Weber rendered human
struggle a necessity of
politics
At
first Weber' s theoretical
project of politics
acknowledged
the varied possibilities
underlying the modern
individual's
struggle for freedom,
even though they were
offset by the
absolute authority of the
German nation-state. But
as
revolution, war, and civil
unrest saturated his
theoretical
focus, Weber became
less concerned with
individuals and
their boundless convictions.
He instead became more
involved in the design of
national institutions, which
could
delineate the prospects of
human struggle and dismiss
individuals whose ultimate
aims challenged the advance
of
the German nation-state.
His theory of politics
thus
prioritized the goal of German
national power over the aims
of individualism, democracy,
and freedom, altering the
struggle of politics from an
art of the possible into a
mechanism of order.
In this way Weber perceived
politics,
not as an end in itself, but
as an act if not to be denied
then certainly harnessed for the
higher goal of ensuring
Germany a "decisive say" among
other nation-states.
,

If Weber's own theory of
politics is not enough to

confirm its anti-political disposition,
then perhaps the
politics of his theorizing can provide
additional support.
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3 the ° riSt

'

he WaS

——

^

^

convictions, noting
audiences "for whom the
hrsforrcal
nation do not take
precedence. .. over all
questions of the
f0ri” that Sh ° Uld
«* anyone with a
fundamentally
different perception of
these tasks,

l
that

win

arguments advanced
SQ here
nere.

^

^

not he open to the

1,88

He wrote these lines
in 1917,
when military "officials" i-iv T
8
like Ludendorff continued
to push
an aggressive policy
of national conquest,
when
.

"litterateurs" like Treitschke
dismissed the national
efficacy of parliamentarism,
when "socialists" like
Luxemburg invited revolt
against the war-weary
German state.
Even prior to this period,
Weber theorized politics
in a way
that affirmed and advanced
his ultimate goal of
German
national power.
In doing so, he also
contested
the

nationalist convictions of a
"vain" Prussian landowning
class, an "unpolitical"
bourgeois class, and a "vulgar"
and
"politically uneducated" working
class.
These battles
underlying. Weber's quest to
theorize politics thus
suggest

that his project was as much
a push for German nationalism
as it was a rejection of
differing political ideas and the
ultimate aims with which they
corresponded.

The politics of Weber's theorizing
uncovers more than
just a passion for the German
nation-state and his struggles
against his theoretical and political
opponents, however.
It indicates, too, a problem
insofar as his political
thinking seeks to exclude any sort of
challenge that might
76

1

the adVanCe ° f G

opening to the

„

“

^ ^^ ^

national power.

Protestant Bthic „

arxist disciple of
historicai materiausm
yearns for seeing
should qo to

In his 192Q

nHe

he cinema. .whoever
wants a
sermon should go to
the conventicle
e "«
H
e also cautioned
He
his positivistic
colleagues
in the
t-hp o
ln
9
Germa n Historical
School
noting that if one
aspired to "the pure,
pure Platonic
Plato
interest
of the technologist,"
it would ue
be Dest
best to remain "in
the
stillness of the libraryLecturing Qn fche „ v00ation „
of politics, he
even alerted his young
audience
.

-

.

.

.

•

r-

to

Nietzschean trends that
led to -a mystical
flight from the
world,
implying that only those
persons who could he . a
match for the world as
it really is"

were cut out for the
enterprises of politics
and political theory.^
Each case
thus confirms how Weber,
with metaphorical dash
and pointed
clarity, extracts
dissimilar views from his own
project and
disperses them to philosophical
sites that pose little
threat to the power of
the German nation-state.
By expelling the views
of Marxists, scientific
positivists, cultural subjectivists,
and others, Weber's
theory of politics displays
a problem shared by many
figures
in the history of political
thought.
One need only note
Plato's exclusion of poets
from The Republic Rousseau's

restraint on Hobbes in The_Soci
abstract

,

or Nietzsche's

expulsion of positivists from The
Gav Science
inclusion within this legacy of

Despite his

exclusion, however, Weber's
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theoretical project of
politics is unique in
that his
criteria for nullification
derives from a devotion
to the
acquisition, preservation,
and expansion of German
national
power,
as far back as his
Freiburg Address he
understands
his theoretical enterprise
to be "a servant of
politics He furthermore makes
it clear that his
intention
is to

serve,

the day-to-day politics
of the persons and
classes who happen to be
ruling at any given time,
but the
enduring power-political
interests of the nation.-"
For
this reason, Weber's
problematic exclusion of differing
..not

interpretations of politics
illuminates at least one more
element verifying the
anti-political
traits of his

theoretical disposition.
Of his theorizing,

it verities,
verif-iPQ

too,

u
how
the politics

much like his theoretical
design of

politics, narrows the prospects
of each task for the
sake of
ensuring the certainty of the
German nation-state.
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CHAPTER II

NATION AND THE PFRTTQ
RILS nc
° F rmn
1TS "WORLDLY
ORGANISATION"
Intro ducti nn

Max Weber'

view of the German
nation assumes a variety
°f forms rn hrs
political thinking. The
most notable form
appears in his early
studies of the labor
"situation" in
East Elbia.
In those writings,
he conceives of the
German
natron as a "race" of
peoples who "can no longer
adapt" to
the changing economic
circumstances in their
homeland *
Some 20 years later,
as he examines the
likely impact of
parliamentary democracy on
German society, Weber
envisions
war-weary Germany as "a
self-assured 'nation of masters'
(Herrenvolk)
entirely confident in its
outward manner .«
Between these two distinct
views of the German
s

,

Weber,

nation,
in devising concepts
that would later comprise

Ec onomy and Societ
y,

nation as such.

conjectures an "ideal-type" of
the

it is a

theoretical fusion of the

"sentiments of prestige" and
"a specific belief in
responsibility towards succeeding
generations ."
Like his
idea of the human struggle
of politics, Weber's view
of the
nation takes various and, at
times, divergent forms in his
political thinking, what remains
3

constant, though,

is his

undying devotion to the ideal
of the German nation.
I believe this
devotion indicates a parallel between
Weber's political thinking and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's
theoretical task in On the Social
Contract
As a citizen of
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st *“" ° f

;r„;r:
S

«•= «»..<

..

y ° f learnln9 ab ° Ut

affairs, " striving „
t0
ln my research new
reasons ho
i
to love
that of my
country -4 Yet as a
political
Political theorist his
task is more
direct in that, among
other things, he aims
-to examine the
act by which a
people becomes a people.
For this act... is
the true basis of
society.- According to
Rousseau, and
other 17th and 18th
century political thinkers,
human
"nature- signifies the
creative force of a
people by virtue
of nature's "reasonable"
capacity to impart far
more than
selfish impulses and
appetites. • By "contracting
f lnd
,,
.

,

!

•

with
himself," rather than
with "brutish" Hobbesian
others a
person admits to those
passions and liberties which
are
universal and, thus,
integral to the formation
of human
communities
-Instantly," notes Rousseau,
-in place of
the private person of
each contracting party,

this act of

association produces a moral
and collective body...
which
receives from this same act
its unity, its common self,
its
life, and its will."*
The formation
of this "general

will," as Rousseau calls
it, depicts one of the
chief
concerns in his theory of
politics, as much as it informs
his duty as a citizen of
Geneva.
As a citizen of Wilhelmine
Germany, Weber is equally
interested in the formative aspects
of a community of
people.
Unlike Rousseau, however, Weber
dismisses the

philosophical import of human nature
since modernity's
88

scientific prowess tends
to undercut such
5„ r
a universal theme
with empirical evidence >
idence.
He also rejects
Rousseau's
negative rendering of
human
i

interests, desires,

and ideals

insofar as their
individual expression
unifies rather than
divides a community.
Weber instead contends
that the
formation of a people
-notably a national
one-isaues from
what he terms the human
struggle
of politics,

a .'machine., of

guides the voice, union,
and growth of the German
Although he differs with
Rousseau on the source and
direction of human collectivities,
Weber still sha r es
Rousseau's curiosity about
their theoretical and
political
significance.
indeed, Weber's devotion
to the ideal of the
German nation dominates
his view of the world
around him, as
well as it obstructs his
ability to theorize a politics
beyond the' bounds of that
national ideal. 1 "
In this chapter,

seek to do more than reconfirm
how
Weber s theory of nation, and
its expression as the aim
of
German politics, limits the
variety of convictions
I

in the

arena of politics.
of national leaders,

By restricting politics to
the training
the reform of governmental
structures,

and the unification of a
citizenry,

I

believe Weber omits

convictions which might contest such
instrumental political
ambitions.
Moreover, insofar as politics serves
the moral

aim of the German nation,

I

claim his theory of the nation

impedes the human struggles that,
ultimately, promote the
prospect of German national glory.
in fact, rather than
89

spurring the prospect
of glory in the
future, Weber's idea
°f
e natl ° n dlSCl °
SeS
paradox" at the heart
of
POlitlCal thinkin3
arises from the clash
between the morally
absolute aim of the
nation and the
earthly function of
modern politics.
it

"

“

P—ox

'

highlights, I
conclude, an incongruity
in Weber's thinking
such that,
first, his idea of
nation constricts the
"human struggle" of
politics and, second, his
idea of politics defies
the
absolute moral "'good'"
of the nation.
In light of this
framework, I raise three
questions: How does Weber
contribute to the German
tradition of theorizing the
idea of
nation? How does his theory
of politics subvert the
ultimate ambitions he ascribes
to the idea of German
nation?
Lastly, what insights
might such a subversion
provide in
of weighing the enduring
value of Max Weber's
theoretical perspective on
politics?

Pathos and- Nation
In 1909 Paul Siebeck,

publisher of the Archiv fur

Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial Politik,
asked Max Weber to
organize a collaborative study of
the science of political
economy.
After assuming editorial
duties,

and later failing

to receive contributions from
his colleagues, Weber focused
on his own studies, which
subsequently appeared as part two
° f - conom Y and Society

.

Entitled "The Economy and the Arena

of Normative and De Facto Powers,"
it represents an
90

^

exhaustive catalogue of
»ideal- types „ that he
£rom
9rOWln9 lntSreSt
^ nter P r etive
Verstehen) sociology
The purpose of this
cataloguing, some argue
is fc{j define
the bond between
-laws and conventions,
on the one hand, and
the groups that
sustain them on the
other.
with a group
such as the nation,
Economy^nd^oci^ exhibits Weber's
attempt to capture within
an analytical device
the complex
ties between individual
citizens and political
leaders.
These ties are complex
because they designate a
national
community based on the
shared yet mutable traits
of human
emotion and a sense of
responsibility before history.

^

(

,

Detached from his orations
on the East Elbian labor
problem, and not yet
consumed by
the furies of the First

World War, Weber approaches
the -ideal-type" of the
nation
as such from an historical
perspective.
This is clear in
his 1914 preface to Ec onomy
and RnoWy
There he
"proceeded from the view that
the development of the
economy
must be investigated primarily
as a particular phenomenon
of

the general rationalization
of life .- 12

His theoretical

Ideal of the nation as such
unfolds, therefore, along an
historical trajectory that confirms
the ever-increasing

mastery of worldly forces by human
calculation.
Yet this
trajectory, and the analytical devices
to which it
corresponds, imparts something different
and,

contrary to the "ideal-type" of the
nation.

at times,

Indeed,

Weber's

impartial depiction of the nation
posits both a specific
91

a

Kind of "pa thoS " and a
speci£ic sentiment Q£
ltS thSOretical foundation. 13
it indicates,

break from the history
of

^
I

believe, a

»

rationalization" and the
structure of rdeal- types.
Equally important I
think Weber s theoretical
ideal of the natron
challenges hrs
own understanding of the
-.machinery., of modern
politics. 1 *
The postulates of pathos
and solidarity reveal
the
degree to which Weber extends
the German tradition of
theorizing the nation, a
tradition that, ironically,
stems
from the work of Rousseau,
with his 1762 work On the
Contract, Rousseau elicited
responses from
and early- 19th century
German Idealist thinkers who
fixed on
his belief in the ..collective"
ambitions of "privatepersons. As each person
"contracts" with another, Rousseau,
declared, "this act .. .produces
a moral and collective
body,
composed of as many members as
there are voices in the
assembly, which receives from
this same act its unity, its
common self, its life, and its will.-This reference to
the "general will " inspired Herder,
among
"logical.,

1

seve^TTI^^

others,

to

challenge not Rousseau's idea of community
per se, but his
notion of the contract which informs it.
Against this idea
of contract, which Herder contested
on the basis of
its a

prion gesture toward

"the outcries of nature," he posited a

human community on man's "invention" of
language.
charged

m

Thus,

his 1770 "Essay on the Origin of Language,"

[t]he first human thought is...

92

preparation for the

he

possibility Of dialoguing
with others!" 1 * With
this
communal view of language,
Herder rendered
uerea it the source of
national feelings," a traittrait that comes from
"the dark

engender one another,
where an urgent occasion
musters all
the soul," 17

it was this emotional
element in

Herder -s work that allowed
Weber to perceive the
nation in
terms of historical change
rather than man's static
nature.
In his chapter on
"Political Communities" in
Economy
Weber portrays the nation
in terms of a unique
"Pathos" such that it influences
a specific group of
people
However, Weber deviates
from Herder's vision of a
Holkstaat
insofar as he concentrates
on a group's shared feelings
and
not on the "objective"
trait of language that
transmits
them.
In contrast to the Marxian
and positivist tenets of
early-20th century social science,
moreover, Weber argues
that the "fervor of this
emotional influence does not, in
the main, have an economic
origin.
It is based upon
sentiments. of prestige." ' By
"sentiments of prestige,"
Weber means the shared bond between
individual members of a
community, in which each "individual
is expected
1

to face

death

m

the group interest." 19

struggle of life and death,

"

a

Given this "common
political community takes

form around "joint memories" that
often outweigh the more
objective bonds of language, religion,
race, ethnicity, or
economy.
in fact, according to Weber, these
sentiments
93

.

"strengthen the ardent
belief in the
he actual existence
of
one s own might,
and this is important
mportant for
fn positive
selfassurance in case of
conflict..,. Thus
Weber do0s
ground the ideal-type
of nation solely
on the basis of
objective measures.
Rather
ather, he grounds it
on the "enduring
emotional foundations"
nf
ns
of aa o
group of individuals,
foundations that are
prone to subjective
impulse, not simply
empirical measurement

^

Weber also characterizes
the nation as such
in terms of
each individual's
historical "responsibility"
toward the
future of the community.
He perceives the
source of this
responsibility
that- which
e that
Y to be
coincides with the
sentiments of prestige:
the shared pathos
.

that comes from
"facing death" in the
interest of the nation.
But rather
n merely fortify a
passionate belief in the
right and
might of the nation, this
idea of responsibility
entails a
belief in the perpetuation
of the nation's own
"succeeding
generations
Given this latter belief,
which connotes a
transcendent, other-worldly
depiction of the nation, Weber
claims "great power structures
per se are then held to have
a responsibility of
their own for the way in which
power and
prestige are distributed between
their own and foreign
polities
Indeed this "responsibility
before history"
imparts, not just an added
degree of emotion
to the nation,

but a universal value by
which the nation accrues,
maintains, and expands its power
among other nations.
94

^^

The responsibility
which individuals fegl
uture members of their
community indicates
another aspect
eber,s ide
t aspect is
power
;;.;6 eXPl ° ring
the
"Ethnic Croups" rn
an^asiety, Weber remarks that
"the concept [of
nation]
seems to refer... to
a specific kind of
pathos which is
linked to the idea of
a powerful political
community of
people
Yet, again, he
untangles this link in a
more
precise way in his
exploration of "Political
Communities "
Based on its shared
sentiments of prestige, which
foster a
sense of collective
prowess, Weber maintains
that the nation
strrves to confirm "the
glory of power over other

— —-

-

.

-

communities... the expansion
of power.However, this
struggle for national power
does not necessarily involve
an
aggressive physical conquest
of another nation's
territory.
He notes instead that
it is "usually anchored
in the
superiority, or at least the
irreplaceability, of the
cultural values that are to
be preserved and developed
only
through the cultivation of the
peculiarity of the group."”
This struggle thus involves
the moral and political
depletion of those values that
diverge from the ideal of the
nation itself, such that they
promote either one differing
Ideal or a multitude of competing
ideals.
Hence human
pathos and responsibility more
than clarify Weber's
theoretical design of the nation as
such.
They clarify,
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m

,

too,

the type of absolute
power that is= pivotal
P
to its
longevity in a world
of other nations.
hS natl °n asserts
this power over the
differing values
i s crtrzens
and other nations
with the assistance
of the
odern bureaucratic
state.
"The more power is
emphasized,"
Weber explains, "the
closer appears to be
the link between
nation and state.
his chapter on
"Bureaucracy "
moreover, he defines
the developmental
path of this rule•

i

based and regulatory
machine as one that
inevitably
approaches the modern state.
The state's role in
the
nation s reach for power
thus appears in "its
purely
technical superiority
over any other form of
organization."
It affords the nation
" [p]
recision, speed, unambiguity
knowledge of the files,
continuity,

strict subordination,

reduction of friction and
of material and personal
costs."” The state's untimely
qualities surface, however,
insofar as its superiority
over the nation's opponents
also
risks expunging the human
pathos that forms the basis
of the
nation as such. As Weber
makes clear, the modern

state
"develops the more perfectly,
the more it is 'dehumanized,'
the more completely it
succeeds in eliminating from
official
business. .all purely personal,
irrational, and emotional
elements."
The state is as indispensable
to the nation's
power as it is pernicious to the
emotions undergirding the
nation's design.
It therefore suggests, I
.

think,
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the first

u

of several theorpioretical ^
i

discrepancies involving
Weber's
ideal -type of the
nation as such,
-i

view of the chot,-,
state

/

„
s

reiatron to the nation
denotes
screpancy in that the
"
former's
i-ecnnical superiority"
technical
implies a dismissal of
the latter's "enduring
emotional
foundations
Undoubtedly, he insists
that the "impersonal
and functional purposes"
of the state
"frequently gain an
ideological halo from
cultural values ... which
appear as
surrogates for a this
-worldly or other-worldly
personal
master and which are
embodied by a given group.with
regard to the nation,
though, Weber also
posits the state as
a mechanism that
gradually confines the
human struggles, or
"frictions," which stem from
a multitude of human
convictions.
"A direetdirect road leads," he
says, referring to
^-•h.0
o
—
of
f
he state,
from mere modifications
of the blood
feud... to the present
position of the policeman as
the
'representative of God on earth.'"’"
The state thus
assures the nation both
emotional and ideological
uniformity
among its individual members
in return for a mask of
honor
and integrity. Yet, when
the dispassionate forces
.

.

.

f-

j

.p

of

officialdom make this mask
transparent, the state also
assures the nation nothing more
than a disciplined
"discharge of business according
to calculable rules and
without regard for person. 1,31
'

This discrepancy between the
state's function and the
nation's exalted moral status
points to another
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contradiction in Weber's
political thinking.
i t tends to
surface when the state
utilises the nation
in its own
reach toward greater
power.
Put a different way
the modern bureaucratic
state seeks to advance
more than ^he
nation's power.
Weber
notes,

for instance,

the extent to

which "those groups who
hold the power to steer
common
conduct within a polity"
are the same ones who
"most
strongly instill themselves
with this idealist

fervor of

Power prestige

In view of these
"interested" members,
the state's advance of
the nation's power
represents neither
an entirely technical
nor a wholly national
project.
Such
"status groups" as the
military, intelligentsia,
civil
servants, and politicians
"remain the specific and
most
reliable bearers of the idea nf t-ho
f the state as an
imperialist
*-

power structure demanding
unqualified devotion ." 33 The
nation's power thus derives,
not just from the technical
Vigor of the state per se,
but from those impassioned
groups
who wield the state in favor
of one expressed national
ideal.

It resides,

furthermore, on the perilous
ground of
the modern state, perilous
because the narrow ideals that
inform the methods of the state
defy the broad emotions that
unify the individual persons of
a nation.

Limited by the state's technical
purpose and its most
entrenched members, Weber's theoretical
ideal of the nation
is also bound by its responsibility
to future generations.
The limits of responsibility have
less to do with the
98
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t

e
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v
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„« „ „

metaphysical framework
of the nation
itself
tne nation ° n a

By

:r;rand
1

e

deaCh " and a hist °ry
Of "superiority,
and
xrreplaceability, - Weber
underscores
likeness which will
persist after ,,
their demise."” This
anscendence of the nation's
temporal boundaries in
the
present signifies a
narrowing of the nation's
"sphere of
values."
it narrows this
sphere for
x cne
the sake of a singular
vrew Of the nation's
future: that is, the
perpetuation of
the nation's present
across time.
However, as Weber
remarks, the metaphysical
reach of responsibility
largely
extends from a group of
"intellectuals" whom he
designates
specifically predestined
to propagate
.

^

.

idea.'-

the 'national

In light Qf

tMs

cQntroi Qf

elites,

^

a

^

Weber's idea of national
responsibility operates
from a finite, even
calculated position-a
position at odds
wrth the nation's collective
pathos.
For all its universal
aims, then, the nation's
responsibility toward its future
Citizens is not without its
theoretical incongruities.
Besides its responsibility
before history, its drive
for power, and its union
with the state, the nation's
"emotional foundations" confront
one additional challenge.
That challenge stems from
the theoretical construction
of
human "pathos" itself, which
Weber links to an individual's
duty to face death for the
good of the national
group.
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Yet,

““
“ trata

riV1

,

“

that are '" privile
9ed

^^

citizens

»<

ltS Very

who,

». »««...

p, tSo,.

within a polity and,
indeed,

Whence ."

38

These groups of

according to Weber,

-think of themselves
as
being the specific
-partners' of a specific
'culture,'"
represent the stewards
of the nation's
emotional union
"Under the influence
of these circles,he notes, -the naked
prestige of -power' is
unavoidably transformed
into other
special forms of prestige
and especially
into the idea of

the 'nation.

Therefore,

though he postulates
the

nation as such on the
shared pathos of individuals,
Weber
still situates its fate
in the hands of certain
individuals.
They are individuals who,
because of their fixed
convictions
and instrumental functions
in the state, promise
the nation
the prestige of power as
well as a breach

of emotions.
By predicating the
ideal-type of the nation on
the
groundwork of human pathos, Max
Weber admits to the
individual's integral role in
the nation's "common political
struggle of life and death."
But his theory of the nation
as such also emphasizes
"that it is proper to expect
from
certain groups a specific
sentiment of solidarity
in the

face of other groups.

sphere of values

."

38

Thus,

the concept belongs in the

It is evident from this
theoretical

difference that the emotional basis
which Weber ascribes to
the nation privileges, not
the individual person
100
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SarUy
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bUt th ° Se

t ° S ° f ° thSr
Path
in

-

can best marshall
the
Moreover, insofar as
elite

3r oups consolidate
the nation- s
indrvidual passions,
it
evident that they-and
not individuals-champion
the
feelings concerning
the nation-s sense
of power prestige.
ce Weber s premise
about the "emotional
influence" of the
nation as such confirms
the extent to which
a passion for
glory, power, and
greatness supersedes
differing passions
the nation itself.
x„ other words, it
confirms a narrow
rather than broad
"sphere of values,"
suggesting a type of
politics that is bound
by the 9
anal
nf national
al of
glory and a
restricted idea of human
struggle.

-

The same can be said
about Weber's premise
of the
nation's responsibility
toward succeeding
generations. On
hand, he understands
responsibility to involve a
shared sense of emotional
solidarity between present
and
future citizens.
In this way, responsibility
reveals a
universal bond that verifies
the nation's historical
continuity and political
purpose.
On the other hand, he
perceives it to be a belief
cultivated and maintained by
specific cultural and political
elites who, with the
"idealist fervor of power
prestige," strive to advance the
supremacy of the nation. Hence
"responsibility"
in this

context underscores neither the
universal design of the
nation itself nor the ultimate
end of national solidarity.
Weber's view of the term intimates
instead the calculated
101

aim of the nation
as such
avaxlable to the national

'

wh-ii^
hlle

Clrcum scribing the
values
citizenry.
This means

^

a

dividing line of sorts
runs the length of
the nation's sense
reSP ° nSibility 3 llne
b y Persons whose
zeal for
national power warrants
the exclusion
'

of "irresponsible"
citizens from the nation's
sphere of values.
Accordingly
Weber's premise concerning
the importance of
national
responsibility no longer
foreshadows the nation's
sense of
solidarity.
in fact, it portends
P rcenas a rift
rift- among
citizens and
leaders, a rift which
imperils that nation's
reach for power
in the present and
future.
«_

with pathos and
responsibility as the basis
of the
nation as such, I think
Weber unwittingly affords
an insight
into the theoretical
factors that obstruct
politics and
national glory.
Furthermore, inasmuch as the
nation strives
to feel the "prestige
of power, " he emphasizes
the selfinterested groups that govern
and guide the nation, denoting
simultaneously the aims which
justify restraint on the human
struggles of politics.
Such restraint, however, tends
to

impede the nation's chances
of achieving historical
greatness.
By infusing the nation with
the state's
'•technical superiority," Weber
theorizes the nation on the
basis of something more calculable
than the emotional traits
of a citizenry.
He situates it, too, on the state's

ordering of the nation's emotional
solidarity.
Given this
impassive state function, I thus believe
Weber's ideal-type
102

.

atl °n Slgnifles
at least two
troublesome outcomes
flrSt ° f C ° UrSe
iS
of friction" between
passionate individuals
who, with distinct
ideals, help
Se the
StrU39lS ° f
second is the
y eliminati0n ° f
emotions which ma not
y
aid
h e nation- s
"superiority, and
"irreplaceability, „ but whlch
nevertheless mirror its
impassioned landscape.
Both
outcomes thus demonstrate
the degree to which
Weber- s theory
of the nation as
such presages limited
occasions for both
thS
StrU93le ° f
and the glory of the
nation.

^

^tion

'

'

:7r

^

-

—

^

Race and

m

his 1895 Freiburg
Inaugural Address, Max
Weber
detects a national crisis
more troubling than the
demise of
Prussian authority, the
immaturity of the German
working
class, or the rise in
Slavic immigration,
what troubles him
18 WUhelmine Germany
s self-imposed
curse of "the hard fate
of the political
epigone " His perception of
epigone
derives, in part, from
Bismarck's deft and forceful
unification of a culturally
divisive Germany in 1871. As
a
result of this monumental
struggle, Weber beholds a
nation
in which the taste for
political conflict and new historical
challenges dissipates in the air
of military conquest and
elative social calm. His view
of Germany's "political
epigone" is such that "a peculiarly
unhistorical and
unpolitical spirit seized the rising
generation of the
-

.

'

-
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ema "
f °r

b ° Ur3e0isie

PeaCe '"

59

as it was with
success and thirs

'

BUt

bourgeoisie, Weber-

i»«
s

Wilhelmine citizenry

a rebuke against
the

view o£ epigone includes
the entire
f or whom,

with great naivete

„
German
history appeared to be
over.
The present was the
complete
fulfillment of the past
thousands of years.Given this
depiction of epigone, Weber
suggests that the least
of
Germany- s problems reside
in the structural
shifts occurring
,

in East Elbia.

The nation's problem
appears in the "masspsychological" flaws of its
citizens, who would rather
subject the German nation
to a legacy of dull
mediocrity
than struggle for the
aim of national greatness.

By denoting epigone as
Wilhelmine Germany's primary
impediment to national
greatness, Weber also acknowledges
the principal task facing
Germany.
-we shall not succeed in
exorcising the curse that hangs
over us...," he proclaims,
referring to the fate of epigone,
"unless we discover how to
become something different: the
precursors of an even
greater epoch. "« This transformation,
which for Weber
entails "an immense work of
political education,"
is

important from the standpoint of
his theory of politics, in
that politics represents the
means of cultivating a
community of people.
It is also important with
regard to
Weber's view of the German nation,
since his desire to
transform it into "something different"
discloses a
theoretical concern for the individual.
In fact, Weber says
104

«

that hS

sciences

^ MS

SCh ° lar

^

“leagues

Mo

in the cultural

^

not want to breed
well-being in people
rather those characteristics
which we think of as
stituting the human
greatness and nobility
of our
nature
This concern for the
individual territory of
the German nation i
ssue s from Weber's
view of epigone, but
rt opposes the push
of "this hard fate"
toward political
inertia
Rather, his early
approach to the German
nation
stresses the alteration
of an individual's
"psychological
and physical racial
characteristics" which make
the nation
prone to historical and
political oblivion.
,

.

Max Weber'S desire to
educate the individual
citizen
again reveals an affinity
with Rousseau, notably
the
Rousseau who penned
in 1772
Facefl
with Russian domination,
a group of Polish
citizens
solicited Rousseau's thoughts
on the measure that could
best
foster a sense of national
independence among all

ffleGoverns^p^

Poles.

Like Weber before his Freiburg
audience, Rousseau's response
was direct: "it is education
that you must count on to shape
the souls of the citizens
in a national pattern and
so to
direct their opinions, their
likes, and dislikes that they
shall be patriotic by inclination,
passionately,
of

necessity. "«

This view of education, however,
which

foretold of Polish youth absorbed
in "public" and "physical
activity," deviated from Weber's
idea in that it presupposed
a "natural" person who,
thanks to "private" customs, spurned
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182! work on

SidSS

who,

censured
or reducing "the
union of individuals
in the state to a
contract and therefore
to something based
on their arbitrary
W111S -’' 5 FiXinS ° n
the ''frightfulness
and terror- that
issued from the French
Revolution, Hegel rebutted
his
Genevan predecessor,
charging that -the
individual .. .has
objectivity, genuine
individuality- not by
virtue of an a
prion nature, but because
of -the state- which
-is mind
objectified.
Though Weber clearly
rejects Hegel's
notion of the state as
-an absolute unmoved
end in itself he accepts Hegel's
critique of Rousseau.
it is a critique
that permits Weber to
situate his idea of a
political
education between a willful
individual and a forceful
bureaucratic state.
the Freiburg lecture,
which he titled "The Nation
State and Economic Policy,"
Weber insists that "race"
(Rasse) marks the key
element in Germany's education
of its
zens.
At the lecture's outset,
he expounds a desire "to
illustrate, from just one example,
the role played by
physical and psychological racial
differences between

nationalities in the economic
struggle for existence.""
The struggle to which Weber
refers pertains to the influx of
Slavic immigrants into what was
at that time the eastern
frontier of Germany. They came
in search of work and
freedom on the landed estates of
East Elbia, estates which
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German laborers vacated
for factorv
aCt ° ry h3 ° k
bs ln cities and
towns
n western
Germany.
For Weber the
lntriguing
•

j

,

either by "nature" or

„

breeding

,

„

^^

lving conditions on
the Junker estates.
it is a ..racial.,
difference no less, one
which explains their
willingness
"even to eat grass', in
return for the chance
to work a
Parcel of German farmland.
Such indignities, he
charges,
Issd back
.to onp pnH +->-1^
e same reason,
namely lower
tations of the standard
of living. .. something
which is
either natural to the
Slav race or has been
bred into it in
the course of its history.coupled with a German
reluctance to change the
estate economy for the
sake of the
"homeland,', the Slavs..racial., traits signify
a nation that
endures grave structural
alterations.
Indeed, these traits
"have helped the Slavs
to victory, in Germanys eastern
frontier
.

.

Max Weber-

view of the German nation's
racial
foundation stems from the Slavic
capacity to make "the
fewest physical and ideal
demands on the quality of life."
it informs his belief
that "the two nationalities
differ in
their ability to adapt to the
varying economic and social
conditions of existence."” The
idea of "adaptability"
Anpassungsfahigkeit reflects the one
component which,
according to Weber, the German
race finds wanting.
The
result of this process, he continues,
is such "that one
s

(

)
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that the ViCt ° rious
nationality

is the
e one P o sse ssin
g the greater ability
to adapt itself
to
given economic and
social co ndi t io ns
of life ." 50

J

Given
what Weber sees as
f
the di
differing racial traits
o£ Germans
and Slavs,- the
ability to adapt to
the changing

accumulate

of German farmlands.

More important,

though,

ack of such a
"mass-psychological" orientation
Geman natlon with
not the "disappearance"
its cultural life,
then its submission
to a more
ersatile nation. Hence
Weber's view of Germany's
failure
to adapt to change
in East Elbia
punctuates its passive
racial composition, as
well as it indicates
the chief
deterrent to political
struggle and national
greatness.
The task facing the
German "racial" nation
thus reveals
itself in a willful
cultivation of its citizenry.
i„ other
words, it is an educational
task that seeks to challenge
the
historical fate of epigone,
Germany's racial constitution,
the German citizen's
apathy toward future glory.
"The
question which stirs us,"
continues Weber, speaking to
some
of Germany's most
esteemed scholars, "is not
the well-being
human beings will enjoy in
the future but what kind
of
people they will be."« The
target of this task of
'

••political education," however,

^

is not

"the broad masses of
the nation" but "the
political qualifications of the
ruling

and rising classes."-

Accordingly, it entails the
108

cultivation of "nn7

al maturit y"
among the leadership

n
circles
of the German
bourgeoisie
j-yeoisie anri
and proletariat.
in
short, Weber means
"their araw
9
P ° f the nation's enduring
economic and political
power interests and
their
ability... to place
these interests above
all other
considerations ." 53 Although
A ]fbnnrt
he voices doubt about
the
outcome of this task,
he remains convinced
that immersions
-to the human struggle for
power ..breed., anything
.

-f

,

,

but "a

soft,

eudaemonistic outlook"
within
wicnin the German
r-e
such a political
education prepares a
"leading
the strenuous struggles
of the future," Weber
German nation might have
a chance to alter
its
Up and prospects for

nation

if

strata" for
surmises,

the

racial make-

glory.

In addition to
advocating the maturation
of Germany's

leaders, Weber argues
that the modern state
must act on
behalf Of the German
racial nation.
it must do so, he
continues,. insofar as it
defends German citizens
against the
influx of immigrant Slavs
in East Elbia
Moreover, it must
do so because it reflects
"the worldly organisation
.

nation

s

power.

of the
In this nation-state
the ultimate criterion

for economic policy, as
for all others,

reason of state'.’"*

is in our view

with regard to East Elbia,
Weber

notes the gravity of state
intervention relative to
relieving Junkers of their
authority over inefficient
estates and protecting German
farmlands from foreign
appropriation.
To ignore such a strategy only
nurtures "an
109
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solated domestic economy,"
.
1St “ rbln9!

3

fSelin9 ° f

„

slavic invasion „

^^

homeless ness" across
the eastem
reaches of the Wilhelmine
German nation
„
Prom thg
standpoint of nation,"
he a<5qpn
assertsc with an eye
on the
Prussian aanots,
-large-scale enterprises
which can onl y be
Preserved at the expense
of the German race
deserve to go
destruction.
To leave them to
their own devices
means permitting
unviable colonies of
starving Slavs to come
“to SXiStenCe
gradual parcelling-off
of the
estates
Web er thus concludes
"that the German race
should be protected in
the east," and that
the state "ought
to rise to the
challenge of defending
it" by subsidizing
efficient German ownership
of East Elbian farmlands.
udgmg from the "racial
characteristics" he ascribes
to Germans, and the
"breeding" tactics he thinks
might
correct them, I believe
Weber's early depiction of
the
German nation reveals several
theoretical disparities. The
first of which concerns
Weber's understanding of
race as the
central component of the
German nation. By positing
the
German nation on the basis
of race Weber tends to
highlight
not so much the specific
racial characteristics of
Germans
nor even the Slavs for that
matter.
instead, he illuminates
the racial traits which the
German nation lacks: "the German
agricultural labourers can no longer
adapt to the social
conditions of life in their homeland ." 57
If there is a
racial ground that underlies
his idea of the German nation,
"

.

•

^

^
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thS ShaPS ° f
PrUSSian
owners who ^
privllege
le 9 e
patriarcha]
-r=, h
iai tradition
over canit-ai-i
^
apitalist development,
a
bourgeoisie that prefers
q Pl *
.
If-mterested eudaemonism
to
collective qlorv
y, and a working
class that favors
lifc
1CiSm t0
nat
-e tension i„
e er s idea of
the nation is that
the "racial
t-

4-
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characteristics" of
Gemats confirm a collective
unwilling nesg to adapt
tQ change fQr
the
"homeland."
^
indeed
y indicate a fragmented
nation in
e present whose
only hope for unity,
power, and glory
resides in a speculative
gesture toward the future.
What further
complicates Weber's racial
design of the
German nation is his
understanding of adaptability.
He
perceives the idea of
adaptability in terms of
what the
n race refuses to
do in East Elbia,
notably Prussian
Junkerdom' s aversion to
land efficiency, global
competition,
and the money-wage
economy.
According to Weber, this
lack
of an "ability to
adapt to the conditions
of its existencemarks the most profound
characteristic of the German
race
It is a "tragic"
deficiency, he says, one
issuing from
Bismarck's Caesarist rule,
which "was meant to lead
not
merely to the external,
but also to the inner
unification of
the nation, and... that
has not been achieved."insofar
as it derives from this
milieu and denotes a pivotal

^

-

trait

German race, Weber's idea of
adaptability confirms
the absence of a racial
dimension in the German nation.
Ill

Th,s absence he
again recesses with
negative giances
oward the future,
when the natron
might be better
prepared
o embrace change
and the human struggles
yyJ-es that accompany
it.
s for the
present, Weber's
eoer s racialist
depiction of the
natron simp ly sugg ests
a theoretical
rift between Wilhelmine
many s historical
situation and its potential
disposition
toward change.
It also connotes
a formidable barrier
to
German national unity,
power, and glory.
The tensions underlying
these ideas of race
and
adaptability, however, do
not prevent Weber from
prioritizing the ideal of
the German nation.
For the
ailure of the German
race to embrace willingly
the
structural changes and
human struggles in East
Elbia merely
marks the conditions for
the possibility of
national
greatness.
it also explains
Weber's idea of a "political
education" for the German
nation, the aim of which
is to
render "the specific function
of the leading economic
and
political strata to be the
bearers of the nation's sense
of
political purpose (Sinn)
Yet, educating these
strata
to push for "the social
unification of the nation" exposes
a
tension in Weber's idea of
the German nation, such
that he
again stipulates a select group
of persons to advance a
collective ambition. By stipulating
a "leading strata" as
the source of national unity,
Weber confounds his racial
design of the nation with a
political divide between persons
who consciously guide and those
who simply comprise the
•
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German race
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t-y,-;

„

racial

reding
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SU99SStS anything
about Weber

'

G

-
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it is that

the
explicit political
function of leadership
overrules the
v ^gue and passive
role n
f
t->,
of the citizenry.
other words it
appears as though some
Germans are more racially
raci ,,
sound than
others.

m

political dlvide also
surfaces in Weber's
view of
StatS " hiCh
Reives to be the guardian of
h e racial constitution
of the German nation.
state
ewardship of the racial
nation constitutes a
tension in
Weber's political
thinking since he
designates this "worldly
organisation" as tne
the "final
final and decisive
say in all
questions of German economic
policy.-” Thus neither
race
nor any other cultural
trait or value for that
matter
represents the guiding
force of the German
nation
addition, the state
compounds this tension in
that Germany's
racial ability to change
depends on the state's
power "to
free the economic forces
es of the nation from
their fetters
and to tear down the
barriers in the way of their
autonomous
development
Contrary to the belief that
'

-

,

m

•

it stems from
inner" quality culled from
human pathos, the racial
trait of adaptability
derives from the "external"
force of
the state.
It is a force, in fact,
that orchestrates social
conditions in a way most promising
to the German nation.
ref ore, Weber s view of the
German state supersedes the

an
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racial make-up o £ the
nation, undercutting
the centrality of
race and the political
prospects of unity and
glory
If Weber' s early
perspective on the German
nation
3 eopardizes the
prospect of politics,
there is little doubt
postulate of race is partly
to blame.
On the one
hand, he argues that
Germany's racial traits
promise little
more than a future of
economic anachronisms and
cultural
subservience, especially
given the East Elbia
"situation"
and power struggles with
other nations. This racial
flaw
certainly invites class
struggles, Slavic immigrants,
feelings of alienation and
homelessness among German
citizens, and a fixation
on tradition despite
the advances
of economic rationality.
On the other hand, Weber
argues
that the German race
requires individual rulers
who can
acknowledge and convey to others
the "enduring economic and
political power interests" of
the German nation.
For these
’bearers of the nation's sense
of political purpose (Sinn) "
represent the unifying link
across a German race fragmented
by differing class and cultural
interests, as well as by a
narrowly fixed center of political
and economic power.

Whether it illustrates

a

collective apathy toward historical

change or a mandate for the
cultivation of select
individuals, Weber's race postulate
holds little hope for
broadening the prospects of politics
in the German nation.
His idea of adaptability also
accounts for another
factor that is central to the further
diminishment
of
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politics in the German
nation,
a Ptabllity ifc
iS

when Weber talks
about

—-

means the facility
of the
Ge
German
race to fight in a
unrfred manner tor the
"endurrng"
interests and values
mirrored in the nation.
After all he
the German race
as "imagining that
peace an d harness
He waiting in the womb of
the
ie rutur
future
e, , even though
it
embodies a dying Junker
class . grQwing
and a leadership
vacuum in German politics.
Thus,

-ws

,

^

as with
postulate, Weber alters
the idea of adaptability
when he claims that
Germans must '.become
something
different," yielding -the
dream" of peace and
happiness for
"the strenuous struggles
of the future."
Yet this
alteration fails to include
"the broad masses of the
nation, " whom he thinks
are too often distracted
by their
"struggle with daily necessity"
to appreciate the
magnitude
of the nation' s struggle
for glory.
Rather, it includes
only that "strata" of
individuals who are "mature"
enough to
Sacrifice their mundane
personal interests for the
advance
of the "enduring"
power-interests of Germany.
insofar as
his idea of adaptability
indicates a nation either prone
to
passivity or partial to specific
leaders, Weber's racial
nation again reflects a narrow
scope of political options.
But only When these racial
traits mix with Weber's
quest for a vigorous breed of
citizen does his idea of the
German nation reveal the narrow
scope politics and the
limited reach toward national glory,
witness his idea of
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struct,

only certain persons

to raise themselves
into the hard, clear
air in which
sober work. of German
politicsS ffinnr'
u
louris hes
an atmosphere
which, however, is
also filled with bh
he earn est grandeur
,

national sentiment

“
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The
he nrr.m
problem with this
instruction
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struggles" that advance
the iaeai
ideal of German
ro
national
It is that the
theoretical consequence
of this

presupposition induces Weber
to designate a
.'leading strata"
of citizens to be
the chief political
agent of the national
ideals of WUhelmine
Germany.
The German nation
not so much a shared
racial trait esuch
u

^ges,

as adaptability, but
select individuals who,
because
Cause of their learned
"maturity «
elevate the "enduring"
values of the nation
above all
others.
If Weber denotes such
leaders as best able to
embrace change with a sense
of national purpose,
i

'

his idea of
the German nation defies
both the broad reach of
race and
the variety of values
in politics.

Besides cleaving the nation's
racial foundation through
the elevation of specifically
"mature" individuals, Weber
fragments it further by granting
the state the "final
and

decisive say" in German politics.

After all, it is not the

German race per se-with its
fractious interests and values-that must adapt to the
shifting social structures in East
Elbia.
Nor is it the "leading strata"
who go forth into
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"the strenuous
struggles of the tuture,”
future » pushing
the ideals
of German
national power and
greatness
eatness.
a
Rather, as "the
Idly organisation
of the nation s
power, " the state
orchestrates Germany
racial facult to
y
emhraoe historioal
It
3
does so by encouraging
land sales in the
east
market expansion abroad,
and leadership
struggles at home'.
nsolidating the German
race and

_

/

instructing German
political leaders, the
modern state from Webers viewpoint
represents more than a
vehicle tor
for na
r
national
power and glory.
Ironically, I believe
it represents a
barrier to the human
struggle of politics
and, thus, German
national glory
especially given the states narrow range of
goals and its
decisive control over
the mixed values

of the citizenry.
idea of the German
state thus undercuts his
idea of
the German. racial nation,
revealing how its "worldly
organisation" dispels the
normative scope of the
nationgranduer" and "nobility."

Eerren volk and

NaM™

One onerous bit of history
differentiates Weber- s later
theoretical approach to the
nation from his earlier ones:
Wilhelimine Germany- s role in
the First World War.
Besides
confirming his loyalty to the
German nation, the war
illustrates the extent to which
Weber blames Germany's
political institutions for prolonging
the conflict and
weakening the nation's prospects
of power.
He does not
117

attribute these
institutional flaws to
either
th e specter of
..epigone- or -the
general rationalisation
e-

Rather,

conditions as

:

of

he attributes the
m to the effects of
such
bureaucratic control of
foreign

policy
Provincial party structures,
the lack of responsible
politicians, and the
absence of universal
suffrage
At
1S PreClSe
n ° teS in
-hen the Great War
as reached the stage
where diplomacy i s
raaking its VQice
heard again, it is high
time to do everything
we can to
prevent the old errors
being committed all
over again.. .«
Weber seeks to theorize,
therefore, a way that
allows the
German nation -to become
something different- after
the war,
but he ceases to posit
that project on the
basis of race or
human pathos 64 Hee inqi-oaH
instead attempts to ground
the German
nation on the idea of "
»
Herrenvni
ntizrenvoik,
a community
'

“

^

.

u-

individuals who actively
particinaiP
y pui
ticipate
political institutions 65

of

m
-in

the nation's

.

The role of institutions
in Weber's idea of an
errenvolk is not unlike that
which Rousseau stipulates
in
hiS ”° rk ° n
Governmen t of Polan d.
indeed, Rousseau
advised the Poles that -national
institutions" are what give
'form to the genius, the
character, the tastes, and the
customs of a people ... what
arouses in it that ardent love of
fatherland that is founded upon
habits of mind impossible to
uproot."
The German variant of Rousseau's
approach to
institutions, moreover, manifested
itself in the work of

^
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Fichte

who,

like Herder before
and Hegel after hi
m still
contested the Genevans theoretical
solace in a .-natural..
,

,

P-t.

in 1808,

as Napolean's troops
were occupying parts
of
Prussia, Fichte delivered
his 14
the
311
WMCh
renewal of Germany
on the institution
of education.
education
„
He lectured his
Berlin
audience that -the sole
means of Preserving
preservino the existence
of
the German nation
= n Q nt
at ion. .an
entirely new self.
a universal and
national self" recruireri
equired a total change
of the

“

"

^

MO.^to
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existing

system of education
countered Rousseau-

His idea of education,
however
s as

well as Kant-s in that
it sought to
bridle an individual's
free will for the sake
of one
Platonic ideal.
it replaced an "old
system" with one that
"completely destroys freedom
of will in the soil
which it
undertakes to cultivate, and
produces on the contrary
strict
necessity in the decisions
of the will.Insofar as such
"decisions" concerned the
advance of the German nation,
I
believe Weber shares Fichte's
view of institutions, even
though he rejects the idea
that they be guided by the
"educated classes" of Germany.

Again like Fichte and other
German Idealists, Weber
initiates his exploration of
an Herrenvolk from the
standpoint of what the German
nation lacks near the end of
the First World War.- He
notes in his 1917
"Parliament

Government

articles that postwar Germany cannot
embrace

the "sterile and sentimental
reminiscences of the
119

governmental practices
of the
Lne OJ
old
d regime,"
regime,
nor
Pursue
"any theoretical
search fn 3 5peci£l
'German' form
orm of
the state." 7 ” These
tradxtxons" promise
Germany little
more than
th
a parliament
that
iac torbids
forbid universal
suffrage a
bureaucracy that lauds
secrecy
Cy a m
n
mona
rchy that relishes
y and SdUCated
"'ttterateurs" who belittle
'.
sober
a tempts to move
the nation in a
different direction
In
contrast he charges,
Germany must become
"a 'nation of
masters
(Herrenvolk,
which means a people
controlling the
-

“

“Hy

'

,

'

,

elected representatives
'

° p ltS

shar-incr
Sharin ^

.

leaders

."
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decisively in the selection
•

H is idea of Her
renvoi, thus

ignifies what the German
nation was not up until
the final
years of the war.
It signifies, too,
what he believed were
the normative
aspirations of postwar
Germany.
Max Weber's idea of an
Herrenvolk symbolizes what
Wilhelmine Germany might
become if it undertakes
to
institute certain "political
arrangements" in the present.
If Germany desires
more than administrative
efficiency and
historical mediocrity, if
it wants a "decisive
say" in the
"universal trends" of the
future, then " [t ]he internal
structure of the nation,
including its political
structure,
has to be adapted to
this task ." 77 Inde ed, Weber
argues
further that parliamentary
institutions constitute the most
effective structure for this
task of national reform.
He

supports this claim with his
notion of a "working"
120

parliament; in which cne
the lecri
si
legislature
scrutinizes the
bureaucracy, parties
train the p oliticianSi
politicians
Persuade the masses, and
the masses select
the politicians.
only a working, as
opposed
ve
to
co a merely ftalking
parliament "
he ex P la rns, "can
be the soil in which
which. .genuinely
political
qualities of lsadpr^hi
n can
hip
grow and work their
way up
through a process of
selection
eccion.
n„
By assuring that
rulers
and the ruled "are
actively involved in
shaping the politics
°f their country,"
Weber- s view of the
"machinery" of
parliament' illustrates the
means by which the German
nation
becomes an Herrenvolk.

^

.

Given its potential for
political self-mastery,
however, Weber warns the
German nation

that such a path to

power and greatness features
neither happiness nor
certainty.
Indeed, he contends that
"technical changes" in
Germany- s political structure
"do not in themselves
make a
nation vigorous Uucttig)
nor happy, nor

valuable.
They
can clear away mechanical
obstacles in its path and are
therefore merely means to an
end."- The nation's task of
becoming an Herrenvolk thus
entails, not only "a politically
mature people, " but "the sure
instinct of other nations" who
will challenge Germany's
"decisive say" in world affairs,
in other words, Weber
believes the conversion of a
nation of
"officials" into a nation of
"'masters'" assures Germany
only a chance- -not a guarantee--to
struggle with other
nations for power.
Conversely, "if parliament were
to fail
,
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uncertainty, butt it iso
a future that
signals many more
prospects for crreatnes^
tness i-htan
than anything the
present affords
the Wilhelmine nation.
.p

.

,

,

.

The contingencies of
the future, however,
do not
preclude the German nation
from utilizing a variety
of
political beacons.
In addition to its
parliamentary
"machinery, " Weberns nation
of masters inevitably
relies on
the modern bureaucratic
state for its guidance.

it is not
that the Wilhelmine
German nation lacks the
efficient
services of an administrative
state.
On the contrary, Weber
notes, "we lacked ...
leadership of the state by a
politician
which does not mean a
political genius... nor even
an

important political talent,
but simply anyone who was
a
politician at all.- H is idea
of a German Herrenvolk
requires a particular type of
state, the will of which
reveals neither a monarch
whose authority comes with birth
nor a bureaucrat whose duty
to an office outweighs
his

individual -ideals.

The will of such a state manifests

itself in a politician who, on
account of his parliamentary
training, is more than just
"moved by the political fate of
his people.
This politician, says Weber, "will
think in
terms of the next two to three
generations, even where the
122
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creation o £ new
political formations
is concerned,
since
' SSe are th
Pe ° Ple Wh ° Wil1
what is to become of
25 natl0n '" I The
link between an
Herrenvolk and the
thUS 1SSUeS " either
from an emotionally
or racially
identified group of
people.
According to Weber, who
by 1917
seeks a structural
remedy for Germany's
internal maladies
Xt iSSUSS fr ° m a
SPSCiflC
Of person.
That person is a
Politician, one who
exemplifies leadership
traits that both
blossom in
-F-i^rvn*
or national power
9
and brave the public
scrutiny from the nation's
masses.
.

'

insofar as an Herrenvolk
denotes willf ul persons
who
further their power with
parliamentary "political
arrangements," 1 contend
that Weber g
war
the German nation
suggests a few theoretical
incongruities.
The first involves the
link between the modern
,

^

state and a

nation of masters.

it

is an incongruity in
that the person

whom Weber posits as the
leader of the Herrenvolk
state "is
meant to be something
different," someone who "will
often
make compromises, which
means sacrificing something
of
lesser importance to something
of greater importance."Hence he bases his idea of
the nation state on a
specific
type of person-a politician,
who distinguishes himself

from

bureaucrats, military commanders,
monarchs, and even the
masses.
The politician does so because
he, unlike the other
members of -an Herrenvolk, willingly
endures the human
struggles of politics.
"If he proceeds differently,"
Weber
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stipulates,

referring to the person
who leads the

""

rrenVOlK

iS n °

-ould not Step into
arena where the
problems of the present
are
contested
The German Herrenvolk
thus revolves around
two potentially
opposing premises, one
being that

Ze

politically mature people"
and the Qther
"small

number

of -a

^

a

of leaders who master
the nation.

s people
This difference between
a nation of masters
and a
leader who masters the natinn 0
nation is more apparent,
and
problematic given Germany's
pursuit of
y
nf power
nn
and glory.
POl
1ClanS WSber argUSS
are P e °P!e who "live
and breathe"
[t]he struggle for
personal power and the
acceptance of
full personal responsibility
for one's cause (Sache,
which
IS the consequence of
such power.
Monarchs rarely
struggle for power, he
continues; in fact, they are
typically born into it. He
believes bureaucrats fail to
grasp the nuances of a power
struggle; they instead excel
at
detaching themselves from
such impassioned tasks.
,

to

'

^

'

-

Lastly,

he perceives the masses
as having some degree of
power, but
only in that it takes shape
in "the selection of the
leader"
by way of the ballot box.
In light of the Herrenvolk's
struggle for power, therefore,
a problem surfaces in
Weber's
political thinking.
it is a problem because he
ascribes
this struggle, not to a willful
citizenry, but to a

politician who "uses the means of
mass demagogy to gain the
confidence of the masses and their
belief in his person, and
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thereby gains power

" 81

p Ut
ut- a
a

dl££erent ^y, Weber'
s view
nf „„ e national
pursuit o f power
presupposes more than
just

"

nSCeSSlty ° f

Politicians.

An »errenvolh lso
presupposes the necessity
of a politician's
mastery over the
erman citizenry,
suggesting not a "nation
natlon of masters"
but a
nation of nonresistant
subjects.

e

politician's parliamentary
re P^ration for
preoaret
y P
masterv
moreover, i nd icates
another element of
tension in Weber's
approach to the German
Herrenvol k
„ e ber is quite
clear
about the role of
parliamentary
y politics in th
e
the formation
of
e postwar German
nation.
indeed, he claims
that the
"actual form" of this
democratic structure "will
depend on
- ere political
personalities with the
qualities of
leadership emerge and
what role they play.But Weber's
parliamentary blueprints
involve more than the
restriction
of rts purpose to
the cultivation of
political leaders.
xt
entails an underlying
premise about the limited
nunfcer of
persons who qualify for
inclusion within this
structure
those who exhibit "a strong
instinct for political power"
and potential for
"political leadership".
According to
Weber, -[t]he 'principle
of the small nu^er'
-i

.

.

m

,

(that is the

superior political manoeuvrability
of small leading groups)
always rules political
action.
This element of 'Caesarism'
us ineradicable (in mass
states)."” Judging from this
exclusionary design of politics,
I thus believe Weber
expends theoretical energy
cordoning off a vital portion of
125

.

^
- - -

erman natl ° n fr ° m
the
lntt °
.

“

m° ral

'

"

the

Juggles

—
——

which transform it

expense that diminishes

t he

-

political thinking
Based on these three
theoretical
i
eoretrcal incongruities,
Weber's
,

° f thS

; meaning of
to the
Herrenvolk.

ses a narrow approach

On the one hand, he
claims
that for Germany to
become a "'nation of
masters'" it must
allow a people to
control both the
"administration" of its
affairs and the "selection"
of its political
leaders.
This
ggests politically engaged
persons whose ambitions
ought
to exceed those
mirrored in he endency
^
toward demagogic
persuasion, "'occasional'"
votes
ui_es 01
of public
ni ,hih support,
and
submission to "'a small
nu^er' " of impassioned
politicians.
On the other hand, Weber,
while presaging Germany's
unstable
P twar circumstances, stresses
the necessity "to create
the
organisational preconditions
for the emergence of
leaders,
and indeed everything now
depends on this happening.-If
the German nation "depends"
on these "leaders," and
if they
signify the control of the st^i^
state and the membership of
power
Struggles, then Weber's idea
of Herrenvolk points to
something other than a German
"nation" of masters.
It
points to a political situation
in which the German nation
reflects both a select circle
of "masters" and a sizable
constituency of "followers."

Given_ this contrast between
a nation of masters and the
masters of a nation, I think Weber's
view of the postwar
126

German Herrenvolk
indicafes a consirainf
not the theoretical
contrast itself,

^

however,

constrains politics.

Rather,

^

IS

that

it has to do with
Weber- s aim

to privilege the
political agency of a
"'small number-" of
masters over the
"unorganised mass" of the
nation.
Though
he grants the mass
citizenry control over
both the selection
of leaders and the
ambitions of officialdom,
Weber still
grounds the force of his
project on the lone
politician.
This politician, whose
chief concern is "the
political fate
of his people,"
represents the chief
participant in Weber's
theory of politics- -that
struggle for state power
between

extraordinary personalities.

The individual citizen,

though,

seeks power only to the
extent that trade unions,
party hierarchies, political
persuasion, and the ballot
box
can discipline his otherwise
"emotional" and "undirected
mass fury." Weber's idea
of a German Herrenvolk
intimates a
type of politics in which
an elite group of dynamic
politicians articulate, contest,
and determine the
historical course of the nation.
It also divulges a
national citizenry of persons
whom Weber renders as
incompetent to take part in such
endeavors.
He relegates
them instead to a faceless
plebiscite.
An Herrenvolk thus
hinges, not so much on a politics
that transforms a diverse
nation into masters--as Weber
intends--but on a politics
that requires politicians to
master the nation's citizens.
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A Similar situatlon
Qccurs
parliamentary democracy,

^

1±ght of

which he perceives

view
fc<>

^

^

^

"technical., means for
the advance of German
nationalism
addition to restricting
politics to the confines
of

In

parliamentary institutions,
Weber stipulates an
evaluative
criteria for those
persons who wish to occupy
this domain
He underscores that
when the right person
engages in
Politics, typically -a
cool and clear

m

head... is all the more

command."

From this criteria, others
follow: " (i) the
smaller the number of
those who participate in
the
iberations, and (2) the
more unambiguously
responsibilities are understood
by each of the participants
and by those whom they
lead."short sober

m

judgment,

decisiveness, and responsibility
speak volumes about the few
persons who qualify for
politics in the German nation.
Yet
they also speak volumes
about the "danger" which
parliamentary democracy presents
to German politics," one
which surfaces in a citizenry
"exposed to momentary, purely
emotional and irrational influences."By cordoning off
politics from "the unorganised
mass," Weber bestows the
"political machinery" of Wilhelmine
Germany,
not to a

"'nation of masters,'" but to a
group of politicians who are
quite distinct from the national
citizenry. And insofar as
this distinction warrants entry
into parliamentary politics,
Weber's idea of Herrenvolk reveals
both a constraint on
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pol ”‘°’

™ ”™

»>

master as well as a
nation.

„

it

„«

Judging from these
fixed political
nniiti
options, Weber's
ater view of the
German nation stresses
messes the imperative
of
social order as much
as the push for
national power. After
a X1
thS PreC ° ndltl0n
Herrenvolk reguires more
than
th
the
"emergence of leaders
of ^
Political masters of the
equires what Weber calls
the "counterbalance
to
thS rUlG ° f the
Streets whi oh is so
typical of purely
plebiscitary nations and
so prone
fao
nron^ to momentary
and
irrational influences
xuences 1,87 Re
uo envisions
this
"counterbalance" to be the
machinery of parliamentary
Politics, and it does
more than simply cultivate
•

'

'

^

.

.

the

collective push for German
national greatness.
It limits
the citizen's promise
of power to the ballot
box, in which
party bosses, politicians,
and bureaucratic officials
seek,
in various' ways, to
harness the "dangerous"
desires of the
masses.
If parliament's role
is to limit rather than
extend
a citizen's political
power, then this machinery
can easily
foster the prospects of
German national greatness.
However,
the consequence of this
task manifests itself in a
rigid
order that precludes a sizable
segment of the nation
from mastering its own fate.
Weber's idea of Germany as an
Herrenvolk thus illuminates,
paradoxically, the limited
prospects of politics and,
consequently, the limited
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likelihood of power,
greatness, and glory
for a German
nation of masters "
'

^alue__of Nat inn

Earlier

drew a parallel
between the political
thinking of Max Weber
and thar
T
at of JeanJacques Rousseau.
I stressed
each thinker'ss aesire
desire to explore the
formative
sources of a political
community
like the nation.
y ^Ke
nat-i
Rousseau
perceives that source
ce to ho
be the individual,
who, by virtue
° f 3 " natUral "
"private" disposition,
affirms
the values interests,
and appetites one
innately shares
with other persons.
As a result, he argues
I

““

;

that "the social

order is a sacred right
that serves as a basis
for all the
others.
However, this
is therefore based
on

posits a peoples

right does not come
from nature,- it

conventions.-

Though Rousseau

formation on the a priori
ground of
nature," he still seeks
social order through the
use of
human artifice: i.e.,
sovereignty, law, government,
education,

'

the state, etc.

Sscia^ontract

His theoretical task in
On The

thus entails more than the
philosophical

discovery of human nature and
its pivotal role in the
formation of a political community.
it entails his desire
to revitalize man's "nature"
with humanly contrived social
institutions, which, ironically,
breed an individual
proclivity toward alienation,
corruption, and vanity.

130

•

Jean-Jacques Rousseau
discusses the base
influence of
uman institutions in
his Discourses on
"The Arts and
Scrences" and "The Origins
of Inequality."
In the first
discourse, which he
wrote in 1750 Rousseau
charges that
such modern institutions
as science,
,

education, and the arts
sap persons of their
^
-heir "nat-^-,1
natural" desire
to coalesce into a
unified political community
yThev
a compel
hey instead
persons to
search for things external
to une
one'ss self,
self things
th
such as
wealth, luxury, and
commercial action rather
than
collective solidarity.
"
We have physicists,
geometricians,
chemists, astronomers,
poets, musicians, and
painters in
plenty," he thus declares;
"but we have no longer
a citizen
among us.- In the second
discourse, which he penned
in
1755 Rousseau continues
the same line of
argumentation,
only this time he stresses
how modern institutions
not just "private” interests,
but "inequality" as
well.
Unlike "natural inequality,"
which derives from the
"physical" traits of man's
strength, age, gender and mind,
he claims that "moral and
political inequality. .depends on
a kind of convention,
and is established. .by the
consent of
men.
The latter consists of the
different privileges which
some men enjoy to the prejudice
of others; such as that of
being more- rich, more honoured,
more powerful, or even in a
position to exact obedience ">»
Institutions thus reveal
one of many paradoxes in Rousseau's
thinking because they
..

,

.

.

.
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ensure both the
perpetuation and the
depletion of his
concept of the modern
individual.

Judging from his three
views of the nation,
Weber
approaches the formative
source of a poiiticai
c
lty
somewhat differently
than Rousseau.
-i-n
eacn
each case,
case Weber's
„ h
approach mirrors an
historical context which
challenges the
natural" dispositions of
individuals.
These challenges
include "the general
rationalisation of life,"
wilhelmine
Germany's "political
epigone ," and the "'mass

«„

m

fate'" of the

P stwar German citizenry.

Unlike Rousseau, they
allow Weber
to view the source of
a community in terms
of an

individual's lack of "nature
e,

"

3 lack
a

u
u
which
he observes
•

in,

say,

the German laborer or
Junker in East Elbia.
Such
challenges also allow him
to see the source of a
community
the political institutions
that transform- rather
than

m

simply preserve-the
collective traits of individual
persons.
Indeed this perspective marks
the underlying
assumption in his later works
on "Suffrage and Democracy
in
Germany" and "Parliament and
Government in Germany." Given
these contrasts, Weber's view
of the national community
highlights his departure from
Rousseau's political

thinking.

Furthermore, it stresses the
significance of individuals and
institutions in his theory of the
nation, as well as the
degree to which the condition of
the German nation always
impels his own approach to poiiticai
thinking.
But more
important,.! think Weber's depictions
of the nation exhibit
132

a tension in his
political thinking,

such that the

individual and institutions
that constitute the
nation

simultaneously dispel its
collective and elevated
design.
With regard to his
ideal -type of the
nation as such,
Weber stresses the
element of human
'.pathos" insofar as
it
mirr ° rS
individual s outy "to
face death"

“

'

in the name of
The relevance of
these "enduring emotional
foundations M howevpr
c
E to be fou nd
in the "nature" of
individuals. According
to Weber, these
emotional traits
emerge only after a
political community "imposes
obligations
on the individual
members."” indeed, he
believes the
relevance of a nation's
shared sense of pathos
takes the
shape of an "idea" which,
since its "earliest and
most
energetic manifestations
... contain [s] the
legend of a
providential mission' ... this
mission can consistently be
thought of only as a specific
'culture' mission."” Such
a
universal overture, which
informs a nation with claims
to
"superiority" and "irreplaceablity,
"
indicates the idealtype of Weber's nation as
such.
As he points out, the
nation achieves its exalted
status on the basis of its
political institutions, which
cultivate "leaders" and
intellectuals" who are "expected
to shoulder this

the nation.

i

,

*-

'

'

mission

Hence the "ideal-type" of the
nation as such
certainly discloses a emotional
element that separates it
from Weber s other depictions
of the concept.
Yet it
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imparts a universal
dimension that portends
the overall
design of Weber's idea
of the

nation.
The foreshadowing of
this universal rM mo
dimension appears
moreover, in Weber's
early racialist
interpretation of the
nation.
With the racial nation,
he fixes on an
objective
WMCh 3 " fUtUre "
citizenry might .'recognise
the character of its
own ancestors" in the
past.
"Through
our work and our nature
we want to be the
forerunners of
that future rate.-.
Race thus forms a trans _
historical
bond between generations
of Germans, allowing
Weber to point
to something more
than a shared ability
to adapt „
•

^a^

^

tQ

fche

changes facing Wrlhlemine
Germany.
He also views
race in terms of the
individuals-be they political
leaders
or, in Weber's case,
political economists -who
propagate and
advance the German nation
as the ultimate collective
value.
Why else does he claim
that -[t]he economic policy
of a
German state, and, equally,
the criterion of value
used by a
German economic theorist,
can therefore only be a
German
policy or criterion
Weber's racial idea of the
German
nation represents, therefore,
a deviation from the
political
and emotional underpinnings
of his later interpretations.
It confirms, too, the
extent to which a sense of
historical
permanence concurs with a claim
of cultural "superiority,"
initiating again a universal task
that informs the value of
the German nation in Weber's
political thinking.
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The conclusion of
this task appears
o£
n
Weber s later theoretical
works on the German
nation as
Herrenvol*.
In those works, Weber
i mplores the
war . torn
German natron to become
something other than
what they are
as of 19!7: "a nation
entirely without any
po li tical
wrll,..» The formation
of this collective
will into a
"'nation of masters'"
compels Weber to postulate
.

,

the

necessity of parliamentary
institutions, which grant
individuals control over
the political fate of
the German
natron.
This same postulate
presumes, however, that
specific individuals
control
the "machinery- of

parliamentary politics.

In fact he means a
"national

politician" who, because of
his parliamentary education,
acts in accordance with
"those universal trends
which will
hold sway in the future
over the outward order of
the lives
and fates of the masses."”
it follows then, I
think, that
Weber's idea of a German
Herrenvolk suggests a theoretical
tension, one between his
desire for a few "'masters'"
of the
German nation and his idea of
a "'nation of masters'."
insofar as it takes "precedence
even over democracy or
parliamentary rule"’*, and denotes
that "it shall and must
live as the land of our
descendants,"” Weber's
idea of an

Herrenvolk illustrates one other
implication.
It
illustrates the extent to which a
universal thread stretches
from the trans-historical aim
of his racialist nation in
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1895 to the "universal
trends"
ends of democracy
that inform his
Political rendering- of the
nation
in 1917.10.

These- theoretical
fragments of the nation
reveal,
believe, a problem with
the universal framework
which

ascribes to the nation.

1

Weber

The elements of human
pathos, race
and Herrenvolk hardly
indicate a unified
interpretation of
the German nation
R-i q
political depiction rejects
the
4-

significance of

race,-

•

a

'

,

his racial depiction
ignores the

weight of parliamentarism;
and his pathological
depiction
relegates both beneath the
weight of collective emotion.
it
follows that each component
symbolizes a separate
terpretation of the idea.
in each instance, however,
he
perceives the nation as an
absolute ideal, one that
supersedes the bounds of
parliamentary politics,
temporality, and even other
theories of the nation.
Indeed
a universal ambition
surfaces in each distinct

interpretation.

But the problem with this
ambition is not

that it parallels differing
theoretical fragments of the
nation, for, despite its foundations
of race, pathos or
politics, the nation remains a
dominant and absolute idea in
Weber's work.
Rather, the problem is evident in
the

political machinery" which Weber assigns
to his overarching "ideal" of the nation. This
theoretical fusion of
machinery and ideals constitutes a defect
in that the

worldly traits of the former dispel the
"ultimate" reach of
the latter.
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WhSn WSber

f ° rmUlateS

his ideal -type of
the nation as
h
he 3 -nds it on
the foundation
°
shared human emotions.
But Weber also posits
that view
of the nation on the
"modern position" of
political
associations.
That position, he
explains, "rests on the
prestige bestowed upon
them by the belief,
held by their
members in a specific
consecration: the -legitimacyof
that social action which
is ordered and
regulated by
them." 101 with this
gesture he hitches a national
community to a whole galaxy
of associations,
including the
modern state, political
parties, and various other

7

"

,

bureaucratic structures.

The errect
effect of
n f this
t-uv.
^
bond
entails a
nurturing of the nation's
pathos
OS' as we
p
well as a justification
Of the actions of
individuals who pursue the
nation's powerinterests.. But, as Weber
admits, these institutional
means
to national power are
tinged with a degree of
difficulty,
even though they reflect a
citizenry- s bestowal of

H ^

legitimate prestige.
a

citizenry-

This difficulty is evident
insofar as

prestige supports national
institutions in
Weber maintains, "social action
comprises physical
coercion, including the power
to dispose over life and
death.
If a nation utilizes such
earthly means to
ensure its "providential -mission,-"
then "superiority" and
"irreplaceability" may very well be the
s

result.

But this

result materializes only insofar
as the "lifeless machine"
of modern politics guides
the metaphysics of national
137

providence earthbound
into the moral tumult
of difference,
human struggle, and
violence.
The same sort of
paradoxical tension occurs
relative to
Weber- s racial configuration
of the German
nation.

As he

makes clear in his
Freiburg lecture, the
best hope for
advancing the German race
manifests

itself in a "political

educatron" of the nation.

This task also utilizes
political
institutions- - notably the
modern state-to prepare
the

German race for its
struggles over contested
territories,
national values, and future
glory.
Hence, Webers

early

political thinking provides
a pivotal instrument
by which
the German nation cultivates
its specifically racial
"ability to adapt to the
varying economic and social
conditions of existence."
It also stipulates
that the state
possesses "the final and decisive
say" on national matters;
that select individuals
embody "the nation's
sense of

political purpose"; and that
even political theorists act
as
intellectual vehicles of "German
policy." Together each
institution sustains the German
nation's constant temporal
bond with "future generations"
of citizens.
Nevertheless,
Weber posits this universal aim
of the nation
on a "leading

strata" of individuals who "are
able to raise themselves
into the hard, clear air in which
the sober work of German

politics flourishes.

By melding "the earnest grandeur

of national sentiment" with
the "worldly organisation of the

nation's power," Weber theorizes what
he thinks is a stable
138

pathway to German
national greatness.
unsteady theoretical
route,

z

think it is an

one rife with the
human

disparities that are
evocative of Weber- s
wish to inscribe
Germany's political
"machinery"
with a "lead™
1
^
-Leading strata"
of
individuals rather than
a "future race"
of German citizens.
The tension between
Weber's metaphysics of
the nation
and his instrumental
design of politics is
also apparent in
his interpretation of
an Herrenvol*.
Against the bachdrop
of the First world
War, Weber theorizes
an interesting
notion of parliamentary
politico
T
y politics.
it is interesting,
not on
account of its capacity
to champion the cause
of democratic
individualism, but because
of its ability to
cultivate
individuals who can "thrust
their hands into the
spokes of
the world's development 1,104
Thus, given the mechanisms
of
party hierarchies, legislative
debates, and plebiscitary
elections, Weber submits that
the German nation
1

•

t-

.

will be

prepared to fight for

a

process" of development.

"decisive say within that
universal
Yet his theory of parliamentary

politics favors a "specifically
Caesarist instrument," which
allows the German citizenry
to supply the nation with
effective leaders.
"This is not the usual 'casting
of
votes or election'," Weber
reminds the
public,

is a confession of

'belief'

"rather it

in the vocation for leadership

of the person who has laid
claim to this acclamation ." 105

He therefore advocates an
instrumental design of politics,
but only insofar as its overriding
absolute ambition is
139

.

German natronal
greatness.
however,

His advocacy also
reveals

the degree to which
he subsumes a
citizenry beneath
111 1VldUal
suggesting a politics
that can
easily unsettle the
„•
"final- and
ana "
^replaceable" ambitions of
the German Herrenvolk

Judging from Weber

"

13 6Vident

4t

—,

s

hat PrOP6lS tte
UUimate
!

^

theoretical

'

itutes the instrumental
means

«

German national greatness.

But more than Dust
constituting means,

it represents in
a
paradoxical way the chief
obstacle facing such an
end.
Though it intends to
cultivate shared values
of power and
glory, the political
machinery of the nation

so,

m

as such does

part,

through the use of
"physical coercion" against
individual citizens. The
state represents, moreover,
not an
instrument for the nation
per se, but for the
individual
leaders who are charged
with advancing the values
of the
German nation. And
Ana insofar =10
•

as this is the case,

the state

indicates how the ideal of
national greatness reflects
the
domain of some, thougli not
all, German citizens.
Even the
mechanism of parliamentary
politics yields the prospect
of
German national greatness,
but only in that particular
political leaders control the
institutions
as well as the

Citizenry of the nation.

Weber clearly signifies politics

as the primary route to
the ultimate goal of German
national
greatness.
But he does so, I believe,
without

considering

the degree to which this
route transgresses the German
140

-

.

nation

sense of shared
pathos

s

Political unity.
is apparent,

therefore
ore,

'

racial homogeneity,
h
racial
and

that Weber's
theoretical
,

approach to the nation
illuminates a formidable
paradox in
P ° litiCal
theorizes the nation
as a
universal end to which
Wilhelmine Germany ought
to aspire,
d that extends
across generations,
eclipses other
convictions, and unifies
a multitude of

“-S'

persons.

signifies,

too,

This end

a nation of citizens
that defines itself
on

the basis of a shared
emotion,

a racial trait,

or an
intricate web of
parliamentary institutions.
But Weber also
theorizes a politics that
aims to advance the
universal
ideal of the German
nation, a politics he
posits on the use
of physical force,
organizational hierarchies,
and the
" PrinClple
of the sma
number'."
i ndeed Weber
anchors
politics to the moral
vagaries of the material

H

world, yet he

populates it with only those
individuals who push the ideal
of German national
greatness.
His idea of the nation not
only necessitates a
narrowing of the prospects
of
politics.

It also faces a challenge
from politics itself,

given that

machinery

violates the nation's universal
claims of
historical continuity, cultural
superiority, and social
solidarity

Based on this paradox that
issues from his theory of
the nation, I believe Weber's
political thinking intimates a
difficult task for the politician
as well as the political
141
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individual person who
elevates an ultimate
ideal on
the shifts
shifting earthly sands
of P
politics
CS
Thi
h
'
Thls
tumult
derives
rrom
from a union that- cihiot-o
s a politician
between an ideal
such as German
national greatness
y Kdcne ss anH
and a political
"arrangement., that is
partial to force and
indifferent to
ail ideals.
Conseguently poll tics
constitutes neither the
moral dissipation of
the politician's
ultimate ideal nor the
technical malfunction
of modern political
institutions.
Politics instead reveals
a politician who
must, both
Publicly and privately,
account for himself when
ideals
outreach the function
of political
institutions and politics
undercuts the universal
design of ideals. Weber's
theory of
the nation thus connotes
the extent to which
the
politician's existence
jeopardizes the prospect of
German
national greatness, which
in tUrn
turn
con strams
the prospects
of politics in the
modern world.
-

,

'

'

™

As it pertains to the
political theorist, Weber's
idea
Of the nation accentuates
a similar sort of
tension.
However, where the politician
endures the paradox between
national ideals and the force
of political institutions,
the
theorist confronts it-either
knowingly or unknowinglye working on a particular
scholarly project.

of course,

This is,

evident in the way Weber theorizes
his own idea
of the nation.
As a theorist of "ideal types,"
he does more
142

than interPrSt the

direction of the nation
as
Weber also situates
himself at the
problematic
crossing between the
nation- s "providential
mission" and its
dependence on the "ohvs-ir^i „
physical coercion" of
institutions,
punctuating a tension in
his theoretical
theoretical approach
a
to nation.
„
When he approaches
the racial character
of the German
nation, furthermore,
Weber underscores the
end of historical
greatness and glory.
Yet he moors that
universal end to a
narrow political domain
of individuals who
qualify for state
leadership on the basis
of their unique
devotion to the
nation, positioning
himself in the crux of
a theoretical
paradox.
The same is true when
Weber theorizes the
German
nation as an Herrenvoi,.
B y allying the end
of a -nation
of masters-" to the
instrument of parliamentary
politics, he
both subsumes the German
nation to a closed strata
of
"'masters'" and colors his
theoretical enterprise with
the
hue of contradiction.
Therefore, I believe Weber's
varied
approaches to the nation
illustrate a political theorist
who
routinely alludes to the
likelihood of a paradox in his
thinking.
it is a paradox that
hinders politics with the
ideal of German national
glory, as well as transgresses
the
ultimate idea of nation with
the worldly and violent
functions of politics.
,
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CHAPTER III

ENTERING "THE ETHICAL HOME" OF
POLITICS
Introduce nn
i

The claim that Max Weber's
political thinking
demonstrates an elitist, anti
-democratic and nationalist
bent affords neither a unique
nor particularly interesting
interpretation
what is, I think, the more
unique and
interesting approach concerns the
"ethical paradoxes" that
correspond to these unsettling
biases in Weber's thinking.
his theory of politics, for
instance, Weber advocates an
instrumental design that promotes
the goal of German
national power, a goal that nevertheless
constricts the
scope of political struggle and,
thus, the very promise of
national power.
Furthermore, with regard to his ideal
of
the German nation, Weber posits
a universal framework which,
ironically, the machinery of politics
undercuts with its
worldly, violent, and finite actions.
In each case the
,

"professional politician" who inhabits Weber's
theoretical
terrain must, regardless of his or her moral
aims, confront
an ethical divide between political means
and ultimate ends.
The vexing nature of this situation, however,
does not
surface solely in relation to the theoretical
appearance of
the politician.

I

believe it also surfaces in relation to

Weber himself, a political theorist who fails to account
for
the ethical rift between his moral gesture to German

national power and his staunch advocacy of the "machinery"
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Of modern politics,

with the exception of
his lectures on
the "vocations" of
science and politics in
1917

and 1919
respectively, Weber rarely
explores in detail the
varied’
intricacies of political ethics,
when Weber does explore
the issue, he seems to
rend himself from the aim
of
AriSC ° tle S 1^£Smafi!leai
3-gtili£a
»hich " is not to know what
virtue is, but to become
good... Hence we must examine
,

'

'

the

right way to act.-

Weber also appears detached
from the
more modern liberal claims
of his German predecessor,

Kant,

who postulates a strict
ethical demarcation between
morality
and politics.
In his 1795 essay on
"Perpetual
Peace," Kant

declares that "politics cannot

...

take a single step without

first paying tribute to morality
.. .The rights of man
must be
held sacred, however great a
sacrifice the ruling power may
have to make."' Contrary to
Aristotle's active quest for
the "good life" and Kant's
logical divide between "right and
utility, » Weber theorizes a political
ethics that more than
couples "'good' ends" with the "morally
dangerous means" of
politics.
It decrees "that one must reckon
with the

possibility or even likelihood of evil
side-effects" which
stem from such a precarious amalgam
4

.

Max Weber thus posits his theory of political
ethics on
the idea of "responsibility." He specifies
his claim in his
lecture on "The Vocation and Profession of Politics."

There

Weber stipulates that the "man who subscribes to
the ethic
of responsibility

..

.does not feel that he can shuffle off
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the consequences of his
own actions ... and
piace the burden
on the shoulders of
others.- indeed, the
politician bears
a "burden" inasmuch
as he is "conscious"
of the "ethical

paradoxes" that lurk
nrir
i

m
t

the mix of good ends
and morally

dubious means and of "his
"responsibility for what may
become of himself under
pressure from them.- Yet,
though
this idea of responsibility
informs the ethic
of the

politician, Weber still ascribes -it
crimes it to nhis own ethical
duty
Of scholarship.
He explains his idea of
scholarly
responsibility in his 1895 Freiburg
inaugural lecture on
"The Nation State and
Economic Policy." A scholar's
"responsibility before history »
Weber tells the Freiburg
faculty, not only entails
"exorcising the curse that hangs
over us (that of being the
belated offspring of
•

,

a great,

past political epoch)."

but

it also demands that the
scholar

teach the German nation "how to
become something different:
the precursors of an even greater
epoch."’ Accordingly,
Weber's attempt to measure up to his
own sense of scholarly
responsibility manifests itself in the
idea of the

politician's "ethic of responsibility."

8

This is all the

more evident in that the ethic rejects
the provincial legacy
of German politics yet still exalts
the ultimate aim of
German national glory.

believe this idea of "responsibility" discloses,
however, a tension in Weber's theory of political
I

ethics.

The tension surfaces not simply because the ideal
of
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responsibility further constricts
the prospects of
politics
with the criteria of a
specific type

of ethical conduct.
Given that responsibility
limits the scope of
politics I
contend that Weber's idea
of political ethics
illustrates
the degree to which Weber
himself, as a political
theorist,
imperils his own "responsibility
before history. " it is a
predicament similar to one
Friedrich Nietzsche highlights
in
fin the GeneaTogy
Nietzsche perceives
••responsibility in terms of what
he calls man's cultivated
right to make ^
promises" relative to some
"'fixed'"
*-

and

"'unforgettable'" ideal.-

responsibility per se.

Yet,

what he rebukes is not

He instead contests its
chief

presupposition, that

is,

"necessary, uniform,

like among like,

the understanding of man as

regular,

and

consequently calculable" enough to
keep his "word... in the
face of accidents, even 'in
11
the
face of fate '."

of

course, Weber would no doubt
rebuke this view of a wholly
"sovereign" and "proud" man, especially
when he declares
that a "responsible" politician
"is at the mercy" of ethical
paradoxes.
The question is whether Weber, as
a citizen of
and a scholar for the German nation,
comprehends the ethical

paradoxes that lurk in his political thinking.
I

will confirm in this chapter that the
answer to the

above question is negative,

that Weber fails to grasp the

ethical paradox residing at the heart of his
political

thinking

12
.

Such a task demands that
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I

first explore the

extent to which Weber-

s

idea of political ethics
corresponds

to hrs other interpretations
of polities and the
nation
It
also demands that I examine
the historical context
in which
Weber- s theoretical approach
to political ethics
confronts
the ethical archetypes of
Christianity, revolutionary

socialism, pacificism and,
yes, even German
Machtpolitik.
in contesting these
varied forms of what he
calls an "ethic
of conviction- " iGesinnungse
thik,
Weber constructs an
"ethic of responsibility"
(Verantwortungsethik)
,

,

thus

compelling a survey of its
theoretical design.
This survey
wrll reveal not only the
degree to which the politician
confronts the limit of his
enterprise, a limit which
reflects the violently transgressed
ideal of the German
nation.
It will also suggest how
Weber himself encounters a
similar limit in the enterprise
of political theorizing,
a
limit complicated by his
devotion to the ideal of German
national glory.
I will therefore
conclude that Weber's idea
of political ethics, though
key to his theory of politics,
is equally significant in
verifying the human limitations of
politics as well as contemporary political
13
thinking.

Pol itics.

Nation,

In 1888,

lecture,

and Ethics

some seven years prior to Max Weber's
Freiburg

Friedrich Nietzsche wrote what was to be the
final

work he himself would publish, Twilight
of the Idols

.

pithy aphorisms, he again disclosed to the
disciples of
157

With

Western philosophy his desire
for a
values," disputing the icons

"

reevaluation of all

of Socrates,

German Idealism, and Liberalism.

Christianity,

The thrust of his critique

was not, however, aimed
at the values of any one
particular
person or school of thought
He leveled it at the
idea that
such values themselves
stemmed from the absolute
and
irrefutable origin of either
.

reason, God,

spirit, or nature.

"When we speak of values,"
claims Nietzsche, "we speak
with
the inspiration, with the
way of looking at things,
which is
part of life: life itself
forces us to posit values."”
Hence he stressed the prospect
that human values emerged
from something far more
immediate, more supple, more
provocative than the "'fixed'" and
"'unforgettable'" ideals
which modern philosophers
tended to oblige.
By extending
his own "anti-natural morality,
»
moreover, "which conceives
of God as the counter-concept
and condemnation of life,"
Nietzsche carved out "only a value
judgment
of

what life? of what kind of life?

I

life-but

of

have already given the

answer: of declining, weakened,
weary,

condemned life

."

15

When Weber pronounces his own "value
judgment of life,"
he also expresses his sympathy
towards Nietzsche's critical
task.

This sympathy appears in Weber's
critique of the

apnon

foundations of Western philosophy and his
outspoken
distaste for the apparent decline of European
(notably

German)

culture- -political and otherwise.

Yet his sympathy

concludes as his theory of ethics dawns, for
Weber, like
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letzsche'

inimical depiction o £
Socrates, -understood
that
a
the world needed
him-his means, his
artrfrce of self-preservation.Indeed, with thg
forces conquering
Wilhelmine Germany, he
theorizes a
political ethics that
necessitates a person who
-must be a
leader,- not only that,
he must, in a very
simple sense of
the word, be a hero
1,17
o,,
^
hero.
By positing his idea
of ethics on
the Philosophically
dubious ground of a
-responsiblepolitical conduct, Weber
thus confirms his
departure from
Nietzsche- s critical enterprise.
But in the same gesture
he
also hints at how his
theory of an -ethic of
responsibilitymight correspond to his
thoughts on politics and
the nation.
It does so, I contend,
insofar as Weber denotes the
"ethic
of responsibility" as
a theoretical elixir
for a German
nation drained of both
politics and politicians. What
remnants in his political
thinking point to a bond
between
politics, the nation, and
ethics?
s

^^

In his lecture on "The
Profession and Vocation of

Politics," Max Weber claims that
an ethical problem resides
at the core of modern
politics.
This is the case, he
explains, because the "principled
convictions" of political
parties, trade unions, parliamentary
committees,
the state,

and politicians "can only be
achieved by force. The genius
-or demon- -of politics lives in a
state of inner tension
with the god of love... a tension that
may erupt at any

moment into irresolvable conflict."
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1

*

Accordingly, Weber's

approach to policies reveals a link
tQ ethics Qniy
ingofar
political machinery
forcefully transgresses
the very
m °ral a itl0n iC
d itS political leaders
seek to advance

^

in the world.

-

in fantfact,

Weber continues,

[t]he specific
means of legitimate
violence per se in the
hands of human
associations is what gives
all the ethical
problems of
politics their particular
quality."” such "ethical
problems" represent a hey
factor in his theoretical
view of
politics, marking the
politician- s hazardous domain
as much
as Weber's delineation
of the ethical bounds
of politics.
By virtue of these ethical
problems, Weber's political
thinking also signifies a
link between ethics and
the
requisite conduct of those
persons who engage in politics.
Again in the "Vocation" lecture,
Weber holds that politics
grants the politician both an
extraordinary "feeling
••

of

power" and an awareness that
one controls "some vital
strand
of historically important
events."” But more critical
than these "inner joys" of the
politician are
the "personal

qualifications" which "will enable him
to do justice to this
power... and thus to the responsibility
it imposes on

him.

By denoting politics as an ethical
minefield, and
then lacing it with the intoxicants
of power, Weber

intimates a type of conduct that negotiates
the

contingencies of the former and the compulsion
toward the
latter.
This intimation, he says, "takes us into

the area

of ethical questions,

for to ask what kind of a human being
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one must be in order
to have the right
to seize the spokes
of the wheel of history
is to pose an ethrcal
question." 22
It not only confirms
a link between
politics and ethics in
Weber' s politrcal thinking,
but it also implies
an ethrcal
standard that is as difficult
for the politicran to
attain
it is for the
political theorist to defend.

believe these difficulties
are most apparent when
Weber maps. out the
intersection between his ideal
of the

German nation and his theory
of political ethics.
In his
essays on "Parliament and
Government in Germany under
a New
Political Order," which he
wrote in 1917, Weber argues
that
the nation's fate requires
"technical changes" capable of

cultivating "responsible"
politicians and citizens.
"The
question," he maintains, "of
whether the nation feels ready
to bear the responsibility
which a nation of seventy
million
people has towards its descendants,
will be answered by the
way we address the question
of the internal reconstruction
of Germany."
By "internal reconstruction"
Weber means
several things: a "rational" rather
than traditional design
of parties; a "universal"
rather than restricted notion
of

suffrage; a "'positive'" rather than
"'negative'" use of
parliament; and a political rather than
bureaucratic form of
leadership for the German nation. 24 Given
these vast
reforms, it follows that Weber presages
neither a "happy"

nor a "vigorous" nation.

He only foresees a nation of

citizens and leaders who share a "responsibility"
to provide
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"the next two to three
generations., with a human
conduct
that willingly enters
-the arena where the
problems of the
present are contested
... if the
cne n^inn
nation hdoes not dare
do the
one, it should reject
the other
ner, tor
fn r iti leads
^
nowhere
Politically ." 25 Thprpfnro
or 6 insofar as he
anchors the ideal
of German national
alorv
Q moorings
9
to t-v,
the
y t-n
of "political
machinery- and -responsiblepoliticians, Weber illustrates
a theoretical bond
between political ethics
and the nation.
In the "Vocationlecture, where he lays
out his most
detailed view of political
ethics, Weber points to
the
difficulty. of coupling a
"responsible- conduct with
the
"pure conviction- of German
national glory.
He does so by
arguing that politicians
who seek to advance such
a cause as
German nationalism have to
personify and exhibit something
more than zealotry and
passion.
-simply to feel passion,"
he notes, "however genuinely,
is not sufficient to make
a
politician unless, in the form
of service to a 'cause',
responsibility for that cause
becomes the decisive lode-star
of all action ." 26
i

i

'

Yet this blend of an "ethic
of conviction" with an
"ethic of responsibility" reveals
more than a possible link

between political ethics and the
ideal of German glory.
By
placing a person between -the flame
of pure conviction" and
"that powerful control over the
soul," Weber also affirms
how the ethical norm of responsibility
compels the
politician to admit the political limitations
of his
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ultimate ideal.

Thus,

difficulty emerges with the
"responsible" politician whom
Weber names as the solution
to
Germany's problems, a politician
who admits to the
paradox
between the violent machinery
of politics and
a

his ideal of

German national glory.

As for Weber, moreover,

the

"responsible" scholar, the
difficulty manifests itself
in a
theory of political ethics
that defies, not only
Weber's
view of the technical nature
of politics, but also
his
fervent duty to the German
nation.

Judging from these ties between
politics, nation, and
political ethics, I think the
necessity of leadership and
the likelihood of paradox
inform each particular idea,
with
regard to politics and ethics,
it is obvious
that the

prospect of paradox bridges
Weber's theoretical approach
to
both concepts. This is the
case insofar as Weber

presupposes political ethics to be
inscribed with a tension
between "the means of violence" and
"the achievement of
'good' ends."
It is also the case in

that these "paradoxes"

confirm, not just the composite
of politics and ethics, but
Max Weber's theoretical ameliorant
for such vexing political
circumstances.
That ameliorant is, of course, the

"responsible" politician, one who is able
"to look at the
realities of life with an unsparing gaze,
to bear these
realities and be a match for them inwardly ." 27
Given the
world's "ethical irrationality" and Germany's
defeat during
the First World War, the ethic of
responsibility only
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underscores the urgency which
Weber ascribes to the
Ptofessronai poiitician.
In other words, the
prospect of
paradox and the necessity
of political leadership
compel him
to theorize an ethic
that allows
ws a person
npr^nn to measure
up to
the formidable demands
of both
Yet
iet, by
hv trying to
"cure"
what Nietzsche thought
was a "declining,
t-

•

weakened, weary

condemned life," Weber
posits the "value" of
responsibility,
narrowing the human scope of
politics and divulging a
tension
his political

m

thinking.

With regard to the nation
and ethics, I think it is
obvious that the necessity
of "responsible" political
leadership marks the critical
link between each idea.
it is
critical inasmuch as his wartime
view of the German nation
mandates "organisational
preconditions for the emergence of
leaders, and indeed everything
... depends on
this happening.

Only nations of wasters are called
upon to thrust their
hands into the spokes of the world's
development." 2 ’
However, as long as leaders become
responsible "masters,"
Weber's ideal of the nation mirrors
a
paradox,

in that such

"organisational" political forces imperil
the values of
German unity, expansion, and power. The
ethical paradox of
the nation thus surfaces with the
necessity of political
leadership, a theoretical panacea which,
ironically,

stresses the moral distance between political
means and
ultimate ends.
It foreshadows a difficult course of
action
for the person who "responsibly" promotes
the principled
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conviction of the nation
in politics.
Though Weber views
this course of action
as a remedy for the
national ills of
Germany, it still points
to an increased
chance of ethical
incongruities for the nation's
political leaders.
lt also
signifies, I believe, an
ethical incongruity for
Weber the
scholar, who, in theorizing
an ethic of responsibility
posits a value at odds with
that of the German nation
and,
thus, the purpose of
his scholarly
enterprise.

Within this theoretical
web of politics, nation,
and
ethics remains Weber's
connection to the legacy of
etzsche

Among other things, this
connection reveals
shared view of modernity's
incapacity to confirm
^

a

a "'fixed'"

ethical standard in the world.

This view of the world's

"ethical irrationality", however,

fails to keep Weber from

perpetuating that "naive" approach
to the world which
Nietzsche despised. Nietzsche
associated it with those
"moralists who wanted man to be
different,

that is,

virtuous- -they wanted him remade
in their own image, as a
png: to that end, they negated the world !" 29
Similarly,

Weber prescribes the world another
curative "'Man ought to
be such and such!" for confronting
its

ethical ambivalence:

the antidote of a "responsible"
politician.

cure may

politics,

"

Though Weber's

negate » some of the worldly components of
it still engenders a bond between his

interpretations of politics and the ideal of German
national
30
glory
Furthermore, the ethic of responsibility
.

appears
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to generate a

senes

of tensions in his
political thinking

They are tensions that
impact the politician as
much as
Weber himself, the political
theorist, both of whom
imperil
in different ways the
"principled conviction" of
German
national glory with "morally
dangerous means".

The fruitful

*T

Promise of' these ethical tensions
remains to be seen,
the first few clues become
apparent when Weber confronts
the
differing notions of ethics in
Wilhelmine German politics.
Opposing an E t hic of Convirtinn

Max Weber confronts the notion
of political ethics in
much the same way a politician
might approach a piece of
legislation: he contests the ideas
of his opponents.

He

also shares Nietzsche's theoretical
approach to the topic.
This is so inasmuch as Nietzsche,
in On the Genealogy nf
Morals, prods the "reversals of
accustomed perspectives and
valuations ... so that one knows how to
employ a variety of
perspectives and affective interpretations
in the service of
31
knowledge."
However, in his "Vocation" lecture on
politics, Weber is not interested in contesting
a piece of
legislation per se, nor is he intent on promoting
a critical

philosophy of perspectivism.

Given Germany's humbling

defeat by the Allies and the growing civil violence
in the
cities of Kiel, Berlin and Munich, Weber's theoretical
point
of attack fixes on "the problem of the ethos
of politics as
a

'cause'

(Sache)." 32

Indeed,

he notes in January 1919
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that the issue o£ political
ethics "has recently been
reopened for discussion (in a
quite wrong-headed fashion
in my
view), so let us approach
it resolutely."The "wrongheaded fashion is, of course,
a reference to the
dominant
on political ethics in
post-war Germany, views that
derive from Christianity,
revolutionary socialism,
pacificism, and the pundits of
Machtpolitik.
In light of
Weber's resolve to contest the
ethical agendas of others,
what might it reveal about
his own theoretical approach
to
political ethics?

What is obvious about Weber's
theory of political
ethics is that it rests on an
historical critique of the
reigning interpretations of the
idea.
In fact, according to
Weber, the chief source of any
discussion concerning modern
political ethics stems, in part, from
the book of Matthew in
the New Testament.
"The Sermon on the Mount," he says,
"by
which we mean the absolute ethics of
the Gospel, is
something far more serious than those
who are so fond of
citing its commandments today believe ." 34
As Weber

perceives it, the Gospel mandates a type
of conduct by which
a person rejects without condition
such worldly means as
physical violence, risking the loss of one's
life for the

other-worldly glory of God.

He thus claims that "it is

necessary to be a saint in all things, or at least
one must
want to be one, one must live like Jesus, the
Apostles,
Saint Francis and men of that kind."
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Only "then," concludes

Weber,

"this type of ethic beco.es
meaningful and expresses
a kind of dignity. But
not otherwise.- Though
this
"unworldly ethic" denotes
humanity at its brotherly
zenith,
it decrees a level of
ethical uniformity that
most people
fail to sustain, expressly
politicians in post-war Germany.
Max Weber's critique centers,
therefore, on the
problematic politics of Christianity's
ethical agenda.
It
is problematic insofar
as the Gospel's "absolute
principles"
of brotherliness and divine
glory appear to be at odds with
"the use of violence, " which
Weber labels as the "decisive
means of politics." Drawing
an analogy to a more secular
enterprise, he views the ethic
of the Sermon on the Mount
as

doctrine compelled by forces similar
to those that drive
modern science.
"What has been said about causality
in
science," he mentions in passing,
"also applies to this
ethic, namely that it is not a
hired cab which one may stop
at will and climb into or out
of as one sees fit ." 36
a

The

moral substance of a Christian ethic
results from neither a
person's occasional devotion to non-violence
nor an

intermittent duty to the truth, depending on
what the
circumstances dictate.
"Rather," counters Weber,

"the

meaning of the sermon
banality)

(if it is not to be reduced to

is precisely this:

we must accept it in its

entirety or leave it entirely alone
view,

."

37

Judging from this

it seems that Weber harbors little,

if any,

doubt

about the import of the absolutist ethic of Christianity,
an
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ethic he believes ought
"not to be taken frivolously."
More
significant, however, he does
harbor doubt about its
capacity to endure the
"paradoxes" that are endemic
to
modern politics, paradoxes
that issue from the
political
requisite of violence.

Turning away from the New
Testament, Weber seeks to
locate the more contemporary
manifestations

of "absolutist
ethics" in early-20th century
German politics. The first
reveals itself in the Allied
victory over Wilhemine Germany,
when, as Weber suggests in
a roundabout way, "the
victor
will of course assert, with
ignoble self-righteousness, 'I
won because I was in the right.'" 38
Whether or not this
ethical posturing corresponds to
the Allies' ideals of
popular sovereignty and national
self-determination, he
still views it with great scorn.
He does so neither by
virtue of its philosophical groundwork
nor on account of the
vainglorious conceits expressed by any of
its public
proponents, notably Woodrow Wilson.
Instead, Weber scorns
such an ethic for allowing war-weary
persons

to "lose sight

of the inevitable falsification of the
whole problem by very

material interests- -the interests of the victor
in

maximising the gain (whether moral or material)

,

and the

hopes of the defeated that they will negotiate
advantages by

confessing their guilt." 39

Thus he contests the Allied

victors, not on the basis of the moral soundness of
their

convictions, but for debasing them with the physical
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.

violence of total war

rpy.-

,

Thls depute allows Weber
to accuse
the Allies of "usinq
=>0
etnics as a means of
g 'ethics'
'being in the
right
rather than as an end in
itself.
'

With regard to such
transgressions, Weber views
the
ethical stance of the Allies
as inept at accepting
-the
responsibility for the future
which the victor in particular
must bear." Anticipating
the forces of foreign
occupation,
financial restitution, and
military justice, he discerns
this conquering ethic from
one more attentive to
the

consequences that issue from such
violent deeds.
"A nation
will forgive damage to its
interests," he says, referring
to
the material impact of war,
"but not injury to its honour,
and certainly not when this
is done in a spirit of priggish
self-righteousness.
Weber rejects this ethic of victory
because it validates a quest for
power while simultaneously
disparaging those persons who feel the
indignant weight of
their powerlessness. More important,
by bartering
ethical

congruity for military conquest, the Allies
foiled any sort
of "responsible" order among nations.
According
to Weber,

such an order is "only possible through
a sober, matter-offact approach (Sachlichkei t) and chivalry,
and, above all,
it is only possible where there is
dignity.

But it can

never be made possible by an 'ethic' which in
fact entails

indignity for both sides

."

41

it

follows then that his

critique of the ethic of victory fixes, not on the moral
aims or vanity of the Allied powers, but on their lack
of
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candor and perspective in
the after m ath of a
ruinous war
in short, Weber
believes this deficiency
reveals how the
Allies undermine their
own ideals of sovereignty
and selfdetermination by wielding
brute force to punish
further an
already-vanquished German
nation-state.

Another early-20th century
display of ethical
incongruity surfaces in the
deeds of the German Supreme
Command, the chief military
authority during

and after the

First world War.

Vaterlandspartei

However,

insofar as the Fatherland
Party

mirrored the Supreme Command's
political
ambitions, Weber claims that
the latter suffered
ethical
flaws different from those
of the Allied victors.
« Given
the Mach tpolitik creed
a
of such
or
sur-h n
ar fu founders
party
as Admiral von
Tirpitz, General Ludendorff
and other "annexationists,"
(

)

-f

the

Supreme Command's ethical
base dissipated with each and
every reach for power.
"The mere -power politician',"
Weber
explains,

"a type whom an energetically
promoted cult is

seeking to glorify here in Germany
as elsewhere, may give
the impression of strength,
but in fact his actions merely
lead into emptiness and absurdity. "«
The source of this
ethical void takes shape neither
in a philosophical
commitment to some ideal nor in a
political duty to
deliberation and compromise. Rather,
Weber locates it
wherever and whenever a "parvenu boasts
of his power and
vainly mirrors himself in the feeling
of power- -or indeed
any and every worship of power for
its own sake." 44
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»

Accordingly, whereas Weber's
critique of the Allied
ethic of
victory fixes on the lack
of "responsible"
judgments, his
critique of Machtpolitik
focuses on its absolute
lack of an
ideal beyond that of human
domination.

By chiding both the
Supreme Command and the
Vaterlandspartei for their lack
of an ethical orientation
Weber confirms more than
just the vain and
self-interested
desires of these P
politicians
ticians
Their orientation
.

^

.

stems from

"a most wretched and
superficial lack of concern
for the

waning

of human action,

a blase attitude that
knows nothing

of the tragedy in which
all action, but quite
particularly
political action, is in truth
enmeshed 46 it is evident,
.

therefore,

that Weber perceives the
ethical flaw of
Machtpolitik to be its inability
to affirm the vitality of
a
person whose devotion to an
ideal outweighs his duty to
mundane self-interest. And
insofar as the pundits of

Machtpolitik fail to appreciate this
human component, Weber
believes they are incapable of
comprehending the "ethical
paradoxes" which often issue from
it.
it is no wonder,

then,

that he attributes "[t]he sudden
inner collapse of
typical representatives of this
outlook (Gesinnung) » to the
"inner weakness and ineffectuality"
that are cloaked "behind
this grandiose but empty pose ." 46
Max Weber's commentary
on the ethical vacuity of the
"'power politician'" certainly
stresses the absence of a guiding ideal,
but he does so in

order to emphasize a more significant
point:
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The absence of

.

id " alS in POlitiCS
PreSUPPOSeS *
o f human
perspective
and, thus, reveals
a lack of
responsibility.

Contrary to his direct
attack on Machtpolitik,
Weber
approaches the absolutist
ethrc of pacificism
with a mo re
nuanced criti q ue in mind
It is an ethic
f<jr which
has great respect,
even though he
perceives it as wholly
unsuited for the .oral
tumult of politics.*’
viewing it as
an ethic that is
closely aligned to the
ethic in the Book of
Matthew, he echoes how
the logic of pacificism
requires a
conscrous renunciation
of all worldly

^

.

violence.

He contends
that an ethic of
non-violence is as problematic
as the
Sermon on the Mount.
Pacificism is problematic,
not simply
by virtue of its
imperative withdrawal from
politics, but
because it demands a deqree of Pt-h^oi
thical consistency reserved
only for saints. Noting
how good Christians reject
•completely the "coercion and
order" of the secular world,
believes the "same applies
to the injunction to
'turn
the other cheek !'-unconditionally without asking
by what
right the other person has
struck you. An ethic of
indignity, except for a saint. »«
The pacifist thus holds
an unworldly ethic of love"
which compels him to say,
"'resist not evil with force',"
while "the politician is
,

governed by the contrary maxim,
namely,
evil with force'."*’

'You shall resist

Based on these ethical and political

shortcomings, Weber avoids chiding
the proponents of
pacificism the way he chided the champions
of Machtpolitik
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Yet,

what incites his
critical
cal wrath against
=
pacificism is
the pacificist who,
in spite
sDite of a, devotion
to an ethic of
non-violence, pursues the
"diabolical powers" of
politics.
The ethical collapse
of pacificism becomes
apparent to
Weber in the harsh light
of post-war German
politics.
Given
that they are willing
to live like saints
in the purely
sense of the word, Weber
expresses a deep respect
uch pacificists as Kurt
Eisner, Ernst Toller,
and F W
Foerster
B y 1919
however, he Vlews

m

,,

,

actions with more skepticism
inasmuch as they "win
refuse
weapons or throw them
away... so that we might
fulfill our
ethical duty to end the
war, and thus to end
all war." As a
result of this "ethical
duty," Weber anticipates
"that
peace, not war, will have
been discredited" in the
aftermath
of Germany's crushing
defeat, foreshadowing the
vitriolic
politics that sabotaged the
Weimar republic. “ in fact,
Weber's ambivalence about
the political wisdom of
pacificism
manifests itself in the testimony
he gave at the so-called
treason" trial of Toller. He
describes Toller as a man
whose profound ethical ideals
were matched only by his
complete lack of political acumen.
"'in a fit of anger,'"
Weber remarks, explaining Toller's
vexing character to the
court, "'God made him a politician .'" 52
Thus, according to
Weber, the political impact of
pacificism surfaces in both
the deflation of the ideals
underlying its ethical posture
and the pacifist's undignified
abuse at the hands
of
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forceful politicians.

its absolute
absnint-v
ethic
of non-violence
•

cannot withstand the
"ethical
meal irrationality"
irraf
of the violent
enterprise of politics.
n

The same can be said
about Weber's insight
into at
least three earl - 20 th
y
century ethica! displays
of
"revolutionary Socialism”:
Syndicalism
icaiism, Bolshevism,
y
n
and
Spartacisnr 53 borne
Some ^pvprai
several months prior to
.

his "Vocation-

lecture on politics, Weber
discusses the issue of
"Socialism- before an
audience of the Austrian
Offrcer Corps
n Vienna.
His critique of a
socialist political ethic
departs from its claim
concerning the necessary
historical
movement toward an economic
system unblemished by
violence
and human suffering.
indeed Weber targets
revolutionary
socialism's -true, ultimate
hope: the proletariat
cannot
free itself from servitude
without putting an end to
all
rule by man over man.-This "prophetic- aim of
justice,
though, which impelled the
deeds of Lenin, Liebknecht,
Luxemburg and Michels, mandates
the use of violence against
the feudal dynasties of the
past and the growing bourgeois
class in the present and
future.
-Hence," he retorts in his
"Vocation- lecture, "it is...
utterly ridiculous for such
people to condemn morally the
'politicians of violence' of
the old regime for using
precisely the same means as they
are prepared to use.— Based
on this ethical discrepancy
between brotherly love and brute force,
I think Weber
perceives the socialist ethic in the same
way he perceives
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the ethic of pacificism.

In other words,

he views both
ethics in relation to
a conviction that
precludes the use of
violence as much as the
prospect of politics
itself.
Yet one difference does
emerge between Weber's
views of
pacificism and revolutionary
socialism.
That difference
manifests itself in
revolutionary socialism's
explicit and
unconditional obedience to
a political cause.
Whereas a
pacificist adheres to an eth-ir o-f
ethic of non-violence,
which
eventually drives one from
politics, a socialist
remains
stalwart in forcefully
eradicating "all rule by man
over
man " SUCh 9 PerS ° n
clarifies, "feels 'responsibleonly for ensuring that the
flame of pure conviction
1

'

(for

example,

the flame of protest
against the injustice of the
social order) is never
extinguished."” Weber therefore
narrows his critical sights
on the human pathos underlying
the socialist's devotion
to the ideal of social and
economic
justice.
He does so, not because
the socialist ethic
intensifies the degree of political
struggle, but because it
discounts the political significance
of responsibility.
A
syndicalist, for example, whose
union violence targets other
socialists and the bourgeoisie alike,
"might be fully aware
that the. .consequences of his
actions will be, say,
.

increased chances for the forces of
reaction, increased
oppression of his own class, a brake on
the rise of his

class.

But none of this will make the
slightest impression

on him ." 58

Given this "utterly irrational" and purely
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xemp lary value „ of
revolutionary socialism,
it follows
that Weber critr ue s
the
q
ethrc of socialism
on the basis of
ltS Pr ° PhetlC and em
°tiona 1 foundations.
•'e

It is a critique,
that rebukes the
proponents of socialism
for
yielding to blind passion
rather than a keen
discernment of
the paradoxical
consequences issuing from
the "diabolical.,
mix of
good
ends with violent means.

moreover,

'

Judging from these
interpretations, I think Weber
views
the ethical component
of early-20th century
German politics
as one completely void
of a durable agency.
His view of the
Allied victors shows how
their lack of dignity

and
relative to a conquered
German nation, thwarts
the mingling of ethics
and politics.
The same is true about
the German Supreme Command
and its political cohorts
in the
Vaterlandspartei, only that it is
their plain want of a
principled conviction that foils
any hope for ethics in
German politics. As for
pacificism, Weber's view reveals
how the aim of non-violence
either diverts such an ethic
away from politics or, if the
pacificist still pursues it,
collapses from the burden that stems
from the political
necessity of violence. Lastly, his
view of revolutionary
socialism demonstrates how the
Syndicalists, Spartacists,
and Bolsheviks fail to fuse ethics
and politics.
According
to Weber, they instead adhere to
a "feeling" that eclipses
the "irreconcilably opposed" yet
"complementary"

foresight,

relationship between ethics and politics.
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In each case

Weber concludes that
the
e eth-ir^i
ethical component of
politics lacks
persons and parties, not
because of the appearance
or
absence of certain
principled convictions.
Rather, it does
so because such
convictions tend to deflect
a persons

critical attention away
from the consequences
that follow
the mix of ..absolutist
ethics., with political
violence
What Weber- s critique
of political ethics
says about
his own interpretation
of the idea entails,
X believe, more
than his desire to
differentiate himself from
his political
and theoretical opponents.
it speaks volumes
as well, i
think, about the standard
of responsibility he
believes to
be integral to any
manifestation of ethics in
modern
standard that alludes to
tragic outcomes.” By
chiding the syndicalist
"for ensuring that the
flame of pure
conviction... is never extinguished"
or the pacificist who
"'turns the other cheek-" when
faced with violence, Weber
suggests a political ethic
premised on something besides
a
zealous obligation to a
principled conviction.
Indeed, he
posits his own theory of political
ethics on the basis of
esponsibility,
which is another way of saying
that "one

must answer for the (foreseeable)
actions.

This

consequences of one's

ethic of responsibility" represents
Weber's

theoretical rejoinder to his opponents.

It mandates a

passionate devotion to some ultimate
end, yet it also
requires foresight and acumen enough
to discern between "the
achievement of 'good' ends" and "ethically
dangerous means
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"

'

3nd side-effect
eLLSq

Unlike the "'pfhin
ethic ^f
of principled
conviction'," Weber'
cufcii s
q idea of
f an "
ethic^ of responsibility'
seeks to confront rather
Sr th^r-,
than lgn ° re the
"ethical paradoxes"
a „ the heart of
modern politics. Just
how far the
politician- - and it, politic,!
11

'

TT-n

i

a

i

,

,

•

toward cd„,ro„ti„ th,„
g
par.do,.,
when Weber postulates
his own theory of
political ethics.

_

„„

Th eorizing

an^ thi^ctL Responsi hi

n

,

It is clear that
Max Weber's critique
of political

ethrcs further illuminates
the intellectual legacy
he shares
with Nietzsche.
Be it Nietzsche's
"great declaration of
war" against "eternal
idols" or Weber's claim
that his
Vocation" lecture "will
necessarily disappoint you
in
various ways," they both
regard theorizing as a
defiant act
"against" their times.
However, in terms of Weber's
theory
of an ethic of responsibility,
which presupposes a human
faculty to discern the mix of
moral aims and violence,

Nietzsche portends a weakness
in the thinking of his
Wilhelmine successor.
In Twilight
of the

t^i

.

Nie tzsche

spurns the idea that man is
"the effect of some special
purpose. .the object of an attempt
to attain an 'ideal of
humanity or an 'ideal of happiness'
.

or an 'ideal of

morality.'"

6

”

Hence he rejects the philosophical
basis

that supports Weber's theory of
political ethics: the
rational and sovereign individual.
"No one is responsible
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for man's beinq there

being such-and-such

“
or

m

'

or

this environment

U

'

3

’

3

at-

."

,phil ° SOPter

n

„

fn-r
r hi
hlS
61

''

remarks Nietzsche,

"for his

v.

bSln9 ln

As he pvnii
explains

circumstances

m

—-——

Beyond

cinnH

"greatness" in
ideas "that would banish
everybody into a corner
and
'specraltr
Rather, one findg ifc
man s
muitrplrcity, in his
wholeness in manifoldness.
He would
even determine value
and rank in accordance
with how much
and how many things one
could bear and take upon
himself,
one could extend his
responsibility."" with a
hint of irony, therefore,
the same legacy that
allows Weber
to theorize an ethic
"against" the idols of his
own time
mirrors the key fount of
reproach against his own
idea of an
ethic of responsibility 63

^

,

.

In light of Nietzsche'

Weber

untimely impact, how might

s

theory to political ethics
divulge the limits of
"responsibility" for the politician
as well as the theorist?
More than measuring the ethical
confines
s

of

Christianity, pacificism,
Machtpolitik, and revolutionary
socialism, Weber's theory of
political ethics also assess
something else.
Indeed, he seeks to locate and
clarify the
theoretical crossroads between ethics
and politics.
He
begins this search in his "Vocation"
lecture
on politics,

asking his audience the following
question: "Where is what
one might call the ethical home
of politics?"
The

intricacies of this search become apparent
when, after
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having raised the auestinn
question, he answers
it with a statementAt this point,
admittedly, ultimate
Wei tanschauungen
collide, and one has
eventually to choose
between them .«
4 -*'*

“

—™
•

hone o,
thus entails at least
two variations on
the theme of human
Struggle.
I believe
it suggests a struggle
between
politicians who devote
themselves to differing
causes as
well as one between
political theorists who
attach

themselves to differing
views of ethics.
Yet the hey to
grasping Weber- s idea of
political ethics, and the
struggles
which concur with it
ic
^
in, is not found
the "ethical
irrationality" per se that
is indicative of the
modern
collision of moral aims.
According to Weber, it
appears in
a person- s conscious
choice between "two
fundamentally

m

different,

irreconcilably opposed maxims,"
whereby a person

can follow the 'ethic of
principled conviction'
Gesinnung
or the -ethic of responsibility"« At this crossroads
of
human choice the ethical
struggles of politicians and
political theorists alike become
quite evident.
(

)

.

The choice Weber recommends to
those persons who seek a
leadership role in politics is, of
course, the latter one:
the ethic of responsibility.
Portraying the ethic of
principled conviction as one "bound
to founder hopelessly on
this problem of how the end is
to sanctify the means," Weber
surmises that "the only position it
can logically take is to
reject any action which employs morally
dangerous means. 66
II
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Moreover, given his
perception
^
that
ac

poises
.

«

the use of violence,

«

Ttlhe h
Lt]he
decisive means of
•

•

the ethic of convictlon
appears flawed in its
potential for logical
coherence and
political success. This
explains, in part,
Weber's critical
commentary against the
political advocates of
pacificist, and
revolutionary socialism.
Accordingly, Weber claims
that the
"means of legiti mate
violence per £e
"

^

hand£j

^

^

ations is what gives all
the ethical problems
of
politics their particular
character."- Based on this
tension between moral aims
and violent means, he
concludes
that a person's duty to
a principled conviction,
though
admirable, is still not
enough to brace anyone
against the
ethical bedlam of politics.
The person who is most
able to
endure this "ethical tension"
is not only devoted
to a

principled conviction but
"responsible" for the paradoxical
consequences that issue from
it.

Max Weber's idea of an ethic
of responsibility reveals
more than the ethical void
bestowed on German
politics by
the varied proponents of an
absolutist ethic of conviction.

also discloses another one of
Weber's chief preconditions
for the possibility of ethics
in modern politics.
His idea
of an ethic of responsibility
posits, not merely a person
Who is capable of making "mature"
choices in politics,
It

but a

person whose choices are justified
neither by right nor
nature.
In other words, it postulates
a person

who stands

out on the basis of his "trained
ability" to "make
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allowances" for such "everyday
shortcomings in people"
as
greed, resentment, stupidity,
naivete, etc.
According to
Weber, such a person
"has no right... to
presuppose goodness
and perfection in human
beings.
He does

not feel that he
can shuffle off the
consequences of his own actions,
as far
as he could foresee
them, and place the
burden on the
shoulders of others.
By experiencing a litany of
struggles, the person who
"subscribes" to an ethic
of responsibility becomes
cognizant of the moral
limitations
of others as well as
oneself.
Such a politician evokes
the
precept of an "original sin"
of sorts, one more historical
than theological in its view
of individual human conduct.
Thus, with an "unsparing
gaze" into "the realities of
life,"

responsible

politician labors to discern the
ethical
disparities between moral aims and
violent means, defying
the absolutist overtures of
"conviction" politicians.
By positing this person as
the basis of an ethic of
responsibility, Weber hopes to fend
off the excesses he
ascribes to the myopic followers of
a principled conviction
and the hollow disciples of
Machtpolitik
As Weber observes
the problem, early-20th century
German society all too often
indulges in the "deadly sins" against
the "holy spirit" of
politics.
By "sin" he means that the "striving
for power
becomes detached from the task in hand
unsachlich and
becomes a matter of purely personal self -intoxif
ication
.

(

)

instead of being placed entirely at the service
of the
183

rv

^

i8

w
Weber labels the
"carnival"

Under this label be

l umps

of wtat

Qf

the actions Qf

Liebknecht who performed
in Berlin and Munich
those of Ludendorff
whose arrogant and

,

as

weU

^

ag

,

piqued widespread distaste
for political authority.
In
Weber s idea of a
"responsibility" refers to
a
person who; "[ejvery day
and every hour,"
confronts the
"enemy which threatpnq
nreatens him
him from within: common
vanity, the
mortal enemy of all
dedication to a cause."™
B y curbing
the vanity of politicians,
the ethic of responsibility
underscores not just a person's
a capacity to
differentiate
a variety moral ends
from violent means.
More specifically
it reminds the politician
to be diligent in
distinguishing
"one's inner composure and
calm" from his "passionate
-f

commitment to a 'cause'

(

Sache

"
)

What allows a person to
discern between these
contentious elements, within one's
own self and among others
politics, is the element of
"judgment" {Augenmass)
In

m

.

using this term, Weber points
to the "decisive psychological
quality" that is representative
of the responsible
politician.
It is a quality that deflects
the vain "need to
thrust one's person as far as
possible into
the foreground"

of politics,

compelling the politician to value the

"distance" between himself and other
"things and people" in
politics 71 This notion of judgment as
distance, which
.
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Weber also refers

<-

0 as

objectivity

'

1

iSachlichkelt)
,

a

allows

politician to differentiate
conceptually one's
passions
from the sobering
circumstances of political
struggle »
It also reminds a
person that politics
"is an activity
conducted with the head,
not with the other
parts of the
Yet if politics is
to be genuinely

human
rather than some frivolous
intellectual game,
dedication to it csn
can nniw
only be generated and
sustained by
passion.
short, Weber's idea of
judgment accentuates
both an ethical chasm
and an historical accord
between a
politician s duty to a cause
and his use of violent
means to
advance that cause. The
import of judgment surfaces,

action,

'

m

therefore,

in the view of a
politician who understands
the
present value of his ideals
in light of the impending

consequences that threaten his
ethical posture, social
status, and political power.
It seems as though the
"responsible" politician banks
on little, if any, success
in either balancing a
conviction

with violence or estimating
the consequences of such a
morally turbulent mix.
"Nor," Weber continues, "can
any
ethic in the world determine when
and to what extent the
ethically good end 'sanctifies' the
ethically dangerous
means and side-effects."- Thus,
the point is that
the

person who abides by an ethic of
responsibility has within
his field of focus neither solely
a principled conviction
nor only an instrumental view of
politics,
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since these "two

"

fundamentally different,
x re cone ll ably
irreconcil
ahi „ opposed
maxims " 75
often reveal themselves
as "complementary
to one
another,
the politician chief
concern is judging the
corollary effects.
"Anyone who makes a pact
with the means
of violence, " remarks
Weber
Der "fnrtor wVmwhatever purpose- -and
every politician does
this-is at the mercy of its
specific
consequences
The "responsible"
politician exhibits how
principled beliefs and violent
means mingle in a way
that
allows the one to bare the
ethical limits of the other,
sparking consequences of
greater gravity than power
itself.
diabolical couplet is what
forever compels the
politician "to be conscious of
these ethical paradoxes and
of his responsibility for
what may become of himself
under
pressure from them.

-

'

The political significance
of an ethic of
responsibility thus manifests itself
in the consequences
that challenge the "inner
defenses" of a politician.
For
instance, Weber rebukes the
politician who, like some
Bolsheviks and Spartacists, seeks
"to establish absolute
justice on earth" by paradoxically
calling "for one last act
of force to create the situation
in which all violence will
have been destroyed for ever ." 78 He
does not criticize the
philosophical ground of their convictions,
nor does he
challenge their use of violent means to
promote them.

Stressing the "ethical paradoxes" that
correspond to their
deeds, Weber instead challenges the
leaders of revolutionary
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socialism insofar ag they

n

remain unaware of the
diabolical
powers at work.
They
are
e
y
inexorable k
inexorable,
bringing about the
consequences of the i r action,
including consequences
for
their being, to which
they win fa
helpless victims f
they remain blind to
them.- Hence the gravity
of these
"paradoxical" outcomes defines
the terrain where
•

n

,

the

politician faces the moral
divide between violence
and
convictions. There the
politician observes

his ethical

limit.

He does so whether he
stays "blind" to consequences
and is "damaged and
discredited for generations
to come, " or
he gams an "unsparing
gaze" and "withstand [s]
even the
defeat of all hopes" with
judgment and passion intact.
Given Weber's critique of
"conviction" politicians, the
best hope for politics, the
German nation, and political
ethics appears in the person
with the "unsparing gaze".
However, this politician who
adheres to the ethic of

responsibility also points,

I

think,

to some theoretical

incongruities which ultimately cast
doubt on the political
relevance of such an ethic.
First of all, by positing his
ethic of responsibility on a person
who is "trained" within
the narrow confines of political
struggle, Weber designates
a political ethic for some but
not all people.
In doing so,
he not only impedes the conditions
for the possibility of
politics, transforming the criteria of
"the hard struggle of
man with man" into a "responsibility for
the conseguences"
of one's deeds.
Weber also impedes Germany's reach for
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national power, since his
prerequisite of "political
machinery". diminishes the
value of "'occasional'
politicians" in favor of more
"responsible" "

full-time'
His idea of an ethic of
responsibility no
doubt suggests a provocative
option to the blind feats
of
conviction-politicians" who comprise
early-20th
century German politics.
Yet, with all its
curative
promise, Weber's idea does
not absolve him for locating
political ethics in those
persons whose "inner being"
'

politicians

1,00

.

supersedes morally
ie conre-ity the
conceit, inconstancy, and
immaturity
of other persons in
politics.
*.

By grounding the "responsible"
politician's "inner
being- on "judgment," furthermore,
I believe Weber
points to
another flaw in his idea of an
ethic of responsibility.
it
reflects a flaw insofar as he
depicts judgment as that

"psychological" trait which allows the
politician to discern
"passion" for an ideal from the
historical "realities" that
often counter it and, thus, hinder
one's ethical reach.
The
problem, though, has little to do
with judgment per se.
It
is most apparent in that Weber's
idea of judgment posits a
"reality" in politics, a reality identified
by other "things
and people" who are also marked by the
coupling
of

convictions and violence.

By making judgment contingent

upon such empirically specific phenomenon,
he not only
posits a narrow view of historical reality,

but he theorizes

a

narrow understanding of political judgment.
188

Indeed,

in

"

his zeal to give sight
to the "blind" disciples
of an ethic
of conviction, those
politicians who-in vain-direct
their
the void, " Weber prescribes
a clarity of vision
in the form of his notion
of judgment.
Yet, though it helps
the politician "maintain
one's inner composure and
calm,

judgment's myopic focus on
"things and people" still
permits
the same person to ignore
the possible normative
discrepancies in his own moral
conviction.
Unlike persons
who submit blindly to a
conviction, despite (or maybe
because of) certain "realities,"
the responsible politician
judges the ethical difference
between a moral conviction

and

the historical struggle with
reality.

m

other words, he

chooses to make this sort of
judgment rather than judging
the very moral conviction for
which he struggles with others
in politics.
The ethic of responsibility thus
reveals a restricted
view of politics, one prioritizing
a specific person who,
with keen judgment, advances a
principled conviction
seemingly unaltered but by empirical
events.
Max Weber's
theory of political ethics impedes the
possibility of

politics by qualifying it with the standard
of
responsibility.

requires

a.

it is a limiting standard,

not because it

person to exemplify the moral and ethical

constancy of a saint, such as that demanded of one
who
follows an ethic of conviction.
On the contrary, a person
who typifies Weber's idea of responsibility accepts
a
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"

different,

if not more difficult

charge
cnar
Th^ person must
ge.
That
anticipate ethical consequences
in terms of "a quite
inadequate, even paradoxical
relation" between violent
means
and a moral conviction.
Yet, like the
'

ethic of conviction,
most people are incapable
of measuring up to an
ethical
standard of responsibility
in politics, a task
Weber
compares to a "slow, strong
drilling through hard
boards.
Instead of a saint, Weber
longs for a "hero"
whose ethical posture can
endure even the paradoxical
2TGp0ircus s ions of politics.
oolit~i pq
Hence his idea of responsibility
puts the prospect of politics
beyond the " 'occasional"official," and even "conviction"
politicians, making it the
sole domain of "heroic"
politicians.
^

,

But more than that, Weber's
theory of political ethics
tends to hinder the prospects
of German national greatness,
and this is evident from at least
two different angles.

Inasmuch as his normative longing for
"responsibility"
restricts politics to the deeds of
heroes, I think Weber
tends to drain the German nation of
its cosmopolitan,
liberal,

and democratic promise.

His allocation of

responsibility to heroic politicians rather than
eager
citizens indicates a serious diminution in
the preconditions
for the prospect of German national unity
and power.

Moreover, given the political significance he
assigns to an
ethic of responsibility, I think Weber unwittingly
reveals a

profound divide between the ideal of responsibility and
his
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principled conviction of
German national greatness.
greatness presupposes

if

"responsible" politicians,
and if
responsibility propels them
to admit the tension
between
violence and ideals, then
Weber's theory of political
ethics
undercuts his unflinching
devotion to the German nation
His notion of political
ethics does so in that it
constrains
the possibility of
politics, which in turn
hinders the
German nation's advance
toward historical glory.
it also
undercuts Weber's devotion
insofar as political ethics
necessitates a politician's self
-scrutiny of his own
principled convictions, even
those that pertain to the
elevated status of the German
nation.
Thus I think Weber
confirms Nietzsche's claim the
"the philosopher" lives "in

contradiction to his today: his enemy
was ever the ideal of
today." Yet, though he "posits"
a value "against" the idea
of political ethics in German
politics, Weber languishes in
relation to Nietzsche's other hope
that the philosopher of
"tomorrow" becomes "'capable of being
as manifold
as whole,

as ample as full

.

'

"«

Nietzsche's view of responsibility

envisions numerous ethical postures,
whereas Weber's view
documents a similar sort of diversity,
but only for the sake
of exalting one ethic above all
others in German politics.

The Ethical Para d oxes of Politics and
Political Theory

At the end of his lecture on "The Profession
and

Vocation of Politics," Max Weber voices an opinion
which
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counters his earlier claims
about the elevated status
of the
"responsible" politician. After
expounding on the ethical
qualities of the "leader" and
"hero," he still concludes
that "even those who are
neither. .must .. .put on
the armour
of that steadfastness
of heart which can
withstand even the
defeat of all hopes."indeed, though he is clear
about
the political distinctions
between leaders and citizens,
Weber appears to qualify both
with a capacity to judge one's
wn choices in the face of
ethical paradoxes.
The
importance of this textual
contrast manifests
.

itself,

I

contend,

in something more than
just a lapse in Weber's
approach to the individual sources
of an ethic of

responsibility.

I

think it surfaces, as well,

in his own

theoretical judgments relative to
the impending consequences
that confront the politician
who abides by an ethic of
responsibility.
For the contrast between political
heroes
and everyday citizens underscores
Weber's estimation
that

"the man fighting for a belief
to do so,

a human 'apparatus '." 84

"need," however,

needs a following in order
As a result of this

"the leader is entirely dependent on the

functioning of his apparatus
his own ." 85

...

...

dependent on its motives, not

The impending consequences for the
politician

thus derive not solely from his capacity
to judge his own

political deeds.

They also derive from other citizens who

have the capacity to judge the politician
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86
.

In addition to this
constraint on the politician's
ethic of responsibility, I
think Weber's theory of
political

ethics reveals a constraint
on the ethical posture
of the
political theorist. On the
one hand, his efforts to
theorize a notion of political
ethics presuppose "the
organisational preconditions for
the emergence of leaders."
On the other hand, they
promise the German nation a leader
who can "seize the spokes of
the wheel of history."

At this

very point, where Weber locates
the ethical clash between
"morally dangerous means" and
"'good' ends," he illuminates
not ] us t the "ethical paradoxes"
that confront a responsible
p litician.
By presupposing a politics
based on
"mechanical" force, while at the same
time advocating the
"principled conviction" of German glory,
Weber's theory of
thics suggests a paradox in his
political thinking. Though
the paradox that confronts the
politician is by far more
menacing, given the impact of violence
on a human
following,

the paradox that defies Weber
nevertheless reveals an
ethical limit in his theoretical enterprise.
It signifies a
limit not simply on the basis of a
tension between his

instrumental view of politics and his universal
design of
the nation.
Nor does it do so merely on account of Weber's
theory of political ethics, which tends to
constrain the

prospects of modern politics and German national glory.
Rather,

I

think the paradox that confronts Weber indicates

an ethical limit insofar as he fails to judge such
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theoretical discrepancies and
the impending consequences
they pose for the vitality
of his political thinking.
For
it is a failure of
judgment that undercuts his
scholarly
"responsibility before history "
a responsibility
he

,

believes "weighs even more heavily
on us today."The role of judgment in
revealing the ethical limits
of
the politician and the
political theorist denotes yet
another link between Weber and
Nietzsche. Again, given
Nietzsche's charge against philosophy
in Twilight nf
Idols,

judgment stems from what he calls
the "weariness of
a
sound clearly expressed by Socrates
and Plato in
their "logical" quests for truth.
"Judgements,"

he asserts,

"judgements of value... can,
have value only as symptoms
are stupidities

."

88

in the end,
... in

never be true: they

themselves such judgements

This symptomatic feature of judgment

is conceivable to Weber given his
perspective on the modern

world's "ethical irrationality,"

a

view which notes the

dilution of absolute ends in an ever-widening
tide of
empirical details. Yet, unlike Nietzsche, who
values
judgment only insofar as it informs the philosopher
the value of life cannot be estimated

,

»

"

that

Weber identifies

judgment as the prime measure of the paradoxical tensions

between ends and means.

He likens it to "that powerful

control over the soul" which merges human "passion" for a
cause with an acute perception of empirical "realities ". 89
Thus Weber's desire to "control" that which Nietzsche
194

believes "cannot be estimated "
again forces him to fall
short of Nietzsche' s standard
for future philosophers,
indeed, near the end of
Ttejiaz^cience, Nietzsche charges
that the philosopher "must
overcome' ... not only his time
but also his prior aversion
and contradiction against this
time, his suffering from
this time, his un-timeliness,
his
romanticism
other words. I think Weber's faith
in
judgment reveals the "weariness"
not only of the politician
who occupies his theory of politics,
but of Weber

m

.

himself, a

theorist who blinks at the sight of
an ethical paradox.’ 1
How does judgment operate within
Max Weber's notion of
an ethic of responsibility, such
that it discloses the
ethical limits of both the politician
and the political
theorist?

With regard to the politician, Weber's
idea of judgment
denotes ethical limits relative to the "human
'apparatus'"

which the politician uses to advance his
principled
conviction.

Among other things, judgment allows the

"responsible" politician to discern his conviction
from such

political means as the "continuous administration" of
citizenry,

officials.

law,

finances,

and military force by paid

Despite this function, however, the politician

remains at the mercy of political "realities,

"

forces that are often at odds with his duty to,
1

ust ice

,

a

beauty,

or even German national glory.

at these sorts of endeavors,

Weber argues,
195

mechanical
say,

To succeed

"things must be

emptied and made into
matteis-of fact iVer
Sachllchung)
and
the following must undergo
spiritual proletarianisation,
in
order to achieve discipline'

.

"»

Therefore,

for all its

ability to inform the
politician of the ethical
discrepancies between "'good'"

ends and "violent" means,

judgment nevertheless fails
the politician.
it fails to rid
or even offset what Weber
calls the "everyday existence"
of
the world, a "reality" which
finds administrative functions
draining passion from a
politician's ultimate conviction.
"This is why," warns Weber,
"the following of a man fighting
for a faith... tends to decline
particularly easily into a
quite ordinary stratum of
prebendaries ." 93
By unveiling this flaw in
the "unsparing gaze" of the
responsible politician, Weber points
to the ethical limits
that the politician might
encounter in modern politics. The
responsible politician judges the
distance between "things
and people" and oneself, overcoming
the "all-too-human"

propensity toward common vanity.

He judges,

too,

the

distance between "the means of violence"
and a principled
conviction, accentuating the dissimilar
purpose of each
element in politics.
He further judges the
"ethical

paradoxes" that are typically the consequence
of these

antithetical factors, anticipating "the diabolical
powers"
that might foil his ideal,

force of his means.

as much as nullify the technical

More important,

though,

Weber's

politician judges "that the eventual outcome of political
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action frequently, indeed
regularly, stands rn a
quite
inadequate, even paradoxical
relation to its original,
intended meaning and purpose
(Sinn)."» It is t hus
evident, I believe, that
judgment detects the ethical
bounds
of a " responsible"
politician.
indeed, judgment is what
allows the politician to pull
back the veil
of his own

principled convictions to reveal
the mortal calculus of
violent political means. As
Weber indicates near the end
of
his Vocation lecture, these
limits emerge most clearly
when a politician admits, both
to himself
and to his

following, nothing more than
"'Here

other

'

1,95

I

stand,

I

can do no

'

.

The weight of this admission,
however,

far exceeds the

potential loss of a politician's office,
prestige, power, or
sense of passion for a cause.
Insofar as the

ethical limits
of a responsible politician
surface among "the ramifications
of the ethical tension between
ends and means," the weight

comes down on Weber's theory of politics.
its impact appears,

On the one hand

not so much in Weber's privileging the

politician's "personality," but in Weber's
illumination of
the tragic fallout which politicians must
confront in
politics.

By acting responsibly,

the politician fights for

an end only to the extent that he admits his
collusion with
the violent means that transgress it,

suggesting a politics

in which the politician withdraws from the fight
for the

sake of the end.

On the other hand,
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the politician's

testimony to his ethical
limits also suggests a
politics in
Which other persons-be they
"full-time" or "'occasional'"

politicians- -question the moral
force of his actions.
Hence
the weight of admitting
one's ethical limits falls
on more
than just the politician's
shoulders,
so to speak,

a weight
imperils the sublime or earthly
"rewards" for himself
and others.
I believe it also
falls on Weber's theory of
politics, in that the politician's
judgment discloses the
tragic finitude of politics,
which in turn constricts the
aim of German national glory.
By the same token,

the

politician's judgment of his ethical
limits implies the
judgment of other citizens and
politicians, a situation that
further foils Weber's aim of German
glory by augmenting the
prospects of political struggle 96
.

The idea of judgment in Weber's
theory of political
ethics also portends the ethical
limits of the political
theorist.
This is the case especially for
theorists who,
like Weber, champion a specific
principled conviction over
the course of their intellectual
enterprises.
For all of
his resolute claims about "'the small
number'" of "leaders"
and "heroes" who ought to inhabit politics,
Weber still
concedes the political value of those persons
"who are

neither of these things."

In fact,

on the margins of

Weber's theory of politics linger the "'occasional

politicians'" and those persons who "put on armour of that

steadfastness of heart which can withstand even the defeat
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all hopes."

Thus he himself occasionally
perceives
other persons who, though
cordoned off from the "small
leading groups" that comprise
politics, represent

nonetheless a mix of passion,
judgment, and responsibility.
However, the key distinction
between the politician and the
citizen is, of course, that
the politician's ethical
limits
come to the fore by way of
the political requisite
of

violence.

But this distinction does
not necessarily bar

from politics someone like
Weber who, as a citizen and
political theorist, promotes his
principled conviction by
means other than violence.
"We are all 'occasional'
politicians," states Weber, in contrast
to the

"'professional politicians'" whom he
believes thrive on
modern politics. We are, he continues,
insofar as "we post
our ballot slips or express our will
in some similar way,
such as voicing approval or protest
at
a

'political'

meeting, making a 'political' speech and
so on ." 98

Therefore the politician and, in Weber's
particular case,
the political theorist are both capable
of judging the
ethical incongruities between ends and means in
their own
deeds and in those of others.
Yet the theorist's judgment of the tension between,
say,

the ideal of German glory and the machinery of politics

does not altogether verify his duty to an ethic of

responsibility.

Like the politician,

the political theorist

judges both the ethical distance between "'good' ends" and
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«

"dangerous means" and the
ne

ethical paradoxes" that
issue
from such unions.
This latt-^-r
atter facu lty is what
Weber appears
to lack.
it is i acking in his
critical exchange with
the
ethical stands of Christianity,
Machtpoli tik, pacificism
and revolutionary socialism,
such that each critique
confirms the closure of
politics for the sake of
.

responsibility and, thus, German
grandeur.
is absent insofar as he
advances

Furthermore,

it

the cause of German

nationalism with

theory of modern politics, the
mechanical function of which
violates the "final and
decisive" rank he ascribes to the
German nation. Whether he
engages in- an "'occasional'"
struggle with his worldly
opponents or a "scholarly" search
for "the ethical home of
politics," Weber appears oblivious
to the "ethical
paradoxes" that mar his theoretical
enterprise.
Perhaps
such misjudgments are the result of
his "common vanity
what Weber himself calls "a kind of
occupational disease"
within "academic and scholarly circles ." 99
Though Weber
also claims that such vanity "does not
... interfere with the
pursuit of knowledge, " his devotion to the
German nation
seems to "tempt him to strive for the glittering
appearance
a

,

of power rather than its reality

."
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Weber's devotion

does not necessarily interfere with his search for

knowledge.

Indeed,

I

think it propels his search, allowing

him to ignore the rift between the "machinery" of politics
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grandeur" of nation as well
as the breach between
his theory Of ethics and
his ethical conduct as
a theorist.
One consequence of Weber's
misjudgment thus surfaces in
his theory of political
ethics, whereby a
"responsible"
politician must remove either
himself or
the ideal of the

German nation from the domain
of politics.
if the
politician remains in politics,
then violence transgresses
and alters his principled
conviction.
if he withdraws from
the fight, the ultimate aim
of the nation remains morally
sound but politically weak.
In each case the politician
typifies, tragically, the extent
to which the ethical
teria of responsibility" narrows
the prospect
of

politics in the modern world.

Another consequence manifests in
relation to Weber's
general project of political theorizing.
Insofar as he

posits politics on an instrumental
foundation, as well as
advocates its use as the chief means to
the goal of German
greatness, Weber confronts his own ethical
limit
as a

political theorist in silence.

He is quite vocal,

however,

when it comes to acknowledging the ethical
flaws in the
thinking of his scholarly and political
opponents.

these unilateral critiques underscore,

I

But

believe, more than

just the absence of judgment in Weber's theoretical
approach
to political ethics.

They accentuate, too, the extent to

which his ethical shortcomings as a theorist surface
and
speak,

if not through Weber himself,
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then through the rivals

.

whom he subjects to the
ethical standard o £
responsibility
Consequently, Weber- s theory
of politics falls
short of his
own ethical standard,
illustrating a politician
who imperils
German glory and a theorist
who fails
to judge the ethical

paradox in his political
thinking.
Judging from Weber's theory
of political ethics,
the
ethical flaws of the political
theorist thus appear to
emerge in the exchange between
differing

thinkers.
This is
evident when Weber challenges
both the ethical posturings
of
Christianity, pacificism, and
revolutionary socialism and
the ethical vacuity of
Machtpolitik
He dispels their
political promise with the criteria
of "responsibility," in
turn further restricting the
prospect of politics and, thus,
his ultimate goal of German
national greatness.
He does so,
too, while unknowingly
highlighting the ethical

incongruities that pervade his own
political thinking.
The theorist's ethical flaws become
evident,

furthermore, in Weber's historical
encounter with Nietzsche.
It is Nietzsche who, with
aspersions toward the
"value" of

"responsibility," defies Weber not for narrowing
the scope
of politics, but for narrowing theory
with "judgements" that
fail to "'overcome'" Weber's own ethical
"timeliness."

In a

way,

Weber epitomizes Nietzsche's belief about "men
of
knowledge" in his preface to On the Genealogy of Morals
that "we are necessarily strangers to ourselves,
we do not

comprehend ourselves."

Indeed, Nietzsche continues, noting
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also the manifold value
of such limits,
misunderstand ourselves, for

-we have to

us the law 'Each is
furthest

from himself applies to
all eternity.— As
long as
Weber' s notion of political
ethics evokes an encounter
with
his intellectual counterparts,
it amplifies the
ethical
flaws in his theoretical
enterprise, as well as it
extends
the paradoxical path of
all succeeding political
theorists.
in shouldering the ethical
burden of "responsibility,"
the politician and political
theorist convey the intricacies
of Max Weber s theory of
political ethics. The politician
not only carries the weight
of judgment in Weber's
idea of

an ethic of responsibility;
he illustrates, as well, how
judgment potentially restricts
politics and the ideal of
German national glory. Yet this
is not the consequence
Weber anticipates, since his chief
concern entails

theorizing a type of ethics that can
revitalize German
politics and, thus, facilitate the
advance of the German
nation.

As a political theorist, moreover,
Weber himself
illustrates how the weight of judgment
impacts his

perspective on political ethics.

Indeed,

by challenging the

dominant views on ethics and the legacy of
Nietzsche, he
reveals more than just the extent to which his
lack of

judgment unsettles his own theoretical approach
to ethics.
By positing "responsibility" as the groundwork
of political
ethics, Weber elects to "remain blind" to the
consequences

that manifest themselves in more constrained notions
of
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politics and German nationalism.
Such a mis judgment -or
lack of responsibility
as a political
theorist-indicates, I
believe, discrepancies in
Weber's theory of political
ethics
in particular and the
enterprise of theorizing in
general.
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Spirit of Tragedy (New York: BasicBook, 1996), 257-ff. it
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we bring to it, and we choose our values 'through a glass
darkly,
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CHAPTER IV

the "INCONVENIENT" GROUND
OF SCHOLARLY JUDGMENT
Introduct nn
i

Despite his condemnation of
judgment in the Western
philosophical tradition, Friedrich
Nietzsche still finds the
moral latitude to validate
the judgments of Thucydides.
-My
recreation, my preference, my
cure from all Platonism has
always been Thucydides » he
says, again in The

Twilit

,

Idols

^

1

By singling out the intellect
of Thucydides,
Nietzsche claims there is far more
to Greek philosophy than
just Socrates and Plato.
He refuses to embrace such
thinkers who, as the Athenian
city-state grew detached from
its "Homeric" cultural legacy,
longed for moral comfort and
stability within the logical framework
of their ideas.
.

Instead, Nietzsche contests both thinkers
with one of their
own,

Thucydides:

strong,

severe,

"the great sum,

the last revelation of that

hard factuality which was instinctive with

the older Hellenes

."

2

Thus his rejection of Socrates and

Plato reveals a distaste for human judgments,
but only those
that masquerade as moral truths.
It also reveals his esteem
for the judgments of Thucydides, judgments which
upset the

universal ground of such moral truths with "untimely"
factual details.

"In the end," states Nietzsche,

"it is

courage in the face of reality that distinguishes a man like

Thucydides from Plato: Plato is a coward before reality,

consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has control
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"

of himself,

things

.

consequently
also maintains control
y he cuso
of

3

Having "courage in the face
of reality" is Nietzsche'
way of saying Thucydides
provides a differing approach
to
the idea of judgment.
it is a view that confronts
rather
than evades the morally unsettled
world which surrounded
him.
Thucydides contrived its theoretical
design

s

over the
course of writing his forceful
work of historical
scholarship, The Peloponnesian War
As Athens and Sparta
battled over the loyalty of Corcyra,
Melos, and Sicily, as
well as the meaning of the nexus
between democracy and
empire, Thucydides judges more than
"the greatest
.

disturbance" in the Hellenic world.

He also questions the

judgments of those historical inquiries
which lead up to and
through the war itself.
Indeed, he claims Homer's poetic
depictions of the Trojan War and Herodotus's
mythological
accounts of the Persian War make it such "that
one cannot

rely on every detail which has come down to
us by way of

tradition ." 4

Conversely, Thucydides posits his judgments

of Hellenic history on a ground of factual
evidence, which

includes personalized accounts of political speeches and

corroborated reports of military engagements.
evidence," he states,

"It is better

"than that of the poets, who

exaggerate the importance of their themes, or of the prose
chroniclers, who are less interested in telling the truth

than in catching the attention of their public
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."

5

Thucydides

notion of judgment, therefore,
rests on the
empirical rendering of "reality,"
one which informs
his

desire to contest the judgments
that comprise the historical
tradition to which he belonged 6
.

This so-called "courage" of
Thucydides also indicates a
shared affinity with Max Weber,
a political thinker whose
idea of judgment requires one
"to look at the realities
of
life with an unsparing gaze."^
the previous

m

chapter,

I

argued that Weber's theory of
political ethics hinged in
part on just such a notion of
judgment.
Judgment
corresponded to the professional
politician's detachment of
empirical reality" from "principled
conviction,
but only

"

to the extent that one assumed
"responsibility" for the

former's material impact on the latter's
idealistic
underpinnings.
More important, however, I claimed this
notion of judgment marked a formidable
source of tension in
his theory of political ethics.
By tethering ethical
conduct to responsibility, Weber not only
narrowed the scope
and merits of political leadership; he also
restricted the

possibility of politics which, in turn, undercut the
ideal
of German national glory.
The tension in his theory of
political ethics thus emerged in the mix between

a

responsible" politician whose judgments restricted politics
and a scientist whose judgments defied a politician's "ethic
of responsibility."

Given this depiction of the double-

edged blade of judgment, it appears Weber and Thucydides
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share respect for the
gravity of empirical
details,
It is
also apparent that their
respect for historical
-reality.,
stems from both the formative
and destructive effects
such
knowledge has on the permanence
of human judgments.

This affinity between an
Hellenic historian and a
German social scientist
ceases, however, when
Thucydides
judges his view of history
to be one "done to
last

forever.

For Weber, who portrays
political "judgment"
(AugenmaS) as the upkeep of
"one's inner composure and
calm
while being receptive to
realities," such disregard for
successive views of history would
seem naive, even vain.’
Furthermore, given the idea of
scholarly judgment (Urteil)
which looms in his 1917 "Science
as a Vocation" lecture,
"®

^

Weber might desire greater distance
from Thucydides's
"monumental" aims.” In that lecture
he contends that the
social scientist's judgments are
distinct from
those

rendered by either ancient Greek
historians or professional
politicians. According to Weber, such
judgments are
distinct insofar as the scientist concedes
that they "will

be antiquated in ten,

twenty,

fifty years

...

Every scientific

fulfilment' raises new 'questions'; it asks
to be
surpassed' and outdated." 11

Despite Weber and Thucydides

drawing on the same wellhead of factual details,
the one
diverges from the other in relation to the historical

duration of judgments.

Where Thucydides views facts as a

retort to tradition, and thus the foundation of an absolute
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history, „eber views them
as a retort to all
knowledgeincluding science-aim thus
the source of a struggle
between
differing scholars.

As

stress in this chapter,
Weber's theory of judgment
bares more than his departure
from the thinking of
Thucydides.
By basing judgment on
the foundation of
"progress- (Fortschritt)
meaning that what one -seizes
is
always something provisional
and not definitive,- I argue
that Weber exposes a rift in
his own thinking on
I

,

politics

12

On the one hand, his idea of
political
judgment points to a person who
must "detach- oneself from
worldly things, other persons,
even his own vain desires.
This person does so in order to
"clear away the mechanical
obstacles" which impede the advance of
his cause, leading
him to relegate judgment beneath,
say, the ultimate aim of
German national power. On the other hand,
Weber's idea of
.

scholarly judgment points to a person who,
rather than
submitting to a singular conviction, anticipates
the

conditional traits of all convictions.
divide,

I

Based on this

charge that Weber's idea of judgment displays the

limited bounds of his theory of politics as well
as the

paucity of. values which inform it.

But

I

do so in a way

that confirms at the same time how his notion of
scholarly

judgment extends the limits of politics by rendering
"ultimate" judgments "provisional and not definite."
conclusion,

I

As a

suggest that Weber's theory of judgment points
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to both a politician who
circumscribes the prospects
of
politics and a scholar who
struggles to extend them.

P olitical

Judgmen t

(Augpnjnafi.q)

It is interesting to note
that many of Max Weber's

political writings first appeared
as public declarations.
They were either lectures
delivered to audiences of scholars
and students or newspaper
articles written with the
intention of swaying German public
opinion.
What was his
1895 essay on "The Nation State
and Economic Policy" but an
"inaugural lecture" symbolizing his
acceptance of the Chair
of Political Economy at the
University of Freiburg. 13
in

it he rebukes the German
bourgeoisie for their lack of

political experience, a class of citizens
which no doubt
comprised at least part of the scholarly
audience.

For that

matter, his 1917 study of "Parliament
and Government in

Germany under a New Political Order" ran
originally as five
separate articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung.
They are
articles in which Weber reproaches both the
character of
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the "official" minions who
helped

administer his monarchical government. 14

Finally, Weber's

1919 brochure on "The Profession and Vocation of
Politics"

was initially a lecture he delivered in Munich, a city
which,

at the time,

was in the throes of a "soviet"

rebellion.' There, before the Freistudentische Bund and

Munich

s

radical Bohemia, he chides those revolutionaries
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.

Who,

in contrast to their
elevated aim of social
justice,
use political violence
to advance it.

What is interesting, however,

is not so much Weber's

proclivity to theorize politics
before a live public
audience.
Rather it is his tendency
to

judge in a public
setting those groups whom he
perceives to be his theoretical
and political opponents. >•
For with his judgments
against
the bourgeoisie,

the monarchy,

revolutionaries, and others,

unwittingly points to an unruly
terrain on which his
own notion of political
judgment becomes prone

to criticism,

as well

Unlike his political writings,
Weber's works on the
methodology of the social sciences
reveal a different
approach to audience and judgment
alike.
Except
for the

"Vocation" lecture on science, most
of his methodological
works speak to a "specialized"
audience of scholars who
confront him in the pages of academic
journals.
For
instance, his 1904 essay on "'Objectivity'
in Social Science
and Social' Policy" appears in the
"exclusively scientific
journal" Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik 16
.

There, Weber- -along with fellow editors
Edgar Jaffe and

Werner Sombart- -claims the journal's "express
purpose" is to
couple "the education of judgment about practical
social

problems" with "the methods of scientific research." 17
Some 13 years later, Weber spoke to a similar audience
on

The Meaning of

'

Ethical Neutrality' in Sociology and
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Which later appeared in
the scholarly journal
Logos.'’
it he spurns the
"widely accepted valuejudgments" of both scientific
positivists, who judge the
world by way of abstract
maxims, and cultural

m

subjectivists,

Who judge it by virtue of
personal experience.
He instead
implores social scientists
of all stripes "to ask
questions
about these things which
convention makes self-evident."”
These instances depict, not
only an audience defined
by its
scholarly rather than political
interests, but a notion of
judgment culled from inquiry
rather than personal
rebuke.

In light of these two
distinct perspectives,

the

following questions ought to be
raised with regard to
Weber's theory of judgment: What
are the philosophical
sources which underlie his concepts
of political and
scholarly judgment, and how might
they impact his

theoretical project of politics?
It must be stressed that Weber's
political writings

offer far more than attacks against
his foes, especially
those writings in which he theorizes a
notion of political
judgment.
In fact, Weber's 1919 "Vocation"
lecture on

politics provides a unique insight into his
theoretical
approach to the idea.

Despite scolding revolutionary

socialists and pundits of Machtpolitik for their lack
of
judgment, he conjectures a theory of judgment based
on a

subtle degree of

"

distance from things and people." 20

He

does so, not for the sake of diminishing the political force
226

Of his opponents,

hut for the purpose of
restraining

t he

"common vanity of all
persons who assume the
weight of
political leadership.
.'Only if one accustoms
oneself to
distance,- Weber maintains,
-can one achieve that
powerful
control over the soul which
distinguishes the passionate
politician from the 'sterile
excitement' of the political
amateur,.
The ..'lack of distance'.'
between a
politician's conviction and his
vain desire to dominate
others, denotes a type of
judgment by which the struggle
of
politics "becomes a matter of
purely personal selfrntoxication instead of being placed
entirely at the service
of the 'cause'."- Though
Weber's theory of political

judgment parallels his disdain for
flawed judgments, it
still tends to fixate on the
element of "distance," ensuring
a politician's steady subservience
to the advance of one
specific ultimate goal. 23
The goal which informs Weber's notion
of political
judgment is, of course, the expansion of
German national
power and greatness. This is not overly
apparent in his

"Vocation" lecture, but it is evident 24 years
earlier in
his Freiburg Inaugural address.
In that work Weber's

approach to political judgment departs from his
critique of
the German bourgeoisie, whom he perceives as
a barrier to
the prospect of national glory.

He points out how the

brilliant yet forceful rule of Count Otto von Bismarck

afforded Germany

a sense of

national unity, a degree of
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political prestige, and an
opportunity to augment its
role
in world affairs.
However, Weber also notes
how Bismarck's
Caesarist" authority "almost
seems to have been too
strong
for us, scorching the
bourgeoisie's slowly developing
capacity for political judgement ." 24
The alternative to
this Bismarckian "tragedy"
mandates a new class of
politicians whose sense of judgment
is nurtured by an active
and continuous engagement with
opponents in Germany's
struggle for national power.
Moreover, Weber insists their
judgments reflect " political maturity,
which

is to say their

grasp of the nation's enduring
economic and political power
interests and their ability... to
place these interests above
all other considerations."Hence his initial depiction
of political judgment fails to
underscore the importance of
"distance" from things, people, and even
oneself.
However,

it does emphasize the supreme
aim of German national power,

which,

m

turn,

shapes Weber's notion of political judgment

into an instrument for the advance of a
particular end.

This function is also apparent in some of
Weber's later
writings, where he theorizes an idea of judgment
capable of

enduring Germany's political tumult during and after
the
First World War.
In 1917, while surveying the possible
problems of "a New Political Order" in Germany, Weber again
faced the tragedy of "Bismarck's legacy."

He repeats his

claim that Bismarck "left behind a nation accustomed to
submit passively and fatalistically to whatever was decided
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.

on its behalf

leader whose

.

But rather than merely
yearn for a

udgments display distance
and maturity, he
theorizes a set of parliamentary
institutions which might
cultivate sound political
judgments among the German
citizenry
For Weber the nation's
"habit of sharing
responsibility, through its elected
representatives
j

... is

only way

judgement

[it]

the

can... be trained in the
exercise of political
He bases judgment on the
distance and

maturity of a politician, but he
also locates each component
within the "progressive democratisation"
of post-war
national politics.
in this instance, judgment
takes shape

m

"the professional politician" who
trains in the
"palaestra" of "parliamentary conflict,"
where "great

problems are not only discussed but are
conclusively
28
decided."
But it does so only insofar

as the politician

assumes the duty "to sacrifice his office
to his
convictions" and secure the German nation
its "decisive say"
in world politics
Even after the war, as the German nation haggled
over
its future at Versailles and Weimar, Weber
continued to

probe the functional design of political judgment.

One

month after his January 1919 lecture on the "vocation"
of
politics

,

he published an essay on "The President of the

Reich" in the Berliner Borsenzeitung

.

In it he not only

argues the merits of a plebiscitary president,

"a head of

state resting unquestionably on the will of the whole
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people

1,29
.

He is after something
else, as well, a

politician with more than just
the power to save Germany
from selfish parliamentary
infighting, ill-advised
partisan
legislation, and vain demagogues.
As Berlin was witnessing
a Spartacist revolt,
followed by Frelkorps
repression
on

behalf of a Socialist government,
Weber argued for "a bearer
of the principle of the unity
of the Reich, a politician
who
"will create a dam to prevent
such one-sided tendencies
getting out of hand."- As a result,
his depiction
of the

Reich's President underscores the
criteria of distance and
maturity which were central to his
idea of political
judgment.
Yet it also reveals the extent
to which Weber not
only relegates political judgment
beneath the goal of German
national power, but links it to a single
politician
who

judges in the name of the national citizenry

31
.

Based. on these works, Weber's notion
of political

judgment appears to be similar to Thucydides's
own idea of
judgment in his survey of "The Policy of
Pericles."

Thucydides recounts how Pericles sought to put
"fresh
courage" into the Athenian citizenry, which had
grown

weary

from failed military excursions, plague, and enemy
invasions.

Speaking before an assembly, Pericles was blunt;

he told Athens that "courage alone" would not suffice
in

bearing the weight of empire, an empire that was "now like
tyranny." .Athens requires an "'intelligence that confirms
courage..., which proceeds not by hoping for the best...,
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a

but by estimating what
the facts are, and thus
obtaining a
clearer vision of what to
expect.'" 32 i n Pericles,
Thucydides found a model of
judgment based on: 1 a
degree
of distance between facts
and ideals and 2) a level
)

of

maturity that recognizes the
contrast between the two.
Moreover, like Weber, he
stresses how Pericles the
political
leader wields judgment, not
for the sake of fostering
democratic politics, but for the
sake of advancing "the
imperial dignity of Athens." 33
For Thucydides and Weber,
judgment denotes a means to a
politician's ultimate end, a
means embodied but by a few
persons willing to subsume
themselves, and others, to the
singular goal of collective
power and glory.
By positing judgment on the
normative groundwork of
German greatness, Weber uncovers some
of the theoretical
affinities he shares with Thucydides.
Yet Weber also turns
away from "the Athenian" who "wrote
the history of the war
fought between Athens and Sparta," exposing,
ironically
enough, certain limits in his own approach
to political

judgment.

In other words,

though Thucydides conjectures a

notion of political judgment similar to the sort
theorized
by Weber, he nevertheless arrives at that point
while

traveling towards a far loftier goal: crafting a history
that will last forever.

Hence the reason for Weber's

aversion has little to do with Thucydides's dismissal of
other thinkers, people who "will not take trouble in finding
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out the truth, but are
much more inclined to
accept the
first story they hear.instead, it has to dQ
with the

ultimate aim underlying
Thucydides's method of scholarship,
that is, an impermeable
monument to Hellenic
history.

For

such an aim potentially
counters both the Athenian
march
towards "imperial dignity" and
the chief purpose animating
Weber's view of scholarship--"scientific
'progress.'" As
Weber notes in his Freiburg
lecture, "it is precisely the
vocation of our science to say
things people do not like to
hear--to those above us, to those
below us, and also to our
own class." 35 Given this view
of science, Weber's

detachment from Thucydides's historical
statuary is not
surprising
What is even more interesting,
however,
.

is the

extent to which such a view counteracts
his own notion of
political judgment.
The philosophical underpinnings of
Weber's view of
science are evident in his "Science as a
Vocation" lecture,

which he delivered in Munich in November
1917.

in this

lecture, which he also addressed to the
Freistudentische
Bund,

Weber argues that the possibility of science in the

early 20th century relies on some fairly daunting

presuppositions.

Countering the "German youth" who rebuffed

science for the metaphysics of "experience,
"the 'way to true being,'

true nature,

happiness

,
'

'

"

he stresses how

the 'way to true art,'

the 'way to true God,

'

the 'way to

the 'way to true

have been dispelled" by man's scientific mastery
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"

.

Of the material world.

3

'

For this reason, the

presupposition of "disenchantment"
circumscribes science
within a narrow field of
events, any understanding
of which
strictly depends on loqic method
^
mernod,
a
and empirical evidence.

'

Yet,

despite its inability to
substantiate universal truths,
science still "further
presupposes that what is yielded...
is
important in the sense that
it is 'worth being known.'"”
Thus science cannot confirm
the essence of,
say,

truth,

knowledge, beauty, or even
national power--all of which
can
justify the aim of science in
the modern world.
As far as
Weber is concerned, science "can
only be interpreted with
reference to its ultimate meaning,
which we must reject or
accept according to our ultimate
position towards life."”
His view of science, then,
postulates not one but a

multiplicity of possible truths, indicating
an unsettled
philosophical ground of moral difference and
human
39
conflict
'

This philosophical context of Weber's
idea of science
reflects the same sort of thinking that
bolsters his idea of

scholarly judgment.

He is clear with regard to science

being a "'vocation' organized in special disciplines
in the
service of self -clarification and knowledge of
interrelated
40
facts ."
Insofar as a scientist acknowledges "the
demon

who holds the fibers of his very life," and discerns
it from

statements of fact,

scholarly judgments are not unlike

those rendered by a responsible politician.
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What separates

the two is not so much
the ultimate conviction
which guides
a person' s' judgment,
be it the quest for
knowledge or the
quest for German glory.
Rather, it has to do with
Weber's
claim concerning the
scientist's recognition of
the fate of
"progress,' with this shift
comes the added
presupposition
that "the ultimately
possible attitudes toward
life are
irreconcilable, and hence their
struggle can never be
brought to a final conclusion."”
Scientists, especially
ones who investigate the
"cultural sciences," thus
construct
ludgments on something more than
the struggle issuing from

scientific-progress.

Unlike the politician, who
judges in
relation to the advance of one
value such as German national
greatness, scientists judge in
relation to a multiplicity of
values which remind them "that
others will advance further
than we have. 1,42
By positing scholarly judgment
on the added foundation
of progress, Weber not only
accentuates the difference
between it and his idea of political judgment.
He also
signals the extent to which scholarly judgment
promotes

conflict between various scholars, compelling
them to
"'question'" and '"surpass'" their own deeds as
well as
those of others.
"The teacher," Weber declares before his
student audience,

"can confront you with the necessity of

choice... He can... also tell you that if you want such
and

such an end,

then you must take into the bargain the

subsidiary consequences which according to all experience
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Will occur

I„ other words,

the ai m behind the

judgments of scholars is not
to recruit, consolidate,
and
mobilize a party of followers
committed to the advance
of
one particular ultimate
goal.
On the contrary, Weber
identifies' the "useful teacher"
as he who teaches
"his

students to recognize
'inconvenient' facts- -I mean
facts
that are inconvenient for
their party opinions ... for
my own
opinion no less than for others. »«
He even goes so far as
to apply the expression
'moral achievement'" to this
duty,
which ensures an increase in
human conflict but also
cultivates independent thinking,
self -clarification
and

frank,

public discussions .«

In this context,

the aim of

scholarly judgment indicates more
than a person's ability
"to make a' decisive choice" in a
morally unsettled world.
It signifies a desire to examine
that choice in a way that
perpetuates rather than stifles human
conflict.

In another context,

Weber's notion of scholarly

judgment is diametrically opposed to his own
notion of
political judgment. Again in "Science as a
Vocation," he
claims "the qualities that make a man an
excellent scholar
and academic teacher are not the qualities
that make him a

leader to give directions in practical life or... in

politics

."

46

The qualities of the scientist are such that

his value is not contingent upon him being a "leader"
of

people

in the vital problems of life" or "in matters of

conduct."

But it is contingent upon him acknowledging the
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historical and philosophical
force of scientific
progress,
which ultimately leads a
scientist "to the aim of
clarity,"
In light of this
admission, Weber continues,
the scientist
"can force the individual
... to give himself
an account of
the ultimate meaning of
his own conduct.”"
Thus
the

scientist judges the world
in way that provokes
people to
clarify the "internal structure"
of their values, prompting
them to recognize the gap
between "'inconvenient' facts"
and
one's "ultimate position
towards life." Conversely,
the
politician judges the world in a
way that supplies people
with a "principled conviction,
"
one which privileges
the

German nation over the judgments
of other citizens.
Though Weber premises his notions
of scholarly and
political judgment on quite divergent
grounds,
he still

intimates the existence of a shared
oppositional bond
between the two. On the one hand, he
posits political
judgment in relation to the ultimate
goal of German national
power, locating its faculties in a
politician who subsumes
himself and others beneath such a goal.
On the other hand,
he establishes scholarly judgment on the
shifting ground of
progress, which reveals a scientist who welcomes
a struggle
over the interpretation of an array of ultimate
ideals.

the heart of Weber's theory of judgment,
a tension

therefore,

resides

between the politician and the scientist, a

tension concerning the moral prominence of the German
nation.

For the scientist,

such a goal is more than just
236

At

)

one o £ many equally
valid goals tQ which a
person
oneself.
It is also worthy of
opposition insofar as "the
ultimate and most sublime
values" have suffered
the untimely
fate of "disenchantment."
The politician admits
to this
"ethical irrationality of
the world," but only
to the extent
that his sense of judgment
maneuvers across its

paradoxical" terrain to advance
one goal over all others.
Given the chasm between
science and politics, it is
not

enough to say that a tension
is evident in Weber's
theory of
judgment.
If the scientist judges
the politician and his
"ultimate meaning towards life,"
then Weber's theory of
judgment also divulges a tension
at the heart of his
theoretical project of politics.

Sch olarly Judgment

(

Urteil

Max Weber's notion of scholarly
judgment (Urteil) stems
part from his theoretical battles with
other influential
schools of scientific thought during
the late-19th and
early-20th centuries.
If Weber was not challenging

m

"scientific positivists," who claimed that
judgment helped
form moral convictions on the basis of
empirical
details,

then he was contesting "cultural subjectivists,"
who

believed judgment infused history with principled
convictions.

In each case,

the problem was not one

concerned with the theoretical meaning of judgment per se.
It was

concerned with the degree of "distance" between
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judgment, a moral conviction,
and the empirical
constraints
tory.
For Weber, the notion
of judgment expressed
by
positivists revealed too much
distance, whereas the
notion
expressed by subjectivists
revealed too little.
From 19 03
until 1917; during which
he wrote essays
essavs on
on, among other
things, "'Objectivity' in
Social Science" and "The
Meaning
of 'Ethical Neutrality,'"
„ e ber engaged both
schools with
regard to the role of judgment
in modern science.
The
result was not a theory of
judgment which superseded other
gns of the idea, but a
scholarly discussion from which
a
theory Of judgment spurred
conflict rather than uniformity
around one ultimate goal of
"truth" or "experience."
Such discussions once again
stress Weber's link to the

political thinking of Thucydides,
who, in his account of
"The Mytilenian Debate," denotes
an idea of judgment based
on the public dialogue among
Athenian citizens. With Athens
in a quandary over how to
punish the Mytilenians for
rebelling against Athenian rule,
Thucydides highlights a
debate which matches the realities of
empire against the
promise of democracy. He first traces the
reasoning of
Cleon,

who,

as a proponent of "imperial power"
and

punishment "by death,

"

argues that Athens has become overly

enamored with "competitive displays" of speech-making.
Cleon perceives such "displays" as evidence of
a growing

Athenian desire to act "more like an audience sitting
at the
feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament
discussing
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matters of state

."

48

Converse!
conversely,
v

as .v,
the advocate of "wise

decisions" and "moderation
in our punishments,"
Diodotus
claims Athens is in need of
debate if the empire
is to

flourish beyond its predicament
with the Mytilenes.
For
with "'words,'" he declarer
A „
ueciares,
it is
possible to deal with
the uncertainties of the
future'"”, reminding Athens
further "that the question is
not so much whether they
[the
Mytilenians] are guilty as whether
we are making the right
decision for ourselves."- Thus,
by altering a debate on
"punishment" into one on the value
of debate, Thucydides
privileges conflict as the cornerstone
of judgment, whether
it involves Cleon's drive for
imperial power or
..

,

i

Diodotus'

push for democracy

51
.

The same can be said about Weber's
inquiries into the
meaning of science. However, where
Thucydides witnesses a
debate between two dissimilar proponents
of Athenian glory,
Weber observes a debate between two differing
views of
science.

As a result of his observations, Weber's
own

interpretation indicates a notion of judgment informed,
not
by the ultimate end of glory, but by the
perpetuation of
human conflict involving a multiplicity of ends.

If

conflict and struggle mark the substance of Weber's
approach
to scholarly judgment,

then what is its purpose in relation

to his theoretical project of politics?

The purpose of scholarly judgment manifests itself in

various forms over the course of Weber's writings on science
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and scientific methodology.
y

in

n

SHpnrQ
Science

as a Vocation, " he
claims science "is not
the gift of grace of
seers and
prophets dispensing sacred
values and revelations,
nor does
it partake of the
contemplation of sages and
philosophers
about the meaning of the
universe.- science, and the
judgments which accompany it,
involves itself in a far
more
difficult task. As Weber
understands it, science is an
enterprise by which scholars
unearth conditional truths
are subject to the tumults
of progress.
They also
take part
a task to compel people-including the

m

scientists- themselves--to "clarify"
the distance between
"this or that ultimate
weltanschauliche position" and the
inconvenient' facts" which counteract
them.
"Again,"
Weber remarks, "I am tempted to
say of a teacher who
succeeds in this: he stands in the
service of 'moral'
forces.
This "'moral'" thrust of science,
this "duty"
to raze rather than elevate
values and truths, this
"unceasing struggle" between differing
persons- -each informs
the goal of scholarly judgment in
its own way.
The force of
each emerges when Weber battles the
"positivist" legacy of
the German Historical School, as well
as the "subjectivist"
bent of younger scholars who question
the rational artifice
of science.

Max Weber's battles with the German Historical
School

began when he arrived at the Verein fur Sozialpolitik
in
1887.

At the Verein

,

a group of scholars,
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business men, and

officials who worked to sway
the economic policies
of the
German state, Weber encountered
such ..strictly scientificindividuals as Gustav Schmoller
and Carl Wenger."

it was
not until 1904, however,
as the editor of the
Heroin's
journal, Archiv, that he
challenged his older colleagues
on
the naive claim of
''-objectivity... buttressing
their notion

of scientific inquiry.

As a Herein member, Weber

acknowledged his intellectual
tie to what he called "our
science," the "sole purpose"
of which "was the attainment
of
value-judgments concerning measures
of state economic
policy.
it was a 'technique'."”
This
"'technique'" was

such that scholars understood
the garnering and ordering of
"empirical" details to be the source,
not the consequence,
of "value-judgments" in modern
science.

56

He labeled their

approach a "confused opinion," for they
perceived valuejudgments to be "'deduced'" from empirical
evidence yet
assumed such a method to be "'objective'"
and void of "'onesided' viewpoints."

As a backer of a "new 'science',"
Weber

wanted to "reject this view in principle."

because

He did so

it can never be the task of an
empirical science to

provide binding norms or ideals from which
directives for
immediate practical activity can be derived." 57
By contesting the scientific purpose of the
Historical
School,

among others, Weber proposes a notion of scientific

objectivity'" based on a different set of principles.
First,

he predicates it on the claim that there is "no
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absolutely 'objective' scientific
analysis of culture"
distinct from the valuejudgments undergirding a
scholar's
perception of the world. Hence
he in no way professes
"that
value-judgments are to be withdrawn
from scientific
discussion in general simply
because ... they
rest on certain

ideals and are therefore
'subjective' in origin." 5 * on the
contrary, his "new 'science'"
aims at clarifying the
distance between a scholar's
empirical analysis of culture
one s uniquely individual
viewpoint, ensuring
at least

an analytical link between
facts and values.

But more than

lust clarifying the scientific
location of value- judgments,

Weber believes the scholar "can
also 'judge' them
critically.
This criticism can... have only a
dialectical
character, i.e., it can be no more than
a formal logical

judgment of historically given valuejudgments and ideas, a
testing of the ideals according to the
postulate of the
internal consistency of the desired end ." 59

Based on

"one's own Weltanschauung » and the prospect
of "judgments"

being levelled against

it,

Weber's notion of "'objectivity'"

thus departs from the methodological creed
of the German

Historical School.

In doing so he points to an alternative

method which, instead of generating "binding norms and
ideals," measures the distance between them and a scholar's

"ordering of empirical social reality."
The basis of this method rests,

furthermore,

on what

Weber refers to as "heuristic means," which allow a scholar
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to judge "the confrontation*
of facts with ideals.
departing from the Historical
School,

Again

which deduced law-like

ends from empirical details,
he theorizes "a conceptual
construct (Ged an k en b il d) which
is neither historical
reality
nor even the 'true' reality. »»
Instead, what he proposes
is an
ideal -type.* with ideal-types,
Weber conjectures
"not the end but rather the
means of knowledge," using them
to illuminate how a scholar's
individually-configured

viewpoint impacts the ordering
of "a finite segment" of
empirical reality. « Consequently,
he claims it was "a
purely ideal limiting concept" which
aids the scholar in
appraising only the analytical link
between
"the real

situation or action" and "certain of
its significant

components.-

This "limiting" trait marks the
pivotal

function of his methodology of the social
sciences, for it
does more than isolate the discord
between historical

facts

and human values in a given inquiry.

it provides,

too,

the

preconditions for a struggle among scholars, all
of whom use
distinctly "one-sided" forms of the ideal-type
to interpret

the world around them.
Weber,

"By means of this category," notes

"the adequacy of our imagination,

oriented and

disciplined by reality, is judged ." 63

With it he rebukes

the "'objectivity'" of his opponents,

as well as embraces a

method of inquiry concerned more with the contingencies than
the necessities of human knowledge.
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In his essay on
'"Objectivity

in Social Science,"

therefore, Weber contests the
German Historical School's
use
of "concepts" as "the
reproduction of 'objective'
social
reality" in science.
The consequence of this
critique,
however, manifests itself in
his own "reformulation anew
of
concepts on the foundations thus
transformed." 8 * This is
Weber's idea of "progress" in
the social sciences, and it
allows him to shift the focus of
science away from "the
'actual' interconnections of
'things'" and on to "the
conceptual interconnections of problems ." 6S
with the
latter approach, his notion of science
becomes an enterprise
in which the purpose of a scholar's
judgment is not to

produce a series of "'completed'" and
"binding" norms from
specific historical facts.
Insofar as it makes "a sharp,
precise distinction" between values and
facts, while engaged

m

"

the Perpetual reconstruction" of ideas,

the aim of a

scholar's judgment reveals the "individual
character" of the
"objective validity of all empirical knowledge" in
science.

Weber labels this aim "the elementary duty of

scientific self-control ," underscoring the scholar's moral
expedition to remind oneself and others of the "hairline"

proximity of knowledge to faith.

It is an

expedition which,

not only unsettles the "'objectivity'" of the Historical
School, but contests any endeavor to elevate an ideal on the

basis of it being complete, binding, and true.
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If Weber's criticism
of the German Historical
School
focuses on the excess of
distance between values
and facts,
his rebuke of "subjectivism"
in science fixes on the
lack of
it.
This latter appraisal is
evident in his essay on "The
Meaning of 'Ethical Neutralitv' in
Sociology and Economics."
y

m

There Weber challenges "a large
number of officially
accredited prophets" who, rather
than face public scrutiny,
"enunciate, their evaluations on
ultimate questions 'in the
name of science' in governmentally
privileged lecture halls
in which they are neither
controlled, checked by discussion,
nor subject to contradiction.""
it is a challenge not
so

much aimed at the ideological viewpoints
of certain
scholars,

for Weber is known to chide both
the nationalist

zealotry of Treitzschke and the socialist
fervor of George
Sorel or George Simmel.« As editor
of the Archiv, Weber
rejected such "one-sided" manuscripts as
that sent to him by
Otto Gross, a student of Freud whose "'new
ethics'" of

"sexual communism" revolved around one's
personal quest for

pleasure.

Weber's distrust is also evident in his

friendship with Stefan George, whom he lauds for "real
greatness" but scolds as "striving for self -deification,
for
the immediate enjoyment of the divine in his own soul

."

70

Thus his charge appears to have little to do with the

content of what a person values about the world.
contrary,

On the

it has a lot to do with a scholar's inability to
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separate clearly one's "own
evaluations" from "personally
uncomfortable" facts.

Unlike the positivist traits
of the Historical School,
the attributes of subjectivism
reveal themselves to Weber
in
a blatant disregard for
empirical analysis,
without naming
specific names, he witnessed
this scholarly neglect
occurring among "the proponents
of the assertion of
professorial evaluations," scholars
who mingled valuejudgments with factual assertions.
In the past, Weber
admits, a scholar's mix of facts
and values typically
derived from a single Kantian imperative
of justice which
was thought to be both "unambiguous"
and "impersonal." 71
But in early 20th century Germany,
he
continues,

"it is now

done in the name of a patchwork of
cultural values, i.e.,
actually subjective demands on culture,
or... in the name of
the alleged 'rights of the teacher's
personality.'" 72
For

this reason, Weber's critique of subjectivism
stems neither
from a desire to return to the "great epoch"
of "objective"

imperatives nor from an aversion to the "ethical
irrationality" of the modern world.

What sparks the

critique is his "fear that a lecturer who makes his
lectures

stimulating by the insertion of personal evaluations will,
in the long run,

weaken the students' taste for sober

empirical analysis."

7
'

It is a fear which leads him to

propose, not the erasure of values from science, but the
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formation of a method which
affirms the impact of facts
on a
scholar's value- judgments
The method Weber has in
mind is not unlike the one
he
theorizes in response to the
Historical School's efforts to
render "completed" values from
empirical details.
However,
with regard to the advocates
of "professorial evaluations,"
Weber s methodological aim is
somewhat different.
Indeed,
he seeks to "vigorously
oppose (bestrei ten) » them on account
of their "view that one may
be 'scientifically' contented
with the conventional self
-evidentness of very widely
accepted value- judgment ." 74 what
Weber rejects is the
claim that such values as moral
"progress," social
"justice," or personal "'experience'"
ought to act as the

only guidepost for a scholar's analysis
of empirical
reality.
For, he notes, when a scholar's
value- judgment
confronts a series of facts, it undergoes
a "re -adjustment"
terms of its historical direction, baring
a provisional
rather than immutable design. As a response,
Weber premises
his own method on a scholar's capacity to
perform three

m

specific duties:
"(1)

to fulfill a given task in a workmanlike
fashion; (2)... to recognize facts, even those
which may be personally uncomfortable, and to
distinguish them from his own evaluations; (3) to
subordinate himself to his task and to repress the
impulse to exhibit his personal
tastes
unnecessarily 1,75
.

.

.

.

By opposing subjectivism, he is not doubting the moral or

historical weight of certain ends but the method by which
247

.

scholars allow them to
outweigh, even dismiss,
the value of
empirical analysis

Again Weber recommends the
"ideal -type” as the
methodological device for maintaining
distance between
value -judgments and factual
assertions.

In contrast to the

Historical School, whose accent
on empirical analysis sought
to deduce fixed ideals from
facts, Weber extols the idealtype as a "heuristic means"
to the end of clarifying the
provisional design of ideals. Yet,
in response to the
pundits of subjectivism, he
utilizes it to show the extent
to which a scholar's valuejudgments alone fail as a proxy
for the solid explication of
facts.
"Its function," he
repeats, "is the comparison with
empirical reality in order
to establish its divergences or
similarities,

to describe

them with the most unambiguously
intelligible concepts, and
to understand and explain them
causally ." 76
The technical

aim of Weber's ideal-type, therefore,
is not directed at
negating the ethical, religious, legal or
aesthetic ends of
the scholar.
Nor is it fixed on deifying the scientific
function of empirical analysis.

Its aim is to help the

scholar "make relentlessly clear to his audience,
and

especially to himself, which of his statements are
statements of logically deduced or empirically observed
facts and which are statements of practical evaluations

."

This is Weber's way of stressing the "hairline" distance
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between "value- judc^ents
and judgments of fact"
in the work
of scholars who conflated,
and
thus confused,

the two.

In addition to uncovering
the "uncomfortable"
facts

which defy a scholar's valuejudgment

Weber's notion of the
ideal-type helps perpetuate a
struggle among scholars.
Given that ideal-types
promise at least an analytical
,

discernment of values from facts,
Weber claims that scholars
face the demanding task of
constantly rethinking the union
between each element. Hence,
on the basis of this shifting
ground, he also designates the
concern of such scholars to
be "a question not only of
alternatives between values but
of an irreconcilable
death-struggle,

and the

Devil.

like that between 'God'

Between these, neither relativization
nor

compromise is possible.-

This struggle occurs, Weber

believes, within the "souls" of
individual persons and among
the scholars who adhere to the
varied "procedures" of
science.

With regard to his rebuke of the
advocates of
"professorial evaluations," struggle is not
dependent on the
scholar's utilization of ideal-types per
se, for struggle
symbolizes the human quest for knowledge at
least as far

back as Plato.

However,

ideal-types seek to promote the

prospect of human struggle within those souls and among
those scholars who have grown accustomed to the

"conventional self -evidentness " of their own particular

value - j udgments

.

It

fosters a scholar's "understanding of

what one's opponent--or one's self--really means--i.e., in
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understanding the evaluations
which really ... separate the
discussants and consequently in
enabling one to take up a
position with reference to this
value.'.”

Ideal-types thus

mark Weber

attempt to nourish struggle
within science, in
spite of trends among scholars
who- -absent a discussion-revel in their "'personally
tinted professorial type of
prophecy
s

.

In light of his critique
of subjectivism,

Weber reveals

the extent to which the purpose
of scholarly judgment was
to
induce a struggle among persons
with divergent ideals. The
means to this end of struggle is,
of course, his notion of
the ideal-type, which allows
the scholar to judge not only
the empirical confines of valuejudgments but the requisite

analytical distance between each
component.

By contesting

the "'German ideas of 1914,'" the
"'socialism of the
future,'" or the "spirit of German
philosophy," Weber

perceives what he understands to be

a

lack of judgment on

the part of the scholarly champions of
these ideals. 80
a response to this deficiency,

As

he conjectures a notion of

judgment premised on something more significant than
just
the configuration of ideal -types and the rebirth
of human

struggle in science.

He premises the aim of scholarly

judgment on the idea that, though one's values may derive
from profoundly subjective sources, the objective element of

empirical details did not necessarily validate them for the
rest of the world.

Quite the contrary,
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for he assumes the

analysis of "empirical 'reality'"
entailed countervailing
forces which required the
scholar to "re-adjust"

his or her

value- judgments.

While pondering "The Meaning
of 'Ethical
Neutrality,'" therefore, Weber
declares the aim of scholarly
judgment to be the perpetuation
of struggle, which
presupposes both the unruly vigor
of facts and
the

historical limits of human values.
By musing over the meaning
of "'objectivity," moreover,
Weber understands the purpose of
scholarly judgment to be
the source of human struggle
in science.
Yet he reaches
that conclusion by challenging
the positivist legacy of the
German Historical School rather than
the subjectivist claims
of scholars who pride themselves
on their "professorial

evaluations."

For Weber,

life's "irrational reality" and

inexhaustable store of possible meanings"
discloses how the
positivist zeal for fact-based ideals
collapses as others
remain "in flux, ever subject to change
in the dimly seen
future of human culture." 81 in this case,
his notion of
"

scholarly judgment shows more than

human struggle in science.

a

proclivity to spur a

It also reveals the extent to

which such a purpose derives from the claim that
empirical
knowledge "rests exclusively" on the subjective and entirely
intangible traits of what a person happens to value in the
world.

Unlike his 1917 challenge to the backers of

subjectivism, which highlights the value of empirical
analysis, Weber's dispute with the Historical School
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stresses the epistemological
force and elasticity of human
values. At the intersection
of both critiques, what
stands
out is a notion of scholarly
judgment,

the purpose of which

to acknowledge the distance
between values and facts, a

distance which ensures the
possibility of human struggle.

—Limits—of—Schol arly

Judgment

If these two works on the
methodology of the social

sciences reveal anything about Max
Weber's notion of
ariy judgment, it is that progress
and human struggle
buttress its theoretical design. By
"scientific
progress
Weber means something other than the
Enlightenment understanding of the term,
one which posits
human reason as the source of economic,
political,
aesthetic, even moral advancement.
Insofar as reason
utilizes objective means to attain a
subjectively desired
end, he instead perceives progress to
be more than a

technical'" advance, but an open door to a tense
nexus
between means and ends. Moreover, given his belief
in an

irreconcilable death-struggle,

"

Weber discerns at least one

consequence of such progress: ultimate ends often rebut and
help shift the historical trajectory of technical
advancement, and vice-versa.

Thus the struggle indicative

of science not only presupposes the likelihood of progress,
it also anticipates the "readjustment" of ends,

the fragile union between the two.
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means,

and

With regard to Weber's

"

idea of scholarly judgment,
progress and struggle denote
its
theoretical design alright, but
they do so while also
stressing the gravity of historical
and moral contingencies.
The theoretical design of
scholarly judgment, however,
points to more than just the
contingencies bequeathed
to it

by the specter of progress
and struggle.

in fact,

while

arguing for an alternative view
of "'Objectivity' in Social
Science" in 1904, Weber situates
his views in part on an
Enlightenment and Liberal groundwork
of human reason. 82
"The transcendental presupposition
of every cultural science
lies," he professes, "in the fact
that we are cultural
beings, endowed with the capacity
and the will to take a

deliberate attitude towards the world
and to lend it
significance 83 By marking " cultural beings »
with a
capacity to inscribe value on the world,
a value based in
part on rational calculation, Weber
claims "it will
.

lead us

to judge certain phenomena" in relation
to that specific

value.

Yet,

while rethinking "The Meaning of 'Ethical

Neutrality'" 13 years later, he strays from his
initial
presupposition, asserting instead the prospect that
those
persons endowed with scholarly judgment are but a
few in

number.

The basis of this later claim derives from what he

terms the "shallowness of our routinized daily existence,"

which allows persons to "avoid the choice between 'God' and
'Devil'

and their own ultimate decision as to which of the

conflicting values will be dominated by the one, and which
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by the other

Though Weber posits his idea
of scholarly
judgment on the provisional
forces of progress

and struggle,
he still circumscribes its
use to technically trained
persons within a particular
historical context.

Judging from these divergent
qualities, it seems as
though Weber s idea of scholarly
judgment entails a degree
of tension,

one which issues from his
thoughts on progress
and struggle.
What are the theoretical
formations of
scientific. progress and human
struggle, and how do they
prompt the tension in Weber's notion
of scholarly judgment?
In positing his idea of
scholarly judgment on the

groundwork of "scientific 'progress,'"
Weber does more than
simply denote the "fate" of modern
science.
He assumes,

too,

that the orientation of science
conforms to a

perception of history which, though fortuitous
in its
outcome, establishes a priori the "increasing
int ell equalization and rationalization"
of human knowledge.

This is evident insofar as he traces an
historical path from
Plato's "discovery" of "the concept " to Bacon's
mastery of
'the rational experiment" to the modern
scientist's sober

deployment of the "tools" of methodology

85
.

With the

addition of his own configuration of the "ideal-type," Weber
lengthens the path one step further, stressing the
instrumental aim of the ideal-type in differentiating facts
from values.

Each "rational" device is thought to

constitute a larger historical project by which human beings
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seek "to bring order into
the chaos" of the creaturely
world
around them. Yet, for Weber,
the uniqueness of this
history
is not to be found in a
teleological aim toward greater
knowledge or a more insightful
understanding

of the world.
"The intellectual apparatus,"
he counters, "which the
past
has developed through ... the
analytical rearrangement of the

immediately given reality... is in
constant tension with the
new knowledge which we can and
desire to wrest from
reality."
Thus the history of rationality
which colors
Weber's idea of progress secures
itself,
not to any one

absolute end, but to a faith in the
technical supremacy of
analytical constructs
-

.

By grounding scientific progress
on the history of
rationality, Weber tends to confine
science to a domain in
which methodological "tools" mark the
source of theoretical
engagement between scholars. This is the
case in his

disputes with both the German Historical School,
which
compiled concepts on the basis of strictly
positive ends,
and the proponents of subjectivism, who did
so without

weighing the empirical force of facts.

Hence Weber's claim

in 1904 that science "cannot tell anyone what
he should do--

but rather what he can do- -and under certain circumstances-

what he wishes to do." 87

Given that a construct such as

the ideal-type is one of many scientific tools,

it fails to

ascertain the ultimate normative value of science itself, or
any other worldly enterprise,

for that matter.
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The merit of

these ideal-types, he believes,

"consists in the insight

that every single important
activity and ultimately life
as
a whole... is a series
of ultimate decisions
through which
the soul... chooses its own
fate, i.e., the meaning
of its

activity and existence. "»

From this perspective, Weber

views the historical path of
science as strewn with those
constructs inept at ordering a
given "'reality" rather than
the ultimate ends which govern
their epistemological
direction.
The "'progress'" of science,
therefore, which
colors scholarly judgment, indicates
not only a history
of

rationality but a history in which
rationality divulges its
instrumental limits.
This assumption about the rational
design of history
thus features at least one significant
limit within Weber's
theoretical configuration of scholarly
judgment.
with its
focus fixed on analytical tools, the
history of "scientific
progress'" remains, as far Weber is concerned,
"the

dissolution of the analytical constructs so
constructed
through the expansion and shift of the
scientific
horizon ." 89

However,

the continuity of this process

follows from him granting epistemological supremacy
to the

rational function of analytical constructs, particularly
his
own rendering of the ideal -type.
For this reason, Weber's approach to scientific

progress assumes a history symbolized by the rational
development of heuristic devices.
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But it does so in a way

.

that limits the focus of
science itself.

insofar as
progress stresses the changing
constellations of these
devices - -devices which allow
a scientist to order
only the
empirical world--the enterprise
of science focuses
on the

means rather than the ends
of human knowledge.
By focusing
on the means of knowledge,
science waives its ability to
"learn the meaning of the world
from the results of its
analysis," entrusting that task
to the forces of faith.
As
a result, Weber limits
the scope of scholarly judgment
to
the divide between facts and
values, but only insofar as
that divide reveals itself in
the rational structure of
ideal - types
If Weber's idea of progress
signifies one restriction

on the prospect of scholarly
judgment, his notion of human
struggle in science suggests another.
in that he perceives
the enterprise of science to involve
an "irreconcilable

death-struggle" between scholars, Weber
assumes that it
privileges. a particular type of person who
can endure the
ever- shifting landscape of human knowledge.

He is adamant

about this point in his 1917 "Science as
a Vocation"
lecture,

when he designates science "a 'vocation'
organized

in special disciplines in the service of
self -clarification

and knowledge of interrelated facts." 90
a

Science is neither

gateway to "sacred values and revelations" nor an "evasion

of the plain duty of intellectual integrity,

"

both which

symbolize a type of person incapable of bearing the weight
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scientific conflict.

Unlike the scientist-scholar,
Weber
states in his 1917 essay on
"'Ethical Neutrality,'" such
persons spend most of their lives
not only refraining from
the choice between good and
evil, but also evading the

deleterious consequences which
correspond to such a choice.
The human struggle so central
to Weber's view of science
thus signifies a person who not
only endures the "common
fate" of specialization,
progress,

and personal frustration.

This person, unlike others, embraces
the uncertainties
corresponding to the struggle of science
with passion, with
a clear picture of empirical
details, and with judgment
enough to distinguish one from the
other.

Given these characteristics and abilities
of those
persons who engage in the struggle of
science, Weber does
not necessarily prevent others from
participating
in the

modern enterprise of science.

"Yet," he remarks,

his "Vocation" lecture on science,

"I

again in

have found that only a

few men could endure this situation without
coming to

grief."

1

He refers to science, moreover, as "the affair

of an intellectual aristocracy,

"

the members of which are

persons who draw strength from an "inner devotion" to
specific scientific venture.

This "psychological" quality,

what Weber also calls "the inward calling for science,

emphasizes the degree to which a person adheres to a

scholarly passion despite the impersonal drudgery of
scientific specialization.

a

It allows the scholar to
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.

withstand "a struggle against
another's ideals from the
standpoint of one's own,"
ensuring not the supremacy of
one's ideal but the chance
that it, and the empirical
studies it colors, extends the
breadth of scientific
discussion.

Thus,

as he assumed editorial
control of the

journal Archiv, Weber asserted:
"Whoever cannot bear this or
who takes the viewpoint that
he does not wish to work,
in
the service of scientific
knowledge, with persons whose
other ideals are different from
his own,

participate.

is free not to

Accordingly, human struggle exhibits

Weber's desire to populate science
not with just any
scholar, only those with mettle
enough to subject their
analyses and corresponding values to
the scrutiny of other
scholars

m

By postulating science on the notion
of struggle, which
turn allows "only a few men" to possess
scientific

dispositions, Weber unveils the other constraint
on the
prospect of scholarly judgment.
It is a limitation insofar
as those scholars who follow their "calling"
for science

constitute the primary agency of judgment within the

enterprise of modern science.

This is the case, not because

they willingly embrace the "death-struggle" of science,
but

because they distinguish with "clarity" the analytical
distance between the facts and values which are at least one
source of that struggle.

Indeed,

the scholar's desire "to

gain clarity " on the rifts between "antagonistic persons,"
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among "mutually loving
persons," or within "the
individual's
own mind" comprises the
unique quality he brings to
bear on
scientific struggles. Most
people, Weber surmises, "do
not
become aware, and above all do
not wish to become aware"
of
the antagonisms stemming from
the mix
of facts and values,

consigning such tensions instead
to "the intellectual
aristocracy" of science.” His idea
of scholarly judgment
contains far more than a faith in
the function of analytical
constructs, which confines scholarly
judgment to the limited
epistemological landscape of instrumental
rationality.

Weber

idea of scholarly judgment also
imparts a view that
such a faculty is the domain of unique
persons, persons who
not only endure the struggle of science
but perpetuate it by
underscoring the distance between facts and
values.
s

The specters of rationality and an
intellectual

aristocracy thus symbolize the extent to which
Weber's
theoretical, approach to scholarly judgment
entails certain

formidable limits

.

With the former constraint, his idea of

scholarly judgment tends to privilege such heuristic
devices
as the ideal -type,

circumscribing the chaos of human

knowledge with analytical means aimed towards a particular
end.

However, Weber's trust in the rational ordering of

knowledge also tends to incite a scholar's judgment in a way
that marks analytical constructs for criticism and,

thus,

lengthens the trajectory of "'progress'" in modern science.
"The greatest advances in the sphere of the social
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sciences," he remarks, near
the end of his essay on
"'Objectivity' in Social Science,
"are substantively tied
up
the shift in practical
cultural problems and take
the
guise of a critique of
concept-construction ."’ 4 Hence the
very constraint of rationality
not only limits scholarly
judgment to a technical domain,
in which the divergent
elements of facts and values
conform to purely
"mental"

constructs.

Of greater weight,

it enables the scholar to

judge the inadequacies and limits
of empirical analyses,
ultimate ideals, and even the
privileged foundation of

rationality itself.

This ironic twist allows Weber
to

perceive the

great attempts at theory-construction"
as
"always useful for revealing the
limits of the significance
of those points of view which
provided their

foundations

1,95
.

Thus his idea of scholarly judgment

acknowledges as well as challenges the
supremacy of
rationality in modern science, underscoring
a propensity for
epistemological disruptions and their matching
struggles.

With regard to an intellectual aristocracy,
furthermore, Weber's notion of scholarly judgment
refers to
persons with human qualities unlike those of most
other
people.

This exclusionist axiom encloses the prospect of

scholarly judgment not by virtue of mandatory psychological

criterion alone, that

is,

"prerequisites" which entail the

scholar's merger of "enthusiasm and work" into a scientific
venture.

It hinders scholarly judgment insofar as the
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scholar measures one's own
deeds by making "explicit
juBt
where the arguments are
addressed to the analytical

understanding and where to the
sentiments »» By requiring
scholars to typify these
paradoxical traits, Weber's idea
of
scholarly judgment suggests a
burdensome struggle for the
few who heed "the call" for
science.
.

Yet,

if these

aristocrats represent the agents
of scholarly jud^ent, then
they also reflect, as did Weber,
the ability to discern the
fact of hierarchy in science
from the ideal of the

"specifically particular character"
of science.
this prospect of immanent critique
can science,

cultural pursuits,

Only with
like other

"change" what Weber labels "its

standpoint and its analytical apparatus
and to view the
streams of events from the heights of
thought ." 97 The
elitist underpinnings of scholarly
judgment, therefore,
mandate rare human qualities, but they are
qualities that

simultaneously summon a "readjustment" in the
thrust of
judgment and, quite possibly, the order of modern

science.

By factoring in the ideas of "scientific
'progress'"

and "human struggle," Max Weber lays bare a few
of the

theoretical shortcomings in his notion of scholarly
judgment.

Though these limits mark a tension at the crux of

scholarly judgment, one between epistemological promise and
historical agency, they nevertheless confirm the gravity of
judgment in Weber's methodological works.

In one instance,

he situates scholarly judgment on the ground of progress,
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tethering its critical faculties
to the historical
development of rational "methods
of thinking,

the training for thought."
to the idea of progress,

the tools and

in anchoring scholarly
judgment

however, Weber not only restricts

its faculties to the realm of
rationality.

He also unveils

conditions by which the scholar,
using judgment, denotes
the distance between the liberal
goal of lending the world
"significance" and the narrow means of
rationality which
fosters the disenchantment of the
world.'"
in another
instance, he posits scholarly judgment
on the ground
of

human conflict, such that it privileges
the judgments of
those "few" persons who are "able to
countenance the stern

seriousness of our fateful times."

Yet,

Weber not only

anchors the prospect of scholarly judgment
to an
"intellectual aristocracy;" he highlights, as
well, the
struggle of progress which reminds the aristocracy

of its

own "provisional and not definitive" fate.

Thus Weber's

idea of scholarly judgment exemplifies certain
theoretical

limits alright, but they are limits which nevertheless

foreshadow openings within science itself and towards the

narrow confines of professional politics.

Judgment and Political Theory
In his introduction to the history of The Peloponnesian

War,

Thucydides bestows on future generations of scholars

vexing perspective on the gravity of judgment.
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This

a

perspective conveys the extent
to which he thought of
judgment as both a means to
induce the judgments of
successive scholars and an end to
all subsequent judgments
concerning politics, war, and history.
On the one hand, he
hopes "these words of mine are
judged
useful by those who

want to understand clearly the
events which happened in the
past and which (human nature being
what
it is)

will,

at some
time or other and in much the same
ways, be repeated in the
future.
This is typified by his idea of
the Athenian

way of life" in the chapter on
"Pericles' Funeral Oration,"
the "future" of Athenian democracy
in "The "Mytilenian
Debate" between Cleon and Diodotus, and
Alcibiades's

role in

"the downfall" of Athens in the chapter
on "Launching of the
Sicilian Expedition." Thucydides, however,
understands that
his "work" is "not a piece of writing
designed to meet the
taste of an immediate public, but was done
to last

forever."”

His rich chronicle of the war between Sparta

and Athens represents, as well as imposes, a
formidable

standard of judgment, one which confines its critical
and
factual orientations to the Hellenic world.

Consequently,

Thucydides's approach to historical judgment exposes a
tension between his desire to spur on future judgments and
his wish to obviate them

100
.

Max Weber's approach to scholarly judgment embodies a
theoretical tension not unlike that displayed in the work of
Thucydides.

Weber proposes "ideal -types" as a way of
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promoting the -formal logical
judgment of historically given
value-judgments and ideas, a
testing of the ideals according
to the postulate of the
internal consistency of the
desired

end."

1

This approach concurs with
his typologies of,
among other things,
"rationalization" in the "Protestant
Ethic" essays, "national
leadership" in certain political
writings, and "social science"
in the methodological

works.

Weber

desire to sustain scientific
discussions fails
to acknowledge the restrictive
assumptions underlying
s

his

views on progress and struggle,
assumptions which limit
discussion to the function of ideal-types
among a few
qualified scholars. Thus there is his
vexing depiction of
scholarly judgment as both the source
of and obstruction to
the possibility of human struggle
in modern science.
Unlike
Thucydides, though, who hoped his judgment
of Hellenic
history might "last forever," Weber hopes
"the professional
thinker" can "keep a cool head in the face
of the ideals
prevailing at the time... and if necessary
...' to swim against
10
the stream. "
This aspiration allows Weber to situate
'

*-

scholarly judgment in contrast to Thucydides's
monumental
project of history as well as his theoretical foes in
modern
science.
It allows him, too, to challenge the dominant
judgments and ultimate ends which comprise the wholly

unscientific enterprise of modern professional politics.
Having held out the prospect of resisting the selfevident ideals of early-20th century German society, how
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might Webet's notion of scholarly
judgment constitute a
plausible challenge to the modern
profession of politics?
One consistent point throughout
Weber's methodological
writings is that he perceives
the scholar and the politician
as two persons who perform
entirely separate tasks in
the

world.

Weber is adamant about this
distinction insofar as
he witnesses the scholar working
in "governmentally
privileged lecture halls" and the
politician laboring in
public places or in sectarian
conventicles."
it is

likewise the case when he claims the
instrument of science
to be "a utopia which "cannot be
found empirically anywhere
real ity" and that of politics to be
"the ethically
dangerous" force of "violence." Finally,
Weber signals this
distinction when, in "Science as a Vocation,
"
he notes that

m

"

[t]o take a practical political stand is
one thing,

and to

analyze political structures and party positions
is
another ." 103 Yet, despite these claims concerning

the

distance between science and politics, Weber deems
science
and the scholar to be a valuable "service" to politics.

The

"scientific worker," he argues,
want such and such an end,

"can tell you that if you

then you must take into the

bargain the subsidiary consequences which according to all
experience will occur ." 104

in other words,

the scholar

"can confront you with the necessity of this choice
B y judging the distance between facts and values,

."

105

which in

turn discloses the limited scope of a person's worldly
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options,

the scientist-scholar thus
exhibits, not
necessarily an aptitude for
politics, but merely a capacity
to oppose it.

This oppositional element of
scholarly judgment fails
to put Weber at ease, however,
since it is at odds with the
"self-confinement" he requires of those
scholars who
recognize life's "inexhaustible"
meanings.
Although
scholarly judgment aids in clarifying
the logical
incongruities and ethical inadequacies
allied with persons,
parties, and other institutions, Weber
still seeks to keep
its focus trained on "the methods
of scientific research."
Despite this tension, he intensifies it
when he proclaims,
at the outset of his "'Objectivity'"
essay, "the express
purpose of the Archiv" to be "the education
of judgment
about practical social problems" as much
as "the criticism
of practical social policy,

legislation ." 106

extending even as far as

Contrary to the professional politician,

the modern scholar does not rely on violence,
demagoguery,

and compromise as means to the specific ultimate
end of,
say,

German national glory and power.

Weber's depiction of

the scholar does not reveal a commitment to any one

particular goal other than the perpetuation of struggle
among persons who mirror an endless flow of possible ends.
It is a goal

which differentiates the scholar from the

seemingly myopic foresight of the professional politician.
What the scholar also has is judgment, which,
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in clarifying

the "hairline" distance
between the "infinite variety"
of
facts and the "individual
character" of "cultural values,"
uncovers the limits of a multitude
of Weltanschauungen.
The
scope of scholarly judgment,
therefore, stretches beyond the
battles with scientific positivism
and cultural subjectivism
to include encounters with,
among others, Socialism,
Machtpolitik, Pacficism, and even
German nationalism.

Based on this potentially broad
reach, Weber's idea of
scholarly judgment intimates an
orientation towards a world
which contests the ends of politics,
even though it concedes
the ethically distinct traits of
such a profession.
To
illustrate this orientation, Weber
addresses the possible
nexus between "an ethically neutral
science"
and the

political enterprise of "syndicalism,"
which he finds to be
both ruthless" and steeped in " romanticism. " 107
He does

so in his 1917 essay on "The Meaning
of 'Ethical

Neutrality,'" one year prior to Socialist
rebellions in
Munich and Berlin.
in that essay, Weber states
"the

analysis of syndicalism" is "completed when it
has reduced
the syndicalistic standpoint to its most rational
and

internally consistent form and has empirically investigated
the pre-conditions for its existence and its practical

consequences." 108

The "task" is to judge, not simply the

logic of an ideal that mirrors a "new society" of class-

conscious trade unionists, or the historical force of "the
general strike and terror" which seeks to paralyze
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capitalist production and subvert
even Socialist
parliamentarians. More important,
as Weber notes in his

'"Objectivity" essay,

it is to judge the degree
to which

action and ... inaction imply in
their consequences the
espousal iParteinahme] of certain
values- -and herewith ... the
rejection of certain others." 109 Hence
his notion of
scholarly judgment moves beyond
science towards politics,
bringing with it a distrust of absolute
political ends and,
thus,

a faith in the prospect of struggle
over the

significance of such ends.
The way scholarly judgment rouses the
prospect of
struggle in politics is similar to the
way it does so in the
profession of science: rendering "ultimate"
ends as

"provisional and not definite."

While lecturing on the

subject of "Science as a Vocation" to an
audience of
aspiring scholars in November of 1917, Weber
speaks in blunt
terms about the historical condition on which
he posits the

scholarly quest for distance and clarity.

He believes

science takes "its point of departure from the one

fundamental fact, that so long as life remains immanent and
is interpreted in its own terms,

it knows only of an

unceasing struggle of... gods with one another." 110

This

view of the historical trajectory of science confirms the
degree to which Weber perceives more than just the empirical
limits of cultural subjectivism or the subjective

constraints on scientific positivism.
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Indeed,

it also

permits him and other scholars
to approach the ultimate
ends
of modern politics with
an eye towards judging their
empirical as well as subjective
underpinnings.
From this
'ewpoint, Weber s idea of scholarly
judgment signifies a
capacity to subject all "gods,"
even science,
to an

evaluation of the bond between
normative ambition and
historical impediments.
It demonstrates his

conviction,

furthermore,

that "the ultimately possible
attitudes toward
life are irreconcilable, and
hence their struggle can never
be brought to a final conclusion ." 111
The potential impact
of scholarly judgment on politics
points, therefore, to the
prospect of a struggle based, not on
the advance of one

particular end, but on the provisional
character of all
ultimate ends.
As a scholar and scientist, Weber
understands the

provisional character of the gods, and other
assorted human
values,

as an historical moment imbued with promise.

belief in the "common fate" of "'progress'"
specifies

when "one can.

.

.master all things by calculation,

"

His
a time

while at

the same time it validates the "strange intoxication"
of

persons who devote themselves to science with great
enthusiasm. 11

-

This paradoxical mix of worldly

"'disenchantment'" and individual "passion" promise the

scholar anything but a simple choice between the sterile
rigors of empirical analysis and the unfettered reach of

human values.

If scholars use clear judgment in their
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scientific ventures, they will
recognize the distinction
between facts and values, but
only insofar as such
distinctions reflect one of only
a multitude of worldly
viewpoints.
in fact, Weber insists the
"belief which we all
have in some form or other, in
the meta-empirical validity
ultimate and final values... is not
incompatible with the
incessant changefulness of the
concrete viewpoints, from
which empirical reality gets its
significance.
Both
these

views are, on the contrary, in
harmony with each other ." 113
Such predicaments promise the scholar,
if not knowledge of
the ultimate value a person ought
to follow, then an
understanding of the limits which define
the value one
chooses to follow.
Scholarly judgment thus aims to
accentuate the "hairline" distance between
any ultimate end
and the shifting stream of empirical
details which underlies
it, suggesting at least a possible
contestation of those
values mirrored in modern politics.
The sort of struggle which Weber associates
with

scholarly judgment involves neither the violence
nor the
demagoguery he ascribes to the human struggle of

politics.

His idea of scholarly judgment affords modern
politics an

alternative form of struggle which, instead of merely

advancing a more forceful ultimate end at the expense of
others,

tends to advance the value of human struggle itself.

By "'Understanding all'" values, however, Weber "does not

mean 'pardoning all' nor does mere understanding of
271

another's viewpoint as such
lead, in principle, to its
approval.
On the contrary, he believes
scholarly judgment
and its related struggles
lead "at least as easily, and
often with greater probability
to the awareness
of the

issues and reasons which prevent
agreement." 114

it forces

politicians into a struggle, not
for the purpose of
maintaining "the binding force of
an ethical 'imperative,'"
but for the sake of ensuring
the possibility of future
"'discussions of evaluations.'"

m

this way, Weber's notion

of scholarly judgment confirms
"that the attainment of such
an ethic is externally, at least,
impeded by the

relativizing effects of such discussions." 115

Though it

promises little aid in the maintenance
of the supremacy of a
particular ideal, scholarly judgment still
offers "insight"
into the "unbridgeably divergent
ultimate evaluations" in
science, economics, religion, aesthetics,
and even politics.
In addition to its impact on politics,

which counters

person's desire to limit politics to the advance
of a
specific end, Weber's idea of scholarly judgment

hints at a

political theorist who questions the confines of
politics.
This is quite a departure from an earlier stance
Weber
assumes in his 1895 Freiburg Inaugural Address, when
he
claims

"

[t]he science of political economy" to be "a

political science." 116

At this early moment in his

academic career, he designates science, and the judgments

which accompany

it,

as a vehicle for the advance of an
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a

explicitly "one-sided" value.

In particular,

science acts
as "a servant of politics,
not the day-to-day politics
of
the persons and classes who
happen to be ruling at any given
time, but the enduring
power-political interests of the
nation. 1,117 Yet, with the wilhelmine
German nation growing
'

increasingly more divided over issues
of class, suffrage,
party politics, and war, his view
of science tends to grow
more inclusive with regard to the
type of ends a scholar
might hope to advance.
By 1904, Weber no longer views
the
German nation as the sole end of
science;
instead, he

espouses a science based on the
"assumption that only a
finite portion" of an "infinite
multiplicity

of... events"

constituted valuable knowledge.

118

with this shift from

the universality of the nation to the
individuality of ends,
it is no wonder that by 1917 he
perceives science as being

composed "not only of alternatives between
values" but of
cases in which "the value- spheres cross and
interpenetrate.

" 119

In many of Weber's intellectual endeavors,

the

intersection between science and politics is laid out in
such a way as to demonstrate the forceful reach of
the

scient is t - scholar
of

.

As one who questions "the significance

theory and theoretical conceptualization ... for our

knowledge of cultural reality,

»

Weber finds himself on a

path which leads to "the confrontation of empirical reality
with the ideal-type."

He rejects the idea that a scholar
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rely solely on "'the facts
themselves'
as the result of
some "naive" attempt to
quash one's own convictions,
without
Which "there would be no
principle of selection of subjectmatter and no meaningful knowledge
of the concrete
reality.
Nor is he content to traverse
a "'middle
course'" which, for instance,
maintains "that through the
synthesis of several party points
of view, or by following a
line between them, practical
norms of scientific validity
can be arrived at.— The path
he chooses as a scientist
and scholar leads up to and abuts
the outer edge of modern
politics, leaving him--and those
others who succeed him- -to
face options other than those of
moral silence or violent
action.
By engaging in "the perpetual
reconstruction
of

.concepts through which we seek to comprehend
reality,"
Weber denotes the option to judge not merely
the "ideals and
value -judgments" of other persons, including
politicians.
He judges, too, these ends in relation
to the "uncomfortable
..

facts" that,

in light of "their starkness," inspire at
most

"'discussions of evaluations'" between scientists and the

persons they face in politics.
At the very least, Weber's notion of scholarly judgment

grants to successive theorists an insight into the limits of
his own theory of politics.

On the one hand, he postulates

his idea of politics on the ground of human struggle, one

that entails a multiplicity of ideals yet, ultimately,

privileges the end of a dynamic and powerful German nation.
'
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A problem emerges insofar
as the aim of German
national
glory supersedes and,
potentially, obviates the
struggles of
modern politics, thus
illuminating a tension between
Weber's
ultimate end and the means he
theorizes so as to advance it.
On the other hand, he
conjectures an idea of science on
the
basis of "'progress,'" which
mirrors a human struggle only
to the degree that it leads,
not to the establishment of
one
viewpoint, but to the displacement
of all viewpoints.
The
impetus behind these struggles
manifests itself in scholarly
judgment, a critical accounting
of the distinctions between
the facts and values which form,
and reform, the

perspectives constituting science as
much as politics.
appears "as not so trifling a thing
to

it

do," remarks Weber,

referring to the scholar who "succeeds"
in helping others as
well as oneself assess "t he ultimate
meaning " of their
conduct in the world.

As far as he is concerned,

such a

person "stands in the service of 'moral'
forces; he fulfils
the duty of bringing about self -clarification
and

a sense of

responsibility ." 122
therefore,

His idea of scholarly judgment,

and the science of which it is part,

proxy for a type of politics tethered to
end.

If anything,

is not a

a specific ultimate

it is simply an option which allows a

scholar to contest the moral limits of modern politics and
the epistemological confines of political theory.
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CHAPTER V

theorizing against politics
Introduce. i nn

By now

think it obvious that Max
Weber epitomizes the
degree to which political
theorizing differs from the
practice of politics. The
dividing line Weber draws
between
vocations of politics and
science underscores "the use
of violence" on the one
side and "the aim of clarity"
I

on the

other,

respectively.

m

fact,

he lived much of his own

professional life struggling to
abide by this divide,
castigating professors for being
demagogues in the lecture
hall and politicians for being
blind to the diabolical force
of power
However, though each vocation
(Beruf) deviates
from the other in terms of its
ethical bearing, Weber
still

contends that politicians and scholars
confront one another
under certain circumstances. These
often involve a
politician who, for reasons of ethical doubt,
entreats
scholars who aid others in deciphering the
possible
consequences that issue from a political mix
of violent
means and moral ends. Max Weber thus perceives

science and

politics as two distinct "value spheres," each with
ethical disposition.

a

unique

But he does so without obviating an

encounter between the spheres, suggesting that scholars and
P^-'-^icianS- -though ethically distinct -- signal a possible

intersection of political theory and political practice

288

2
.

Jurgen Habermas's theoretical
enterprise posits a view
of contemporary philosophy
not unlike the one Weber
derives
from the "modern times"
of the Occident.
In his work The
T heory of Communicative
Action Habermas accepts
Weber's
vaew of the conditions
which divide philosophy from
other
ways of being in the world,
including
f

politics.
This is the
case inasmuch as Habermas
dxscerns that the " [t heoretical
surrogates for worldviews have
been devalued, not only by
the factual advance of
empirical science but even more
by
the reflective consciousness
accompanying it ."
]

3

Accordingly, like Weber, he observes
the modern world to be
a place of moral fragmentation
and ethical strife.
Unlike
Weber, however, Habermas charges
that from this metaphysical
turmoil might loom the prospect of
a new bond between
philosophy and other worldly pursuits.
He believes that
"the way is opening to a new
constellation
in the

relationship of philosophy and the sciences

."

4

This "new

constellation" rejects Weber's allusions to
the rational
"disenchantment" of the modern world
to an

5
.

it instead points

intersub j ective understanding or communication"

between dissimilar persons, even theorists and
politicians.
A more provocative response to the divide between
theory and politics surfaces,
Foucault.

I

think,

in the work of Michel

It is provocative in that Foucault,

unlike Weber

and Habermas, declares contemporary political theory a

failed enterprise.

In his lecture on "The Political
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Technology of Individuals,"
Foucault contends "the failure
of political theories is
probably due neither to
politics
nor to theories but to the
type of rationality in which
they
are rooted.- What vexes
him is not so much modernity's
push toward rationalization,
a push that also

disturbs the
likes of Weber, Habermas, and
especially Theodor Adorno.
Foucault warns against an "increasing
individualization"
that, in the name of an
emancipated self, validates
rationalization and, paradoxically,
the technical reach of
the total state.
He contends that political
theory
"nowadays must lead not to a
nonpolitical way of thinking
but to an investigation of what
has been our political way
of thinking during this century."’
Hence Foucault does not
seek to challenge politics per se
with political theory;
instead, he seeks to confront the
rationality of theory
through a particular type of political
practice 8
.

Theodor Adorno also submits an interesting
rejoinder to
the breach between theory and practice.
The interesting
aspect of Adorno's project is not that he concurs
with

Weber's view of the rationalization of the world's
value
spheres.

His "Dedication" in Minima Moral

i

notes "the true

field of philosophy ... the teaching of the good life,"
has,
since its "conversion into method,

"intellectual neglect,
oblivion.

1

"

suffered through

sententious whimsy and finally

Despite this "melancholy" view of philosophy's

empirical trappings, Adorno rejects Weber's claim that
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rationalization tends to fragment
the value spheres of
modern life. On the contrary,
Adorno charges that technical
rationality leads, not to the
splintering of values, but to
their consolidation under the
totalizing cultural scope of
commodity capitalism.- "What the
philosophers once knew
of life," he argues, "has
become the sphere of private
existence and now of mere consumption,
dragged along as an
appendage of the process of material
production, without

autonomy or substance of its own ." 11

Hence a tension

between theory and practice appears
absent in Adorno's
thinking insofar as the practical reason
of capitalism
privileges the empirical remains of human
life.

Yet,

what

is present is a desire to transgress
the totalizing reach of

instrumental practice.

This desire manifests itself in

Adorno's idea of "critical theory, which can
"scrutinize.

.

.the objective powers that determine individual

existence even in its most hidden recesses

."

12

in short,

it critiques the factual foundations of
scientific

positivism, commodity capitalism, and reifed thought which

combine to constrict the prospects of human subjectivity.

Clearly the theoretical projects of Habermas, Foucault,
and Adorno do not exhaust Max Weber's impact on the

enterprise of contemporary political theorizing.

After all,

his theoretical reach touches the work of other thinkers,

such as Lukacs, Mannheim, Merleau-Ponty

and even Bataille.

Neither do

I
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,

suggest,

Strauss, Arendt,

therefore,

that

Habermas,

Foucault and Adorno
adequately reflect the
manifold scope of contemporary
political theory. „ hat j
will suggest is that
each of the three theorists
reveal a
unique relationship with
Max Weber's theoretical
corpus, one
that departs from the
concept of rationalization.
Though
they all depart from this
comparatively unique concept,
each
theorist ultimately turns
against both Weber's theoretical
project and the contemporary
enterprise of political theory.
It is. thus important to
underscore, 1 believe, the
degree to which each thinker
perceives contemporary
political theory to be a barrier
to any fruitful union of
P itics and theory.
Yet, their varied perceptions
ought
not to goad other theorists
into thinking they can mend the
divide between politics and theory,
recede from politics
altogether, or forfeit theory to the
empirical reality of
political practice.
I contend that contemporary
political
theory permits the theorist, not a
gateway into politics,
but a critical posture against the
enterprise of politics.
It compels one to think in the
breach between politics and
theory for the sake of theorizing against
rather than for a
political practice that often ignores the
democratic merits
of critical thought

13
.

The support for my claim stems from

Weber's political thinking,

inasmuch as the "ethical

paradoxes" undercutting his thought also point to the

possible source of
iticians

,

a critical

and citizens.

dialogue between scholars,

In addition to this instructive
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flaw in Weber's thinking,

the works of Habermas,

an d Adorno further confirm,

in differing ways,

Foucault

how theorists

both confront and transform
the practical confines
of
contemporary politics. As a
conclusion I win discuss
so much the political
aspects
of theorizing,

,

not

but the

educational prospects that
provoke differing theoretical
erpretations of politics, such
that they countervail
political practice 14 Unlike
Weber's idea
.

of •political

education,” which targets "the
ruling and rising classes" of
the German nation, I defend
an education in theory that
provokes politicians, citizens,
and theorists to think about
politics in a different light.

Max Weber and th e Limits of Theory

Despite his many contributions to
contemporary
political thinking, Max Weber's legacy
lingers in the
shadows of more recent thinkers.
it is apparent that
Weber's thinking bears on Habermas's
probe
into the

problematic meaning of "purposive rationality."

Yet,

Habermas's approach entails a specific reading
of Weber's
sociological works, omitting those works that address

politics and the shifting interpretations of rationality
For that matter,

15
.

Foucault confronts Weber on the basis of

the structural limits underpinning Weber's view of

rationality

16
.

Foucault overlooks, however, the extent to

which Weber's methodology of the social sciences might
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anticipate his own critique
of the powers that
nourish what
he calls the "human
sciences." Furthermore,
Adorno
critiques Weber on the basis
of his "unrealistic"
theories
of rationality and
scientific methodology.
But even he
to address the controversial
dimensions of Weber's
political thinking, except to
relegate it to the
vast

category of bourgeois subjectivism.”

it is

my contention,
therefore, that Weber's
contributions tend to issue, not
so
much from his thoughts on politics,
but from his views on
science and methodology.
it does so in that Weber's
idea of
science unknowingly exposes the
"ethical paradoxes" in his
own political thinking, reminding
subsequent theorists that
such flaws open up rather than
preclude a dialogue between
scholarship and politics.

Though Weber's idea of science broadens
the view of his
theory of politics, it still consists
of
several

incongruities that diminish its value to
contemporary
theorizing.
Indeed his approach to science confronts such
controversial issues as "progress," "methodology,"
"'objectivity'," and the "ethical neutrality" of
university
teachers.

However, by confronting and affirming these very

issues, Weber also imposes weighty standards on both
his own

theoretical approach to politics and opposing theorists.

By

analyzing Weber's theory of politics through the critical

prism of his idea of science, at least three discrepancies
become apparent in his theoretical corpus.
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They include the

)

principle of the small
number'
"various spheres of values »
ues,

"
'

the
cne precept
nror^t- of* a world of

m

an d the axiom
and
that "the use of
violence" is essential
to politics.

With regard to the first
of these discrepancies.
Max
Weber' s idea of politics
never ceases to postulate
select
criteria for those persons
who engage in politics.
Notable
among them is the politician's
capacity to weather
the

ethical tumult that corresponds
to any coupling of good
ends
with violent means. This
condition is central to Weber's
argument in The Profession and
Vocation of Politics," in
which he articulates his
theoretical design
of the

politician.

Of course,

he dismisses the idea of a

politician who holds to an "ethics
of conviction"
(Gesinnungsethik)
since such persons

fail to acknowledge

,

"the ethical irrationality of the
world."

To contend with

this "irrationality," Weber insists
a politician must be
conscious "that the achievement of
'good' ends is in many

cases tied to the necessity of employing
morally suspect or
at least mprally dangerous means ." 18
Furthermore, he
continues,

the politician "must reckon with the
possibility

or even likelihood of evil side-effects

."

19

in this way,

Weber qualifies the politician on the basis of
something
other than an impassioned duty to a cause or
principled
conviction.
(

Augenmass

There is also the element of
,

"

judgement "

which Weber refers to as "the decisive

psychological quality of the politician ." 20
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Without it, he

.

concludes,

the politician contributes little
to the

enterprise of politics beyond either the
"pure conviction"
of a syndicalist or the "empty
pose" of Machtpolitik
Aside from the "personal" trait of
"judgment," Weber
stipulates that the politician must also
anticipate a
decidedly turbulent ethical fate.
in other words, it is not
enough for a politician "to be conscious
of these ethical

paradoxes and of his responsibility for
what may become of
himself under pressure from them ." 21 The
politician must
be conscious of the possible alterations
in the meaning of
his cause or principled conviction,
given that

he couples it

with the morally dubious means of physical
force.
concede,

says Weber,

He must

"that the eventual outcome of political

action frequently, indeed regularly, stands
in a quite
inadequate, even paradoxical relation to its
original,

intended meaning and purpose {Sinn )." 22

Therefore,

the

person who pursues a path into politics is unique
not only

m

the sense that his powers of judgment discern
the

distance" between morally good ends and violent means.

The

politician is unique, moreover, in the sense that judgment
allows him to anticipate the disruption of and challenge to
the ultimate ideal that marks his ethical path through

politics.

This proviso of judgment clearly divulges an

element of elitism in Weber's theory of politics.

Yet,

believe it is an element that nevertheless relies on the
unique qualities of other persons, thus indicating the
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I

"

degree to which his idea of
politics might very well
threaten the elevated status
of modern politicians.
indeed I think Max Weber's
idea of the politician
reveals something more intriguing
than a person's

psychological and historical insights
into the meaning of
ethical paradoxes.
it seems as though the
politician
sometimes relies on the insights
of others, notably persons
wrth specifically scholarly
qualifications.
In fact,

from
his 1895 "Freiburg Address" to
his 1917 lecture on "Science
as a Vocation, « Weber denotes
in various ways how scholars
might inform the ethical bearings
of politicians.
in the

"Freiburg Address," he characterizes
the scholar as "a
servant of politics" who promotes
"the enduring powerpolitical interests of the nation." 23 in
his essay on
"'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social

Policy," he

contends that a scholar can "aid the acting
willing person
attaining self -clarification concerning the

m

final axioms

from which his desired ends are derived." 24

Finally, when

he speaks before fellow scholars in Munich
of 1917, Weber

declares that "if we are competent in our pursuit...
we can
force the individual, or at least we can help him,
to give

himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own
conduct.

2S

Given the politician's sense of judgment,

which admits to the prospect of modified and differing
ideals,

the scholar,

therefore,

can help him clarify his

ethical options or challenge him to explain the consequences
297

s

of his political
deeds.

in any case

.

I think Weber'
principle' of the small
number" is u problematic
one
It
is problematic, not
just because it narrows
the scope of
politics, but because it
allows some scholars to
alter
possibly the ethical and
practical design of politics.
In addition to positing
politics on the basis of a
unique trait of judgment,
Weber postulates politics
as one
of several. "spheres of
values," revealing what I
believe to
be another discrepancy in
his political thinking.
The
source of fragmentation among
these spheres, Weber argues,
appears in the historical and
cultural process of
"rationalization."
In his 1906 essay on "The
Protestant
Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,
"
he ascribes this modern
process to a religious proclivity,
one that pushes "innerand other-worldly values towards
rationality, towards the
conscious endeavor, and towards
sublimation by
II

i

/

knowledge.'; 26

However,

inasmuch as a religious value of,

say,

"salvation" plays itself out in the rational
mediums of
commerce, aesthetics, science, or politics,
Weber also
observes a significant "tension." This
tension surfaces in
a paradox,

which reflects the transgression of divine

salvation by the "impersonality" of the market,
the "appeal
to violence" in politics,

science.

or the "empirical refutations" of

He also believes it surfaces in "man's relations

to the various spheres of values," such that over
time these

relations "have.

.

.pressed towards making conscious the
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internal and lawful
aufonomy of thg lndividual
spheres
By positing this view
of the world as a
series of value
spheres, Weber reveals
his neo-Kantian commitment
to
rationality while confirming
his belief in the
practical
differences between science
and politics. 2 *

As result of rationalization,
the value spheres of
politics and science thus
distinguish their separate
vocational boundaries.
According to Weber, they also
"drift
into those tensions" which
result from each sphere's
own
sense of " internal and lawful
autonomy " suggesting
struggles that extend beyond
those with religion.
This
distinction and tension between
politics and science is
evident in Weber's lecture on
"Science as a Vocation."
"To
take a practical stand is one
thing," he remarks, referring
to the conduct of the politician,
"and to analyze structures
and party positions is another." 2 ’
This latter
,

conduct,

which Weber ascribes to the scholar,
is unlike the conduct
of the politician, whose "words"
are hardly

"plowshares to

loosen the soil of contemplative
thought; they are swords
against the enemies: such words are
weapons ." 30 The
scholar,

though,

struggles to "abstain" from such political

maneuvers and flagrant expressions of one's
ultimate ideals.
The task of the scholar, says Weber,
"is to
serve the

students with his knowledge and scientific
experience and
not to imprint upon them his personal political
views ." 31
Yet,

though the conduct of the scholar is separate from
that
299

Of the politician,

they still share

common domain in terms
of the "cultural
values" which politicians
propound and
critique.

a

Such a domain indicates,

countervailing claim against
Weber"spheres of value ." 32

s

I

think,

a

premise of distinct

The most formidable
demarcation between the
"spheres"
of politics and science,
however, involves the
politician's
necessary use of physical
violence.
While depicting the
scope of politics, Weber
notes that " [i] t is only this
very
appeal to violence that
constitutes a political

association," and that "the state"
is what claims "the
monopoly of the legitimate use
of violence.^ By positing
the sphere of politics on the
basis of violence,

therefore,

he not only constricts the
ethical conduct of the

politician.

He implies,

as well,

that politics prohibits

other worldly conducts by virtue
of the distance between
them and violence, eliminating, among
others,

clerics,

and scholars.

Yet,

artists,

interestingly enough, the

violence which Weber ascribes to the sphere
of politics
evokes at least one particular aim. That
aim has to do with
something other than just the "constitution"
of the unique
traits of the political sphere.

It has to do,

I

think, with

the "absolutely essential" claim that "every
political

association" appeals "to the naked violence of coercive
means in the face of outsiders as well as in the face
of
internal enemies

."

34

In other words,
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violence constitutes

the unique design of
politics
lines, hntn
P
but ih
it also
represents that
Which bridges policies
to differing value
spheres,

suggesting a fusion rather
than a separation of
spheres.
Another apparent dividing line
between politics and
science is somewhat more
subtle than the politician's
use of
violence.
That element pertains to
the scholar's disclosure
of "'inconvenient' facts"
in the face of ultimate
ends.
Central to Weber's characterization
of
"The Intellectual

Sphere" is, of course,

the rational push toward
factual

explanations of events, ideas, and
other phenomena.
trajectory also indicates a
provocative

This

consequence, not the
least of which is that each
"increase of rationalism in
empirical science increasingly pushes
religion from the
rational into the irrational realm ." 35
Indeed it impacts
value spheres other than those of
religion.
Yet,

the

rational thrust of science has little
interest in value
spheres per se; its chief concern involves
the values
themselves, regardless of the sphere in
which they dwell.

Weber submits, therefore, that "the empirical
as well as the
mathematically oriented view of the world develops
refutations of every intellectual approach which in
any way
asks for a 'meaning' of inner-worldly occurrences ." 36
Though the sphere of science derives its singular
design by

clarifying and refuting ultimate ideals, it still reaches

beyond its designated scope to infiltrate other spheres
which propound such questionable ideals.
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Given this

nexus,

I

thus believe the
"various spheres of

values" which comprise
Weber s v ew Qf fche
moaern
reflect not a strict
separation but an occasional
confrontation between differing
spheres.
,

.

One other inconsistency
undercuts Weber's standing
in
contemporary theory.
It again concerns
the degree to which
postulates violence as the
fundamental element of
politics. Given the criterion
of political "judgment"
and
the "rational" fragmentation
of the value spheres,
it is no
wonder that violence is the
chief feature of Weber's
theory
of politics.
For these reasons, and
others, he charges in
the "Science as a Vocation"
lecture "that as long as life
remains immanent and is
interpreted in its own terms,
it
knows only of an unceasing
struggle of these gods with
one
another. 1,37 Under these
circumstances, the politician has
no choice but to fight for
his ultimate ends, to struggle
for a cause he deems both
invaluable to the world and
incomparable to other convictions.
Violence thus represents
the chief means of the politician
who seeks to advance such
ends in the modern world.
However, insofar as Weber claims
that "the ultimately possible
attitudes toward life are
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle
can never be
brought to a final conclusion, " 38 violence
is also

available to persons outside the sphere of
politics.
available, I believe, not because Weber
inscribes

It is

the other

spheres with violent means.

On the contrary, he does no
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thing.

Rather,

it is available to
other spheres on the

of life s "irreconcilable"
elements,

which suggest
that the political sphere's
"monopoly on the legitimate
use
of violence" is at best
a contestable claim.
Therefore, though violence
is the defining feature
of
s theory of politics,
the ethical repercussions
of
violence still reach beyond the
sphere of politics.
They
reach toward "The Intellectual
Sphere" when a politician
either relies on scholars for
their ethical "clarity" or
attacks them on the basis of their
status as "inconvenient"
outsiders.
I thus believe Weber's
political thinking points
to an interesting confrontation
between politicians and

political theorists.

In this breach between the
"spheres,"

between "the means of violence" and "the
aim of clarity,"
between the practice and theory of politics-

-this is where

the scholar meets the politician.

This is one place where,

according to Weber, the scholar "stands in
the service of
moral forces; he fulfills the duty of
bringing

about self-

clarification and a sense of responsibility ." 39

This

possible confrontation, however, does not stem from
Weber's
theory of politics, which postulates an elite
number
of

persons,

separate spheres of value, and a monopoly on the

use of physical violence.

It derives from the scholar's

duty to articulate the ethical clarity between "'good' ends"
and "morally suspect" means, as well as from the scholar's

desire to undercut all convictions with "inconvenient'
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.

facts

"

Hence,

the limits of Weber's
theory of politics
emerge in contrast to his
idea of scholarship,
which
.

suggests a likely encounter
between politicians and
political theorists

Because his theory of science
points to the theoretical
confines of politics, I think
it provides the
enterprise of
contemporary political theory
a different interpretation
of
Max Weber's political thinking.it is different in the
sense that- the flaws and
paradoxes in his political thought
do more than validate the
critical components he ascribes
to
the scholar.
They also demonstrate the
degree to which
scholars undercut claims about
the "'principle of the small
number'" and the monopoly on
"the use of violence " in
politics, thus obscuring the lines
that separate "the
various spheres of value." For
this reason, I further
contend that Weber's theoretical
approach to politics offers
contemporary political theory a critical
alternative.
It is
an alternative in that political
theory can now provide
something other than a vehicle by which
to advance such a
narrow cause as German national power or
a neo-Kantian
divorce from the practice of politics.
In light of Weber's
flawed project, I believe contemporary political
theory

promises a confrontation between the practice of
theorizing
and that of politics.
This is not to say that I
think

theory represents a practice more political than
politics,
but only that it exhibits practices and ideas which
undercut
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the practical sanctity
of politics.

it is to say,

simply,

that the purpose of
contemporary political theory
is to
provoke new ways of thinking
about both the practice of
politics and the critical
distance between it and political
theory.
order to illustrate this purpose
in more detail,
I now turn to the
contemporary theoretical projects
of
Habermas, Foucault, and Adorno.

m

Habermas a nd the Rationality of Thpnry

Jurgen Habermas has taken on an
intellectual role in
contemporary German society similar to
the one Max Weber
assumed during the Wilhelmine period.
Like

Weber, Habermas

defends publicly a specific view of the
role of science and
scholarship in the modern university.
However, contrary to
Weber's view of the "bureaucratized"
university
life,

Habermas believes the university still
symbolizes "a
discursive debate that carries with it the
promissary note
of the surprising argument ." 41
in the well-respected

weekly Die Zei t, moreover, Habermas rebuked the
"revisionist" tendencies of several prominent German

historians who

,

after decades of "distance" from the

Holocaust, equilibrated it with the American bombings of

Dresden and the Stalinist purges.

This scholarly "balancing

of accounts" led him to champion something other than "an

ideologically closed milieu to which reality no longer has
access."'-

Rather,

he defended the "mediators and the mass
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media- who criticize such
"scholarly results" in "the
public
flow o£ the appropriation
of tradition ... it is
here, in the
public sphere, that
comparisons can be used to
settle
damages."
The public role Habermas
assumes is thus
reminiscent of Weber's encounters
with a mass German
audience. Yet, when it comes
to Habermas's specific
theoretical ambition, Weber
plays an altogether dissimilar
role as Habermas's adversary.
For the last two decades,
Habermas has formulated,
advocated, and clarified what
he refers to as a "theory
of
communicative action." it is part
of a theoretical

enterprise that expressly departs
from certain facets of
Weber's sociological work, notably
his idea of

"rationalization."

In particular,

Habermas critiques

Weber's theory of "purposive-rational
action" insofar as
Weber defines its instrumental push
through the world as
"universalist" in design.

Habermas rejects this design

because it regards the "multiplicity of forms
of life as
limited to cultural contents, and ... asserts
that every

culture must share certain formal properties
of the modern

understanding of the world ."'

1 '4

in contrast,

he theorizes

an idea of "communicative" reason that points
"to a

symbolically structured lifeworld that is constituted in
the
interpretative accomplishments of its members and only

reproduced through communication ." 45

pluralization of reason,

I

Given this

thus submit that though Habermas
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»
rejects Weber's theory of
rationalization, he still concedes
to a notion of philosophy
that presupposes the
absolute
necessity of rationality.
indeed, in light of his
loyalty
to rationality- -albeit
"communicative"--! contend that
Habermas reveals a fusion of
theory and practice such
that
it foils the critical
element of each particular
craft."
difficulty which Habermas
accentuates in Weber's
thinking consists of the
"universal" reach Weber ascribes
to
"purposive rationality." it is
evident,
though,

that

Habermas comes to Weber with a
significant degree of respect
for his impact on contemporary
social and political
thinking.
In T heory of fommunicat
he esteems
Weber as a theorist "who broke
with both the premises of the
philosophy of history and the basic
assumptions
i

of

evolutionism" that comprised late modern
European social
thinking." Despite these breaks,
Habermas approaches

Weber with caution, portraying him as
one "who ... wanted to
conceive of the modernization of old
European society as the
result of a universal -historical process
of

rationalization ." 48

This element of "rationalization"

constitutes a problem for Habermas.
reasons,

It does so for several

not the least of which has to do with what
Habermas

labels as Weber's "largely unclarified" and "restricted
idea
of purposive rationality

[Zweckrationali tat]

1,49
.

The more

significant flaw has to do with the degree to which Weber's
idea of rationality is "not complex enough to capture all
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"

those aspects of social
actions to which societal
rationalization can attach.Accordingly, Habermas does
not dispute rationalization
per se, only the breach
between
Weber's theory of rationality
and the manifold social
actions of the lifeworld of
modernity.
The point of Habermas's
critique focuses, therefore,
on
what he perceives to be the
"universalist" ambitions
underlying Weber's theory of
rationality. Although he
admits that "Weber himself did
not draw universalistic
consequences without reservations,"
Habermas seeks "to
defend the thesis that a universalist
position follows from
Weber's conceptual approach ." 51
By "universalist
position," he means the extent to
which Weber imputes to
rationality more than just a worldly
action that advances an
ultimate end with objective means and
a sense of proportion
between that end and means.
it involves, too, Weber's
contention that such an action represents
the " formal

properties " of all manifestations of purposive
rationality
the modern world.
This is so, proceeds Habermas,

m

despite

Weber's "culturalist position."

Such a position "requires

that for every form of rationality it is
possible to specify
on the same level at least one abstract point
of view from

which this form could at the same time be described as
'irrational .'" 52
ist

He thus charges that Weber admits to a
as much as "culturalist" view of rationality,

hinting at a possible tension that might at least undermine
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rationality'

s

technical push toward
universalis..

Haher mas
rebuffs this prospect,
however, since he claims
Weber
ultimately gauges the
"progress" of these cultural
spheres
by the culture- invariant
of successful disposition
over
natural and social processes
encountered as something in the
objective world
Habermas critiques the flawed
"universalist" design of Weber's
theory of purposiverationality.
He does so, not for the
sake of expelling it
from contemporary theorizing,
but for the sake of reclaiming
the "culturalise traits
that linger within the worldly
scope of theory.

The discrepancy between the
universal scope of
rationality and its particular cultural
manifestations marks
Habermas's chief point of contention
with Weber.
He
attributes this flaw to Weber's narrow
methodological view
of the "universal-historical
process of rationalization."
It is a view that

"takes into consideration the horizon
of

possibilities opened by the modern understanding
of the
world only to the extent that it serves

to explain the core

phenomenon he [Weber] identified in advance

."

54

in short,

the weakness in Weber's theory of
rationality is such that

he elevates the idea of universal rationalization
over the

empirical evidence that might refute it.
Habermas,

"Thus," says

"Weber starts immediately from the actually

existing forms of Occidental rationalism, without viewing
them against the counterf actually projected possibilities
of
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^

ional i zed lifeworld
i-ewona.

1,55

d,,
By

failing to assess
i

universal rationalization
against the empirical
signs that
defy it, Weber ignores
the culturally nuanced
variants of
rationality. They are the
variants of science,
politics,
religion, aesthetics, and
the economy that take
shape in
distinct and separate value
spheres despite a shared
normative duty to means-end
rational thinking.
Thus, Weber
appears to ignore a profound
rift between his theory
of

rationalization and its practical
and empirical forms in the
cultural spheres of modern
society.
These oversights, or

what Habermas calls the
"repressed problems" in Weber's
theoretical project, make themselves
known when they "turn
up again" in Weber's "reflections
on the state of our
times ,,5S
.

What troubles Habermas most about
Weber's project is
not the foreshadowing of a
"disenchanted" society indicative
of the increasing depletion of
individual autonomy.
Rather,
it has to do with Weber's
problematic postulate of universal
rationalization which undergirds this bleak
depiction of
modern society. On the one hand, Habermas
notes how Weber
sees the sign of the age in the return of
a new polytheism,
in which the struggle among the gods
takes on the

depersonified, objectified form of an antagonism among

irreducible orders of value and life ." 57
points to his

"

Hence, Weber

culturalist " notion of purposive rationality,

even though its "universalist " design precludes, in theory,
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such a struggle by
mandating the same "formal
properties »
for all value spheres.
On the other hand,
Habermas notes
how Weber sees
rationalization as a "threat"
to a person's
"inner autonomy," sinC e
"within modern society there

is no

longer any legitimate order
that could guarantee the
cultural reproduction of the
corresponding value
orientations and action
dispositions »=» Thus, Weber
denotes the "universalist"
reach of purposive rationality,
even though its "culturalist"
traits demonstrate,
.

P

ice,

in
a capacity to inscribe
a disenchanted world with

myriad of values.

Given this theoretical tension
in Weber's
thinking, Habermas doubts Weber's
view of "disenchantment"

and its role in the depletion
of an individual's autonomy.
I believe that the main
problem with Habermas's
critique of Weber exists, therefore,
in a form other than
his dismay at the "rational"
depletion of an individual's
autonomy.
it appears in Habermas's alarm
over the divide in
Weber's thinking, between his "universalist"
design of
rationalization and his empirical confirmation
of its

"culturalist" displays in modern society.

He rebukes Weber

for failing to "engage in counterfactual
reflections," such
that they aid him in clarifying the discrepancies
in his

theoretical approach to rationality and rationalization.
However, Habermas's critique makes its own push
toward

universalism in that he claims "Weber considers societal
rationalization explicitly from the perspective of purposive
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rationality.

At the level o£
institutions,

he does not
apply the comprehensive
concept of rationality
upon which he
bases his investigations
of cultural tradition."”
Habermas rarely delves into
Weber's less sociological
works
to spur the " counterf
actuai reflections" that
might reveal a
contentious view of rationalization.
in fact, Weber's
view of the institutions of
science and politics would
confirm that rationalization,
though "purposive"
in its

design,

still encounters persons who
infuse rationality with
"substantive" values.
In this way, the divide
between his
theory of rationalization and
its cultural manifestations
in
the modern lifeworld appears
less spacious than Habermas

perceives it to be.

it appears cramped,

suggesting that

Weber's notion of rationalization
underscores the clash
between its theory and practice in
the modern world 60
As a rejoinder to the limits of
Weber's theory of
rationalization, Habermas conjectures of
course a theory of
communicative action. The purpose of this
rejoinder is to
"mobilize the rationality potent ial ... expressly
.

for the

cooperatively pursued goal of reaching understanding ." 61
Yet,

I

think Habermas's response is a problematic one,
in

that he seeks to resurrect "rationality" from
the ruins of

Weber's theoretical enterprise.

By positing action on a

theory of communicative "rationality" Habermas seeks
to

marry what -Weber divorces: theory and practice.

purposive rationality, which presumes
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a

He replaces

means-end dichotomy,

With a communicative
rationality that reflects
"the
inter subjective relation"
between
objects,

their shared social world.

m

subjects,

and

other words, communicative

rationality denotes "a concept
expressing the
interconnection of those moments
of reason that become
separated in the modern world."Given this theoretical
ambition, Habermas clearly
diverges from Weber's

enterprise.

doing so, he postulates an
overarching ideal that
indicates a universal language,
such that it orchestrates
relations between differing
subjects, differing value
spheres, and the differing
practical actions of daily life.
A problem surfaces, therefore,
not solely in the universal
overture of communicative rationality.
it surfaces in
Habermas's desire to obviate the
divide between contentious
interpretations of the lifeworld.

Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative
action thus
possesses another problematic dimension.
This problem
surfaces,

I

believe,

insofar as "process of reaching

understanding" presupposes an idea of rationality
that spurs
dialogue across seemingly incommensurable
value spheres.
Habermas claims "the interpretive accomplishments
on which
cooperative processes of interpretation are based

represent

the mechanism for coordinating action ." 63

He is also quick

to claim that "communicative action is not
exhausted by the

act of reaching understanding in an interpretative

manner ." 64

Hence,

Habermas declares his "communicative"
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project an open-ended one,
anticipating the prospects
of
modification, clarification,
and reinterpretation
that
correspond to the "process"
of human communication.
Despite
these conditions, Habermas
maintains a theoretical
commitment to "understanding,"
which "refers to
communication aimed at achieving
a valid agreement. »«
This end point of agreement,
at which a theory of
communicative action aims, may
include change and
reinterpretation, but only insofar
as they advance the goal
of rational agreement.
The prospect of disagreement,
of an
incongruity between interpretations
of the
lifeworld,

seems

perfunctory within-if not entirely
absent from- -Habermas
theory of communicative action.
In light of these theoretical
tensions,

I

'

s

think it is

apparent that Habermas's critical
view of Weber leaves
to be desired.
His view of Weber's

a lot

idea of rationality,

though accurate in its detection of
and practice,

a rift

responds with a theory of "communicative"

rationality that, like Weber's, reveals
ambition.

between theory

Thus,

a

universalist

where Weber's theory of rationality affords

a critical gap in which to judge the
degrees of disagreement

between theory and practice, Habermas's theory
of
communicative rationality engenders a march toward
linguistic understanding and agreement.

This aversion to

theoretical discrepancies, human conflicts, and differing

perceptions of the world reveals,
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I

contend, not only the

universal reach of Habermas's
project.
I believe it
also
reveals how his theory of
communrcative action disarms
the
oppositional and quarrelsome
traits of human interaction,
relinquishing the prospect of
difference for the sake of a
coordinated understanding.
These traits are especially
indicative of scholars and
politicians, who, in very
different ways, strive for clarity
and understanding but who
still value the creative
contingencies lingering in human
disagreements and misunderstandings.
Indeed, they often
stem from an unquestioning
commitment to purposive
rationality.

But they also derive from the
substantive

values that correspond to and
influence rationality, in
either its purposive or communicative
form.
Given

Habermas's staunch commitment to
"rational" understanding,
thus perceive the prospects of a
dialogue between
contentious interpretations, between theory
and practice,

I

to

be limited by the overarching quest for
a singular notion of
understanding. His idea of "communicative
action" does not
merge theory and practice as much as nullify
their

distinctions, which provoke multiple dialogues
about the
meaning of the contemporary lifeworld.

Foucault and the Power of Theory

Unlike Jurgen Habermas, who directly contests Max
Weber

s

theory of rationality, Michel Foucault approaches

Weber's theoretical corpus in a more oblique manner.
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"I

don't think

I

am a Weberian

"

Foucault once rented
at a
roundtable talk with other
Furopean intellectuals,
"since my
basic preoccupation isn't
ratinn^iittionality considered
as an
anthropological invariant " 6S
LdkP
ibe Habermas,
,

he spurns

Weber's theory of rationality
ln that lt:
Y in
n ot only posits
"an absolute value
inherent in reason," but
uses "the term
empirically in a completely
arbitrary way."- Poucault
departs from Habermas,
though, when he relegates
rationality
"to an instrumental and
relative meaning," choosing
instead
"to resituate the
production of true and false
-i

t-

'

at the heart
of historical analysis
and political critique."By

turning away from Weber's
theory of rationality,
Poucault
moves closer to a critique
of the "production of
truth," a
locution for power he ascribes
to

the likes of philosophers,

psychiatrists, and political
statesmen.
Foucault reveals
his connection to Weber
inqnfar as he rejects
er insofar
the structural
rigidity undergirding Weber's
idea of rationality.
I therefore contend
that the focus of Foucault's
critique of Weber is not the idea
of rationality per se, but
the rational "truths" that support
it and Weber's legacy in
contemporary political theory.
indeed, Foucault is not
interested in the "difference. .between
the purity of the
ideal and the disorderly impurity
of the real."” As it
.

relates to Weber's idea of rationality,
he is more

interested in the "different strategies

..

.which can

perfectly well be understood in terms of their
rationality,
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even though they don't
conform to the initial
programming."
Rationality thus represents
a departure
point for Foucault, spurring
a critique from the
standpoint
of such traits as
madness, sexuality, and
discipline which
defy the theoretical
structure of the ideal in
question
Given this critique of the
structural limits of theory,
Foucault obscures the fine
lines that divide the
rational
from the irrational, science
from politics, theory from
practice. Accordingly, I
believe that Foucault's critical
project entails a rethinking
of the rationality that
braces
the discourse of contemporary
political theory.
However,

this "strategy" is somewhat
problematic.

For

I

further

contend that,

insofar as he rethinks the
rationality of
theory, Foucault politicizes
theory more than he theorizes
distinct notion of politics. 71

a

Many of Foucault's early writings-notably his
structural inquiries into insanity,
the human sciences, and
the prison- -tend to stress the
philosophical
impact of

Enlightenment thinking.

In "What is Enlightenment

"
,

Foucault outlines a philosophical
tradition stretching from
Kant in the 18th century to his own
theoretical aims at the
end of the 20th century.

Drawing on Kant's own essay of the

same title,

Foucault locates Kant's Enlightenment legacy
"at
the crossroads of critical reflection and
reflection
on

history.

it is a reflection by Kant on the
contemporary

status of his own enterprise." 72
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Foucault thus also claims

"

that Kant's interpretation of
Aufklarung confronts

contemporary thinkers with

a

underscores this choice in

a 1983

of Telling the Truth."

difficult choice.

He

lecture entitled "The Art

since Kant,

Foucault charges, modern

thinkers "may opt for a critical
philosophy that will
present itself as an analytic
philosophy of truth in
general" or "a critical thought that
will take the form of
an ontology of ourselves, an
ontology of the present." 73
Kant's Enlightenment thinking obliges
modernity to work
toward either "true knowledge" or a
critique

of "truth" as

the basis of the alleged reality
of the present.

latter project that,

reflection in which

says Foucault,
I

it is the

"has founded a form of

have tried to work." 74

The chief aim of Foucault's theoretical
enterprise

manifests itself in a critique, not of a metaphysical
past
or future, but of the historical present.

Again, with

regard to Kant's essay on "What is Enlightenment,"
Foucault
claims that its uniqueness appears in "a reflection by
Kant
on the contemporary status of his own enterprise.

7S

Rather than sustain a philosophical search for truth, Kant
affords the philosopher an alternative type of inquiry which

scrutinizes the enterprise of philosophy itself.

This

inquiry unfolds relative to something other than the

metaphysical ambitions of philosophy, ambitions that reach
from the ancient Greeks to the modern Europeans and decree a

philosophical uniformity between past and present.
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"It is,"

Foucault states,
in

"in the reflection on
'today as difference

history and as motive for

a

particular philosophical task

that the novelty of this
text appears to me to lie."™
Thus, Foucault's theoretical
project takes shape in a

critical disposition outside,
but in relation to, the
transhistorical confines of modern
philosophy.
its target
is not the metaphysical
design of truth, justice, or beauty
per se, but the contemporary
practices of a philosophical

tradition that perpetuate them.
Michel Foucault's project demonstrates
the extent to
which Kant's idea of Enlightenment
informs his own desire to
think against modern philosophy and
its contemporary
legacy.

But to think against philosophy does
not necessarily mean
one must discard or ignore its historical
impact on the

present.

After all the production of "truths" and
"true
knowledge," which extend beyond mere statements
to include
an intricate web of established practices,
represents the

departure point of Foucault's project.

Indeed,

Foucault

problematizes " more than "man's historical mode of being,
and the constitution of the self as an autonomous
subject,"
a task that affirms his commitment to a modern notion
of

philosophical interrogation."

7
'

He also seeks to prompt

the permanent reactivation of an attitude.

.

.a

philosophical

ethos that could be described as a permanent critique of our

historical era,

"

confirming his desire to think against the

project of modern philosophy

78
.
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Consequently, Foucault's

critical task signifies at
least two unsettling
components,
both of which contest the
established practice of

philosophy.

The first has to do with
its critical
orientation "toward what is not
or no longer indispensable
for the constitution of
ourselves as autonomous
subjects.
The other, which issues from
the first,
entails a recasting of "the critique
conducted in the form
of necessary limitation into
a practical critique

that takes

the form of a possible transgression

.

"»»

m

other words,

each element targets the ontological
foundations of
contemporary philosophy: subjectivity and
necessity.
Countering the Enlightenment's sway over
philosophy,
Foucault contests the legacy that
perpetuates necessary
"truths" about past and future notions
of human
subjectivity.

"The critical ontology of ourselves,"

concludes Foucault,

"has to be conceived as.

.

.a

philosophical life in which the critique of what we
are is
at one and the same time the historical analysis
of the
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with
the

possibility of going beyond them ." 81

This critique of

present-day philosophy, however, indicates

a

narrowing of

the theoretical scope of the philosophical enterprise.

It

is one thing to heed Foucault's claim that an "escape from

the system of contemporary reality" for the sake of "another

way of thinking ... has led only to the return of the most

dangerous traditions."

8

-

It is another thing altogether to
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heed his claim that "the crit-in^n « ^
al ontology of ourselves"
constitutes a "work carried
out by ourselves upon
ourselves
as free beings.- The
problem with this last point
is
,

not,

believe, one that concerns
Foucault's critical desire
to broaden the philosophical
issue of human freedom.
Rather, I think the problem
lies in his desire to localize
the critical force of
philosophy against itself. His
critical ontology thus points
to a fruitful turbulence
within the enterprise of
contemporary philosophy, but I am
not sure if it engenders a
compelling theory of
I

politics.**

This problem becomes more
apparent in Foucault's examination
The History of Sexualify
.

Michel Foucault's chief task in The
History nf
Se xuality involves discerning what
is typically understood
to be sex from that which he
perceives to be the discourse
of sexuality. Put differently, his
theoretical concern is
not the degree to which persons indulge
in or abstain from
sex.
Nor is he interested in the manifold
interpretations
of sex as they reveal themselves in history
and across

cultures.

According to Foucault, the "central issue" is "to

account for the fact that it is spoken about...
What is at
issue,

m

briefly,

is the over-all

'discursive fact,' the way

which sex is 'put into discourse

.'" 85

His exploration

thus entails something more than sex; it entails,

relationships of power that correspond to sex.
the language of the persons who talk about sex.
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too,

the

He explores
He

investigates the institutions
that sustain these persons
as
well as archive and
disseminate their discourses.

More
important, he contends that
the seemingly indefinite
qualities of sex give way,
over time, to the peculiar
discourse of sexuality.
"Under the authority of a
language
that had been carefully
expurgated so that it was no
longer
directly named," Foucault
charges, "sex was taken charge
of,
tracked down as it were, by
a discourse that aimed
to allow
it no obscurity, no
respite. »« Hence, the critical
force
of his exploration takes
aim at the discourse of sexuality,
which is another way of saying
it targets the marriage of
sex and power.

he discursive structures underlying
the expansion of
sexuality confirm, therefore, not
the repression of sexual
pleasure, but its stimulation within
technically advanced
societies.
Foucault contests a Freudian tradition
which
posits the productive capacities of
society on the

repression of sexual desire, pleasure, and
excess- -traits
that,

it was thought,

virtuous pursuits.

distracted persons from more socially

"We must ... abandon,

"

he charges,

"the

hypothesis that modern industrial societies ushered
in an
age of increased sexual repression ." 87

He justifies this

claim insofar as history and, more important, discourse
reveal something other than a modern technological denial
of

pleasure, or vice-versa.
concerned,

"

[p]

Indeed,

as far as Foucault is

leasure and power do not cancel or turn back
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against one another; they seek
out, overlap, and reinforce
one another.
They are linked together by
complex mechanisms
and devices of excitation
and incitement
Accordingly,
he perceives the expansion
of sexuality inasmuch
.

as the

institutions of science, law, the
state, and the economy
forge discourses from, ironically,
their attempt to moderate
and control it.
"We have not only witnessed
a visible
explosion of unorthodox sexualities,"
remarks Foucault.
But, he continues, we have
seen also "a deployment quite
different from the law" of repression,
one
that "has

ensured.

.

.the proliferation of specific
pleasures and the

multiplication of disparate sexualities

."

89

Sexual

pleasure has not been diminished in the
least; it has been
transformed and amplified in conjunction with
power.

As a result of this discursive ordering
of sexuality,
Foucault contends that an affirmation of the
human body and

subjectivity constitutes the primary duty of modern
institutions.

Again,

he challenges an essential precept of

modern political thinking, one that postulates fear and
violence as the chief means that link rulers and ruled.

Corresponding to the expansion of sexuality, what took shape
"was a political ordering of life, not through an

enslavement of others, but through an affirmation of
self

."

90

Modern power thus converts from a source of pain,

consternation, and suffering into one of possible pleasure.
It reveals a multi-faceted character,
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furthermore,

that has

learned how to control
subjects by knowing and caring
for
their many pleasures rather
than by modifying them into
objects of technical force.
According to Foucault, modern
power "provided itself with
a body to be cared for,
protected, cultivated, and
preserved from the many dangers
and contacts, to be isolated
from others so that it would
retain its differential value.
Sexuality appears to
augment political power, extending
its reach below the
exterior of subjects and into their
precarious biological
and emotional environs.
It demonstrates, too, the degree
to
which Foucault's critique disrupts
the modern theoretical
approach to political power 92
.

Michel Foucault's critique of sexuality
theorizes,
therefore, not so much an agency of power
that negates life,
but one that controls it by administering
human desires and
bodily pleasures.
"Power," he charges, is no longer

concerned with "legal subjects over whom the
ultimate

dominion

[is]

death,

but with living beings,

and the mastery

it would ... exercise over them would have
to be applied at

the level of life itself

however,

."

93

A theory of politics,

or a set of human practices

(discursive or

otherwise) which strive to acquire, maintain, or contest
this power over life,

appears absent from Foucault's

exploration of sexuality.

It is clear that

"life" plays a

central role in his view of politics, especially when he

claims that "modern man is an animal whose politics places
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xistence as a living being
in question."” What
is
not so clear is the
theoretical design Foucault
ascribes to
the politics and
"political struggles" that
correspond to
this questioning of life,
pleasures,
needs,

rights, or sense
He establishes the
discursive controls of
sexuality such that they
manifest themselves in, say,
laws
against sodomy, scholarship
on deviance, or the shifting
demographics of pregnancy. He
also confirms the conversion
of power over death into
a power over life.
Yet, I believe
Foucault fails to explicate a
political nexus between
of happiness.

discourse and power, such that
the critique of "truths"
moves beyond the pinched realm
of

archivists, psychologists,

administrators, and scholars.
In his work on "governmentality,

though,

Foucault
tries to flesh out a theory of
politics that highlights the
provocative bond between discourse and
power.
Moreover,
••

it

represents his most direct confrontation
with the
theoretical legacy of Max Weber. Departing
from a tradition
of thinking that stretches from
Machiavelli
to Weber,

Foucault rejects the claim that violence
constitutes the
essential ground of political power. Unlike
his view of
P ° Wer in T he History of Sexuality where he ascribes it
to
web of discursive institutions, Foucault's
view of
,

a

governmentality" locates power in one specific discursive
practice.

In his essay on "The Subject and Power,"
Foucault

stresses how "power is less a confrontation between two
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P

adversaries or the linking
of one to the other
than a
question of government."”
p ower entails, he
continues,
"guiding the possibility
of conduct and putting
in order the
possible outcome
Foucault thus moves beyond,
say,
Machiavelli' s notion of princely
"virtu," Hobbes's idea of
forceful "covenants," or
Weber's claim
about the state's

"

monopoly of legitimate physical
violence .»

Indeed,

he

seeks to reveal something
different about power.
He points
to "the possible field of
action of others" whereby "free
subjects" confront "government,"
the chief aim of which is
to direct the various
conducts of individuals and
groups.
He seeks a notion of power
that cannot "be sought on the
side of violence or of struggle,
nor on that of voluntary
linking. .but rather in the area
of the singular mode of
action
.which is government." 97
.

.

.

The more interesting element of
Foucault's idea of
governmental ity concerns the degree to which
he grounds it
on antecedents other than those of
a political design.
He
contends, rather, that it emerges in
conjunction with
specific economic practices.
In his 1978 lecture on

"Governmental ity

,

"

Foucault draws on the 16th century

literary quarrels surrounding Machiavelli
Tho— rince to support his claim.
he notes,

Vayer,

'

s

publication of

"The art of government,"

referring to Machiavelli and, later, La Mothe Le

"is essentially concerned with answering the question

of how to introduce economy.

.

.how to introduce this
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.

meticulous attention of the
father towards his family
into
the management of the
state."” More specifically,
Foucault is interested in the
economy as it reveals a
paternal component indicative
of administering the
possible
actions of children, wives,
mistresses, wealth, and other

ant

resources."

in light of these familial
intrusions

into the field of power, he
further contends that, by the
18th century, the discourse
of government prioritizes
the
value of economy. Relying on
Rousseau and the Physiocrat
Quesnay, Foucault notes how the
"word 'economy'" begins to
signify not only "a level of
reality" but, more important,
"a field of intervention"
which broadens the discursive
scope of government 99 The discourse
of government reveals
a managerial quality distinct
from that of physical violence
or legal contracts.

Given the economic discourse of
governmental ity,
Foucault rejects the idea of the modern

state as an agency

defined by, its functional unity and political
totality.
again contests both Weber and the foundations
of modern
political theory, claiming that "the state is no

He

more than a

composite reality and a mythicized abstraction,
whose

importance is a lot more limited than many of us think.
Maybe what is really important

...

for our present... is not so

much the etatisation of society, as the
governmental ization
society,

"

'

of the state.

1,11111

By

"

atzatisation of

Foucault refers to the ever-increasing
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t

.

functionality of the state to
dominate and manage the
multitude of desires that compose
modern society. Yet he
also refers to the state
inasmuch as its functional
reach
becomes the "target" of opposition,
thanks to those persons
who perceive themselves to
be the opponents
of the state's

impersonal force.

Hence,

he departs from a feature
that is

central to Weber's notion of

a

bureaucratic state, Marx's

idea of bourgeois state, and
even Hegel's theoretical
depiction of an Enlightened state 101
The
.

governmental! tat ion of the state is...
the only real space
for political struggle and
contestation,"
"

since "it is the

tactics of government which make
possible the continual
definition and redefinition of what is
within the competence
of the state and what is not ." 102
The totality of
the

state is thus a fiction as long as government
inscribes it
with a discourse that reflects, not only
free subjects, but
free subjects who challenge the discursive
boundaries of the
government

With his theory of governmentality

,

Foucault

underscores neither a monolith of total power nor the
absence of human freedom.

Rather, he points to the fissures

that characterize the modern concept of power,

such that

they undermine any reach for totality and the negation of

human freedom.

Again,

in his lecture on "The Subject and

Power," Foucault reminds us that

"

[a]

the very heart of the

power relationship, and constantly provoking
328

it,

are the

.

calcitrance of the

win

and the intransigence
of

edora.

Though he alludes to
governmental ity as the
chief souroe of modern
political struggles, Foucault
still
fails to explain its
theoretical design.
The most he
provides is a reference to "
agonism' » or what he calls
"a
relationship which is at the
same time reciprocal
incitation
and struggle; less of a
face-to-face confrontation which
lyzes both sides than a
P
permanent provocation ." 104 His
idea of governmental ity,
therefore, points to a theoretrcal
space in which the agon of
politics occurs.
'

,

However,

I

think this agon tends to advance
not the aim of politics,
which possibly imperils the
structure of government, but the
aim of government itself, which
entails the power to

constrain the prospects of politics.

In other words,

Foucault's idea of agonistic politics
appears anchored to
the structures and discourses
of government rather

than the

discourses of an agon which might reveal
a differing notion
of politics.
Hence he not only falls short of theorizing
a

politics, but he appears to deviate from
his desire to
augment the discourses of governmental ity
thus believe Foucault's idea of agonism
reveals, at

I

best,

a

"political task" whereby a person partakes in "the
analysis, elaboration, and bringing into question"
the

governmental" desire to administer human conduct.

Yet,

theoretical insights into the agon still presuppose the

necessity of a governmental discourse, suggesting that he
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his

not only views government
as "indispensable"
but constrains
the discursive field o£ "
possible transgression."
In this
way, Foucault offers
us little in the way of
thinking
against the very modern
liberal democratic institutions
that

constitute contemporary politics.

Indeed,

with the

exception of his recasting of
"power" in terms of life over
death, he appears to validate
their pluralistic structures
and ambitions.
At its worst, moreover, I
believe Foucault's
idea of agonism indicates
a narrow field

of "strategies"
that push toward the aim of
power at the risk of diminishing
the prospect of resistance.
The is the case, not only
because he posits government as
the primary site of agonism,
but because he postulates power
as the primary ambition of

agonistic politics.

Though a reach for power may
"provoke"

a desire to resist it,

that

recalling James Madison's warning

mbition must be made to counteract
ambition,"
Foucault's theory of agonism nonetheless
elevates the goal
of power over all others.
Thus, Foucault's
"

[a]

critical

enterprise- reveals a theory of politics.

The question

remains, however, whether it stems from
a "critical ontology
of ourselves" or echoes an affirmation
of "man's historical

mode of being."
Michel Foucault confirms how Kant's Enlightenment

thinking turns against its own rational aspirations,

suggesting that thought itself might reveal the limits of
public power.

He explained,

too,
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how the discourses of

sexuality constitute a
novel approach to
"bio-power": the
administrative expansion of
human desires and bodily
pleasures.
Even his approach to
"governmentality" documents
egree to which power
represents a clash between
willful
subjects and the disciplinary
aims of government.
But

Foucault, whose theoretical
aim is to advance a "critical
ontology of ourselves," tends
to underscore the traits
of
historical "others" rather than
the theoretical limits of
contemporary politics. This is
not to say his project lacks
a critique of the way
theorists approach the subject
of
politics. Nor does it mean his
project lacks a differing
approach to thinking about politics.
Instead, I think
Foucault demonstrates the extent
to which his critique
engenders, not so much a theory of
politics per se, but a
politics that impacts the enterprise
of political theory.
This impact appears in his own thinking
against the

allegedly "indispensable" discourses of
rational "truth,"
"sexuality," and "government." But it is

most evident in

that Foucault's project adheres to an
scholarly discourse,

which disrupts the meaning of theory yet still
affirms the
pluralist aim of a liberal political practice.

A dorno and the Dialectics of Theory

Max Weber's impact on the early members of the
Frankfurt School at the Institut fur Sozialfurschung spurred

neither a "critical ontology of ourselves" nor
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a theory of

a

"inter-subjectivity."

what Weber did contribute
to the
"critical theories'' of Max
Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse,
and
Theodor Adorno, among others,
was their interest in
his idea
of rationalization.various ways, each thinker

m

appropriated Weber's idea insofar
as it posited the dominant
role of " Zweckrationali tat"
under industrial
capitalism.

They also departed from his
idea of rationalization,
given
what they percieved to be
Weber's intellectual surrender

to

market capitalism, bourgeois
political institutions, and
scientific positivism. The last
of these limits is the one
Adorno tends to stress in Dialectic
of Enlightenment
Minima
Moralia and Negative Dialectics 106
,

The chief issue that spurs Theodor
Adorno's critique of
scientific positivism derives from
a legacy he
inherited,

not only from Weber, but principally
from Hegel and Marx.
That legacy involves the troubled
ties between theory and

practice.

In Mi nima Moral:

,

for instance, Adorno perceives

the rational push of positivism as
a force that has "set
aside" Utopia and "demanded" the transparency
of theory and

practice.

practical.

Consequently, he believes "we have become all too

Fear of the impotence of theory supplies

a

pretext for bowing to the almighty production process,
and
so fully admitting the impotence of theory
of Adorno's project surfaces,

therefore,

."

107

The thrust

in an attempt to

rescue theory from the empirical and instrumental advance of

rational practice, which he thinks gradually annihilates the
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critical force of theory.

^

In

even turns to the
"positivistic" scholarship
of Weber,
seizing what he calls
"constellations" for "the
conversion
into objectivity, by way
language, of what has been
subjectively thought and
assembled. ">« H e seeks to
promote a tension between
theory and practice,
one that

validates the critical power
of theory while it
subverts the
totalizing grasp of practice.
I

contend,

however,

that

though Adorno's enterprise
points to the fruitful mix
of
theory and practice in
"constellations," it still leaves
the
"critical" theorist detached
from any vital encounter with
the practice of politics. >“»
This becomes apparent,
I

further charge,

inasmuch as Adorno's project
of "negative
dialectics" postulates a "totality"
that obviates, not only
theory, but any such theoretical
task that seeks to subvert
the cultural dominance of rational
practice 110
.

Like Michel Foucault who succeeded
him, Adorno locates
the flaw of modern philosophy in
the achievements of

Enlightenment thinking.

Yet,

where Foucault finds a

thriving "philosophical ethos" in the
Enlightenment, Adorno
locates quite the opposite 111 One of his
chief

.

contentions

m

D ialectic of Enlightenment turns on
the claim

that Enlightenment thinking contradicts
its own emancipatory

ambitions.

"Men," Adorno explains,

referring to the

Enlightenment's anthropological underpinnings,

"have always

had to choose between their subjection to nature or
the
333

subjection of nature to the
Self."-

Given th±s rigia

choice,

he further notes that
"[t]he essence of
enlightenment is the alternative
whose

inevitability

that of domination

is

Of course, modern man
opts for the

second choice, dominating
nature rn a way that allows
him to
transform the world from a
place of subjective
apprehension
and ignorance to one of
objective order and empirical
truth.
Despite this "rational"
orchestration, man's "enlightenedpath is not necessarily paved
with the glowing remnants
of
his liberation from nature.
"With the extension of the
bourgeois commodity economy,"
counters
Adorno,

"the dark

horizon of myth is illumined by
the sun of calculating
reason, beneath whose cold
rays the seed
of the new

barbarism grows to fruition." 11
Enlightenment represents,

For Adorno the

"

therefore,

not just the growth of

man's subjective sovereignty, but
also its complicity in the
social and cultural displays of
rational domination.
In light of this paradox,

Adorno details the extent to

which man's rational liberation from
nature reveals the
eradication of one's own treasured subjectivity.

By using

reason to control the contingencies of nature
and secure the
end of self-preservation, man gains an
objective knowledge
of the natural world around him.

Man does so, however, at

the cost of neglecting the nature of his own
subjectivity.
"As soon as man discards his awareness that he
himself is

nature," Adorno charges,

"all the aims for which he keeps
334

himself alive-social progress,
the intensification of all
his material and spiritual
powers, even consciousness
itself -are nullified.—
They are nullified because
the
means of instrumental reason
supersede the ultimate goal of
self-preservation.
Consequently, man renounces the
very
elements of his nature that defy
reason: passion,
indeterminacy,

chance.

claims Adorno,

"is almost always the destruction
of the

"Man's domination over himself,"

subject in whose service it is
undertaken ." 116

This

eradication of subjectivity thus
derives not solely from
man's technical control of the
objective elements of nature
It occurs because "the
substance which is dominated,
suppressed, and dissolved by virtue
of self-preservation is
none other than that very life as
functions of which the
achievements of self-preservation find their
sole definition
117
and determination ."
Hence, man's struggle to free
himself from the "irrational" elements of
the world

underscores more than just his technical control
of nature.
Integral to Adorno's project, it also accentuates
man's

gradual depletion of the human desires, ideals,
stories, and

theoretical ambitions that stem from incalculable sources.

Theodor Adorno contends that the profound distinction
of Enlightenment thinking thus manifests itself,

not in the

growth of human thought, but in the dissipation of its
critical faculties.

If the Enlightenment cannot move beyond

the confines of instrumental reason,
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then modern thought

entails far m0 re than the
renunciation of nature and
human
subjectivity. According to
Adorno, it assumes the
"reified
form of mathematics,
machine, and organisation,"
confirming
the degree to which
thinking "avenges itself"
on the persons
who comprise modern society
and culture.- indeed,
in
that the Enlightenment
took "everything unique
and
individual under its tutelage,
it left the uncomprehended
whole the freedom, as
domination, to strike back
at human
existence and consciousness by
way of things.'— To
lsion a manner of thinking
beyond instrumental
reason,

beyond the. empirical objectification
of nature-including
one's own subjective self-is
thus unfathomable.
Adorno
refers to such thinking as "the
oppressor's
fortress,"

a

narrow domain in "which even
revolutionary imagination
despises itself as utopism and decays
to the condition of
pliable trust in the objective tendency
of history ." 120
Its architecture shields man and
reason from

irrationality.

by shielding both, Enlightenment
thinking obstructs the
view of the world beyond the fortress,
beyond the
Yet,

clutches

of instrumental reason.

Judging from Adorno's Dialectic of

Enl

i

ahi-pnmpnf

modern society appears to leave little--if any-critical
space within which persons might theorize against

instrumental reason.

This is evident in his notion of the

culture industry," which reflects the subordination of
"all
areas of intellectual creation" to the "same end" of
336

.

Zweckrationali tat

.

If demonscraces how
thinking aspires

a

cultural uniformity that,
not only affirms the
consequent
commodity of reason, but
soothes the persons who
make
themselves numb within the
bourgeois system of commodity
capitalism.
"What is decisive today,"
notes Adorno, "is the
necessity inherent in the
system not to leave the
customer
alone, not for a moment
to allow him any
suspicion
that

resistance is possible."-

The confines of society
become
increasingly rigid and narrow
given the absence
of

theoretical prospects that
provide a countervailing
force
against the "totality" of the
culture industry.
However, I
think the extent to which
Adorno posits this "totality"
on a
human duty to the "same end"
marks the limit of his own

thinking in D ialectic of Enlig
htenment.

if Enlightenment

thinking obviates critical resistance,
if it "dictates" that
man's "needs should be so
predetermined that he feels
himself to be the eternal consumer,"—
then Adorno's
project can only follow one of two
paths.
His project
manifests itself either as a critique
of

Enlightenment,

which

m

turn possibly foils the claim of
"totality," or as
another entertaining product of the culture
industry, which
nullifies its critical impact.
In either
case,

the force of

Adorno's project appears constrained by its
own theoretical
designs
If there is an effective force behind
Adorno's

theoretical approach, it appears in his critique of
modern
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science.

He outlines this
particular task in Minima
Moralia, a se ries o£
aphorisms through which he
formulates a
notion of "dialectical
thought."
it constitutes his
critical charge against what
he believes to be the
most

perilous repercussion of the
Enlightenment: the reified
thinking of scientific
positivism.
Like the Dialeptic^f
E nliqhtenme nt

,

Adorno's task in

Minimajoi^

involves a

critique of instrumental
reason as it reflects, not
only the
uniformity of human subjectivity,
but the scientific
objectification of human experience.
This latter
trait, by

which a "hardened plaster-cast
of events take the place
of
events themselves," represents
Adorno's understanding of
reification.
Reification signifies the positivist
tendency
of modern science, a tendency
that
exalts the empirical

design of objects as the genuine
embodiment of human
subjectivity.
Countering this naive and dehumanizing
drift,
Adorno rejects not only "the last
traces of a deductive
system, together with the last
advocatory gestures
of

thought.

Dialectical thought opposes reification
in the
further sense that it refuses to affirm
individual

things in

their isolation and separateness: it
designates isolation as
precisely a product of the universal ." 123 Accordingly,

Adorno theorizes

a

"dialectical" perception of the world

that thinks against the modern reified mind,
which, he says,

"pays for its absolute judgements by loss of the
experience
of the matter judged

."

124
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in this way Adorno
stresses the chief shortcoming
of

positivism and reification:
the lack of "distance"
between
thinking subjects and empirical
objects.

He locates this

shortcoming in the false
transparency between human
experience and methodological
representations.

As a

theorist, Adorno struggles to
think against this
instrumental muddying of the
philosophical waters, so to
speak, advocating an infusion
of critical "gaps" between
subjects and objects. The "value
of thought," he states,
highlighting the flaws of reification,
"is objectively
devalued as this distance is
reduced; the more it

approximates to the preexisting standard,
the further its
antithetical function is diminished »“»
Thus,

.

locating the gaps that exhibit the

for Adorno,

differences between

diverse subjects and empirical objects,
represents an
integral element of the "dialectical"
enterprise.

Contrary

to the "totality" toward which
positivism and reification
lean,

Adorno contends that "knowledge comes to
us through a
network of prejudices, opinions, innervation,
self-

corrections, presuppositions and exaggerations

."

126

Equally important, it comes to us "through the dense,
firmly- founded but by no means uniformly transparent
medium
of experience

12
.

If there is a way to resist the

totality" of Enlightenment thinking,
thinking,

to resist reified

it occurs through the act of theorizing the

oppositional distinctions between subjects and objects.
339

Dialectical thought symbolizes
Adorno's attempt to
counteract the expansion of
reified thinking with increasing
degrees of theoretical distance.indeed, his notion of
critical theory postulates a
degree of dissonance between
thinking and the facts that
correspond to it. According
to
Adorno, thought "relates to
facts and moves by criticizing
them, its movement depends
no less on the maintenance
of

distance.

it

expresses exactly what

is,

what is never quite as thought
expresses

precisely because

it.—

The

enterprise of critical theory finds
its most provocative
voice in revealing the philosophical

limits of the culture

industry and the quests for
reification that nurture its
totality.
As a consequence of this enterprise,
Adorno
reveals a distinct theoretical
approach to thinking and
being in the modern world.
"Distance

is not a safety-zone,"

he cautions,

"but a field of tension," a place
"to prove, by

criticism of knowledge, the impossibility
of
between the idea and what fulfills it ." 130

a coincidence

in Minima

Moralia, Adorno's critical task seeks to
reject outright the
totalizing aims of reified thought, countering it
with a

theory that differentiates the absolute yet
fragile bounds
of the culture industry.

He seeks to theorize not only a

view different from that of

modernity's reach for totality,

but a way of thinking that relates to totality from
an

oppositional locality.
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The consequences of this
distance do not appear in
a
simple Cartesian divide
between thinking subjects
and

P rical objects.

They appear, according to
Adorno, in the
critical space that rejects
the totality of reified
thought.

Within this space, critical
thinkers do not theorize
alternative or utopian paths
to Enlightenment thinking
and
the culture industry.
Rather, they theorize in
ways "that
displace and estrange the world,
reveal it to be, with its
rifts and crevices, as indigent
and distorted as it will
appear one day in the messianic
light."'” However, Adorno
is well aware of the obstacles
facing the theorist who
chooses to inhabit this space.
In fact, he declares that
a
"dialectic" approach to theorizing
"is also the utterly
impossible thing, because it presupposes
a standpoint
removed, even though by a hair's
breadth, from the scope of
existence ." 132 Hence, Adorno's theory
of dialectics
confronts something other than a totalizing
culture
industry, the aim of which nullifies
theoretical strategies
of resistance.

It also encounters a distance that,

despite

its pledge of a fruitful clash between
theory and practice,

still situates dialectical thinking within
reach of the

culture industry.

Therefore all thought, even Adorno's

dialectics, appears "marked... by the same distortion
and

which it seeks to escape.

postulate of "distance,

"

I

1,133

Given this

think it is again evident that

Adorno's quest to circumvent the practical reach of
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Enlightenment thinking fails to
evade its fundamentally
invasive drift.
If Adorno hopes to
promote a critical
theory at odds with the culture
industry, he must rethink
the "gaps" between such
differing environs.
His rejoinder to this
theoretical inadequacy assumes
its most definite shape in
Neg ative

Dialectic

work Adorno delineates

a

m

»«

this

problem that encompasses more than

the reification of philosophical
thought--!

bond between theory and practice.

.e.

,

the troubled

Adorno presumes that

philosophy has "broken its pledge to
be as one with reality
or at the point of realization,"
rendering its
new task as

one that would "inquire whether and
how there can still be a
philosophy at all." 135 Based on this
presumption, which he
derives
part from the "historical" ruins of
20th-century
fascism, capitalism, and Soviet Marxism,
Adorno confirms the
subservient relation of theory to practice. 136

m

"The call

for unity of theory and practice," he
repeats,

"has

irresistibly degraded theory to a servant's role,
removing
the very traits it should have brought to that
unity." 137

The critical force of theory has been sacrificed for
the
sake of solidifying,

say,

claims to racial,

methodological superiority.

It

ideological, or

diminishes theory's capacity

to countervail the ambitions of practice.

In turn,

renews his charge that practice is "nonconceptual

,

"

Adorno
given

that it lacks the critical distance by which to perceive

distinctions between theory and practice, thus becoming what
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^

he calls "the prey of
power

__
ao a
As
a.
consequence,

"

he proposes
to explore the idea of
a "constellation
in science," such
it holds in an everchanging oppositional bond
both
critical theory and rational
practice.
"This is why,"
Adorno declares, "theory is
legitimate and why it i 8
’

hated

" 138
.

Dialec tic of Enlightenment
and Minima Moral
Adorno inscribes dialectics
with the task of theorizing
against the reified concepts
of the culture
i

industry, even
though this totality tends to
obviate such resistance. With
Ne gative Dialectic s, however,
Adorno modifies the same task
With a specific notion of
theoretical constellations.
In
order to reinvigorate the critical
force of theory, Adorno
does not detach it entirely from
practice, nor does
he seeks

to conflate each endeavor.

Instead, he hopes to restore the

tension between theory and practice
by exploring thought in
terms of constellations, "a knowledge
mindful of
the

historic positional value of the object
in its relation to
other objects ." 339 They represent Adorno's
attempt
to

theorize beyond the rational concept reflected
in the
couplet of a thinking subject and an empirical

object,

to

render both susceptible to more than one single
interpretation.

In doing so,

he turns "to a scholar of so

positivistic a bent as Max Weber, who did ... understand
ideal types' as aids in approaching the object, devoid
of

any inherent substantiality and capable of being reliquified
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.

at

will.-

Drawing on weber

,

s

.

not on q£ „,. deai types(n

for the social and cultural
sciences, Adorno claims
he has
found a way of thinking
"beyond the alternative of
positivism and idealism."
indeed, he contends that
"a close
look" at Weber' s ideal
types "win show that these...
are not
mere conceptual fixations.
Rather, by gathering concepts
round the central one that
is sought, they attempt
to
sxpre s s what that conrpnt
ntoncept aims at,
not to circumscribe it to
,

operative

ends.—

m

this way,

constellations transform

thinking from a technical
instrument into a valued end,
whereby the pursuit of totality
encounters theoretical
scrutiny
The impact of thinking through
constellations manifests
itself in something more than a
trace of subjectivity in
otherwise wholly reified objects.
it appears in the form of
a contradiction, such that it
frustrates the Enlightenment's
rationally practical reach for a totalizing
identity.
By
theorizing constellations, Adorno points
to the possibility
of thinking as something other than
a conceptual validation
of instrumental reason, something
other than an absolute

transparency between thinking subjects and empirical
objects.

He wants to emphasize "that objects do not
go into

their concepts without leaving a remainder, that
they come
to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy
... the fact

that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived ." 142

Adorno

s

approach to constellations thus reveals a type of
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theoretical practice that,
contrary to the totalizing
Identity of the culture
industry, fixates on the
fruitful
contingencies of contradiction.
"Contradiction is," Adorno
states, "nonidentity under
the aspect of identity;
the

dialectical primary of the
principle of contradiction makes
the thought of unity the
measure of heterogeneity." Put
simply,

lt provides the theorist
not so much a particular

perspective but a field of possibilities
that defy any
overture toward totality. Such
contradictions, which derive
from a constellation, promise
that "the heterogeneous
collides with its limit," allowing
for a
type of thought

that "exceeds itself

."

143

The underlying ambition of Negative
Dial ort- ire
surfaces, therefore, in Adorno's
affirmation of theoretical
prospects in the increasingly narrow design
of the culture
industry.
Furthermore, the strength of this work is
not so
much Adorno's vexing diagnosis of modern
philosophical
thinking.

Nor does it stem from his resuscitation
of

Weber's theory of ideal types,

a

thinker whom Adorno links

to the Enlightenment's legacy of scientific
positivism.

Instead,

I

Adorno

belief that even though we may theorize in a

s

think the strength of Negative Dialectics is

critical manner,

"the words we use will remain concepts.

Their precision substitutes for the thing itself, without
quite bringing its selfhood to mind; there is a gap between
words and the thing they conjure
345

."

144

Yet,

the very

strength that corresponds
to Adorno's theory
of
"constellations" also mirrors
a srgnifreant flaw.
It
indicates a flaw, I be i le ve,
in that constellations
presuppose not only the
totality of the culture
industry,
but a strict divide
between subjects and
objects, theory and
practice
Like Weber's theory of
ideal types, Adorno's
idea
of constellations
maintain an insightful
tension that
countervails any overture
toward ideological and
practical
absolutism.
Unlike Weh^-r
u
hough,
who at most sought to
contest the one-sided views
of historical materialism
and
scientific positivism, Adorno
seeks to contest a monolithic
mind-set which encompasses all
views.
Thus, constellations
may reveal the possible margins
of Enlightenment
.

'

thinking,

but in turn they cannot avoid
its certain assault against
the design of constellations.

would also argue that the critical
distance between
subjective expression and objective
representation
I

represents another weakness in Adorno's
project.
it does so
by the fact that "negative dialectics"
employs the promise
of

possibility" to betray "a gap between words
and the
thing they conjure ." 145 The very "possibility"
of negative
dialectics confirms, therefore, not just a
challenge to the
reifed grasp of the culture industry, but,
more important,
the dispersion of Adorno's postulate of
"totality."
way, Adorno finds himself in a theoretical
bind.

in this

If Adorno

presupposes the totalizing reach of Enlightenment thinking,
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then he risks nullifying
the critical force of
negative
dialectics
if he invests critical
theory with a forceful
element, an element indicative
of constellations,
then he
risks dispelling the very
totality that spurs negative
dialectics
the first place.
The other "possibility"
lies
between the totality of
Enlightenment thinking and the
force
of negative dialectics,
a prospect that compels
theorists to
question the presupposition of
totality and the hope of
negative dialectics. This
prospect confirms, not so much
the limit of Adorno's theory
of negative dialectics,
but its
confinement to the practice of
theory, thus revealing the
subversion of his own philosophical
enterprise.
.

m

T he Contemporary Purpose of
Political Theory
If Max Weber's theoretical
corpus underscores anything

about political thinking,

it is that the rift between theory

and practice remains an onerous
obstacle for contemporary
political theorists.
It is evident in Adorno's idea
of

"dialectics," such that his desire to think
against

practical reason leaves him lacking either

a

"totality" to

critique or a "critical theory" by which to
resist

it.

Even

Habermas, who seeks to mend the rift between
theory and

practice with "communicative reason,

"

confronts a barrier by

anchoring theory to the practical cause of
intersubjectivity."

Finally,

Foucault confronts an

obstacle insofar as his theory of a "critical ontology"
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.

tends to unsettlpS

'

notn0t

<-v,^

Che P ractl ce of politics
per se

,

the practice of contemporary
political theory.
each
case, the divide between
political theory and political
practice remains intact 146

but

m

.

It is important to
note,

think,

that this divide
spurs significant tensions
in the work of Weber,
Adorno,
Habermas, and Foucault,
tensions that reveal quite
divergent
views of political practice
and theory.
I have
I

argued,

furthermore,

that such tensions do not
diminish the
political force of contemporary
theory, nor do they invite
the theorist into the
practical routines of politics.
Instead, I believe they provide
insight to theorists who
seek to rethink the critical
purpose of contemporary

political theory
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These insights appear in such

scholarly ethics as Weber's appeal
to "'inconvenient'
facts," Foucault's request for
"permanent provocation,"
Adorno's search for a "field of tension,"
and
even

Habermas's request for "a valid agreement."
insights,

I

Given these

would contend that the purpose of contemporary

political theory is not so much to theorize
a new type of
political practice, nor to politicize the traditional
enterprise, of political theory.

Rather,

vexing rift between theory and practice,

in light of the
I

perceive the

critical purpose of contemporary political theory to
be

primarily an instructive one

148
.

By instructive

I

mean

that a theory of politics allows a theorists to challenge
348

the very value of
political
political

nr-ao*-

•

lce

inciting a discussion
between theorists and
others that drsrupts
the meaning of
politics in theory as well
,

as practice.

Consequently,

I

contend that this sort of
instruction divulges a
theorist's
particular approach to
politics,

scholarship, and ethics,
an

approach that engenders
varied political implications.
The enterprise of
contemporary political theory
appears
most provocative when an
idea of politics confronts
the
empirical weight of political
practice.
This challenge is,
I believe,
the hallmark of Max Weber's
theoretical
enterprise.
it is evident
in that he insists on

postulating a theory
ltics that a-;
y of politirc;
P
directly opposes the
given political landscape of
Wilhelmine Germany. This
oppositional proclivity is apparent
.

n

at the outset of his

theoretical endeavors, when, in
his 1895 Freiburg address,
he situates himself between
Germany's provincial past and
its idealized future.
He rejects both the Prussian
Junker's
view of a "patriarchal" politics
and the German

proletariat's reach toward

a

"classless" politics.

In fact,

Weber even rebukes those growing voices
who advocate the
political project of liberal democracy,
claiming that "the
vital interests of the nation take
precedence
even over

democracy or parliamentary rule." 150

Yet,

he still

underscores the necessity of democratic institutions,
though
he theorizes their design as an instrument
of national
power

rather than a goal that might rival the German
nation.
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Thus

Weber concedes that "if
parliament were to fail and,
as a
result, the old system were
to return, the consequences
would be far-reaching indeed."-*
Given this difficult
position between Germany's dying
traditions
and its

fledgling reach toward the
future, Weber's theory of
politics provides more than an
alternative

to each political

camp.

it offers itself up as
a force that unsettles
the

standard concepts of politics
in Wilhelmine Germany.
In terms of Weber's
theoretical
successors,

the more
sanguine approach to theorizing
comes from the work of
Habermas.
Indeed, he seeks to defy the
instrumental drift

modern society and politics with
a pluralistic notion of
communicative action. His theoretical
opposition to
politics is more subtle than Weber's,

a theorist who clearly

and publicly articulates a notion
of politics at odds with
the historical drift toward
liberal-democratic axioms.
In

theorizing a notion of communicative action,
Habermas
indirectly questions something other than
the modern
institutional design of liberal -democratic
politics.

He

contests the philosophical postulates of a
technically
rational subjectivity, postulates that support
such a

contemporary political design.

15 *

He claims that

communicative reason does not simply encounter ready-made
subjects and systems" which are the central tenets of
liberal politics.

Rather,

he continues,

structuring what is to be preserved,
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"

"it takes part in

thus challenging

liberal -democratic politics
to entaace a more fluid
and
participatory design.
His project, though,
still tends
to reach beyond the past
and present limits of
contemporary
politics to embrace a utopian
politics in which individual
subjects strive for shared
understandings rather than
partisan differences. Ultimately,
he seeks a notion of
"subjectivity" that "resists the
denaturing
of the self for

the sake of self-preservation.

.

.a

symbolically structured

lifeworld that is constituted in
the interpretative
^.ccompl i shment s of its
Lb rnpmhprc:
,H only
members 3r
and
reproduced through
1164
communication
For this reason, Habermas's
theoretical
project of politics defies contemporary
approaches to
politics, not by critiquing them
directly, but by reaching
beyond them toward some utopian future 155
.

.

Michel Foucault's theoretical approach
to politics is
more intricate than Weber's and clearly
more provocative
than Habermas's.
Indeed, Foucault's idea of power disputes
the notion of a centralized or even
disengaged
agency,

positing instead

a

provisional one in which various foes

contest one another's schemes of domination

156
.

Contrary

to many contemporary forms of politics, which
either affirm

the state as the epitome of power or diagnose the
citizen as
a

victim of

it,

Foucault envisions a politics in which those

very forms constitute the source of conflict.
'every intensification,

He notes that

every extension of power relations

to make the insubordinate submit can only result in the
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limits of power.
power,

I

1,157

believe,

Yet this notion of
decentralized

is limited by something
more than the

ambiguities and vagaries of
Foucault's lexicon.
it is also
limited by a subtle affinity
with traditional notions of
liberal democratic politics.This is evident insofar as
he declares that "between a
relationship of power
and a

strategy of struggle there is
a reciprocal appeal, a
perpetual linking and a perpetual
reversal.
At every moment
the relationship of power may
become a confrontation between
two adversaries.— Clearly,
Foucault's theory of
politics compels us to rethink the
empirical designs of our
contemporary commitment to liberal
-democratic political
institutions. The more important question
is,
however,

whether a return to past notions of
political "agonism" can
bear fruit for contemporary politics
rather
than just for

those persons who engage in the shifting
discourses of
political theory.
The often obscure theoretical endeavors of
Adorno

nevertheless clearly divulge,

I

believe,

the principal

theoretical challenge to the contemporary practice of
politics.

Like Weber in many ways, Adorno is honest enough

to see the naive ambitions of a utopian design of politics,
as well as the desperate turn toward the past for

romanticized ideals of an agonistic democracy.
target is the politics of the present.

His chief

His approach to

politics "considers actual or imagined differences as
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stigmas indicating that not
enough has yet been done;
that
something has still been left
outside its machinery, not
quite determined by its
totality."- This

is not to say
that his theoretical task,
his dialectical opposition
to the
present state of politics,
epitomizes the critical force
of
political theory.
indeed, an explicit theory
of politics is
absent from his understanding
of critical theory.
He simply
states that politics "should
point to the bad equality

of

today... and conceive the better
state as one in which people
could be different without fear." lsl
insofar as

"dialectical thought" maintains
critical "gaps" between a
theory of politics and political
practice, Adorno precludes
a return to the past and
discounts a reach to the future by
struggling to remain in the present.

These contemporary acts of theorizing
against politics
thus signify, not a political practice
per
se,

but a

scholarly venture that potentially engenders
political
consequences.
Though he advances an idea of politics
against the totality of the culture industry,
Adorno still
concedes that theorizing confronts an obstacle in
the form
of reification.

The very act of theorizing against the

totality of the culture industry presupposes elements
of
thinking that stem from the Enlightenment underpinnings of
that peculiar totality.

endeavor," he asserts,
society,

"When oppositional intellectuals
"to imagine a new content for

they are paralyzed by the form of their own
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consciousness, which is modelled
in advance to suit
their
needs of this society."*The theorist's critical
engagement with the world
thus comes with a
significant
cost, one that reminds
him or her of the distance
between
theory and practice.
In other words, critical
thinking

"has

forgotten how to think for
itself, it has... become
its own
watchdog.
Thinking no longer means
anything more than
checking at each moment whether
one can indeed think."*-

The consequence of theory,
therefore, not only underscores
the paradoxical limits of
the theorist's scholarly
practice,
but reveals at least one
perspective on the theoretical edge
of contemporary politics.
it provokes others to
consider
whether a paradox or philosophical
tension informs their own
interpretation of politics 164
.

Max Weber also points to the sort
of cultural closure
to which Adorno alludes.
Unlike Adorno, though, Weber's
approach to theorizing presupposes a type
of conscious
struggle which he ascribes to politics:
Where the politician
struggles for power, the scholar struggles
over the meaning
of theoretical concepts.
The critical force of theorizing
thus concerns, not so much the practical
conduct of, say,
politics, but the conceptual elements which inform,

perpetuate, and renew it.

The scholar's practical domain

entails "the analytical rearrangement of the immediately

given reality,

"

a domain that necessarily mirrors a

constant tension with the new knowledge which we can and
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desire to wrest from reality.—

According to Weber,

however,

the practice of the
theorist remaxns distinct
from
that of the politician;
still, the repercussions
of a

theoretical struggle allude
to the practical "reality"
of
politics.
The scholar is after all
integral to "a
continuous process passing from
the attempt to order reality
analytically through the
construction of concepts ... and the
reformulation anew of concepts on
the foundations thus

transformed.—

The practical direction of
theory is thus
contrary to an idea of politics,
and for that reason

constitutes a challenge to any
practical notion of politics.
In many ways Habermas shares
Weber's commitment to
scholarly conflict, but he rejects
any notion of struggle
that, like Weber's, presupposes
the primacy of sovereign
individuals.
Indeed, Habermas rejects the philosophy
of
consciousness he believes underlies modern
notions of
subjectivity, and thus the growing rational
disenchantment
with the contemporary world.
For this
reason,

he claims

that theorists no longer need to be concerned
with

explicating "the knowledge and mastery of an objective
nature.

The more important theoretical inquiry concerns

theoretical clarification of "the intersubjectivity of

possible understanding and agreement - -at both the
interpersonal and intrapsychic levels

."
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The distinction

between Habermas and Weber becomes apparent insofar as
Habermas's theoretical reach for communicative action
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reflects, not a critical
struggle, but a common
understanding among different
persons.
According to
Habermas, "communicative
actors move in the medium of
a
natural language, draw upon
culturally transmitted
interpretations, and relate
simultaneously to something in
the one objective world,
something in their common social
rid, and something in each's
own subjective world ." 168
Hence, Habermas's theoretical
project signifies the

possibility of a worldly engagement
between theorists and
politicians, yet this engagement
reveals no

direct challenge

to the contemporary practice
of politics.

It precludes the

prospect of dissension for the sake
of valid agreement.
Michel Foucault's theoretical charge
against politics
corresponds in many ways to Weber's own
scholarly
disposition.
it does so by targeting, I think,
not so much
the act of politics itself, but the
ideas and values
that

sustain such acts.

In this way,

Foucault also distinguishes

his project from that of Habermas's
theoretical quest for

understanding,

"

which presupposes

a

shared rational

language rather than a discernment of marked differences.
Foucault does so, more specifically, when his theoretical

project reflects a critique, not of politics per

se,

but of

the knowledge that helps maintain the self-evident qualities
of a contemporary notion of political practice.

matter of shaking this self -evidence,

"

"It's a

he declares,

"of

demonstrating its precariousness, of making visible not its
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arbitrariness, but its complex
interconnection with a
multiplicity of historical processes .-- 169
Again,
his

approach to theory is primarily
scholarly endeavor with

a

a

scholarly one, but a

significant political consequence.

For Foucault seeks to unsettle
the very meaning of politics
by "making visible a singularity
at places where there is a

temptation to invoke a historical
constant
which imposes itself uniformly on
.-' 170
all

...
in

an obviousness
short,

he

seeks to exploit the "breach of self
-evidence" underlying
the contemporary political practices
we take for granted.

Therefore Foucault's "critical ontology,"
which thwarts the
epistemological uniformity of theorizing,
represents a
critical force.
It is forceful in that it
vexes,

not the

practice of politics, but the theorist who contends
that
practice and theory represent either two distinct

domains or

one ambiguous quest for power

171
.

One significant consequence of contemporary political

thinking thus emerges,

I

believe,

in an ethical disposition

that acts against the dominant approach to present-day

politics

172
.

It is also important to note that the ethical

posture of contemporary theory derives in part from the
theoretical distinction Weber makes between politics and
science.

For Weber,

this posture is not reflected in or

founded upon the daily practice of politics, where the

struggle between persons necessarily entails the use of
violence.

The words of a politician,
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repeats Weber,

"are

not means of scientific
analysis but means of
canvassing
votes and winning over others
... they are swords
against the
enemies: such words are
weapons.'— However, the ethical
posture of the theorist denves,
not from the confines of
science per se, but from the
more fluid enterprise of
teaching.
As a teacher, the theorist
differentiates "that
it is one thing to state
f act s ... while it is
another thing
to answer questions of the
value of culture and its
individual content and the question
of how one should act in
the cultural community and in
political

association.—

It

is thus important to note that
Weber's approach to theory

entails more than a broad catalogue
of ideas stretching from
the varying degrees of Herrschaft
to the opposing
"vocations" of science and politics.
His approach to theory
reveals, I believe, an ethical stance
that provokes a
possible rethinking of what we as citizens
take for granted
about the boundaries of political practice.
If there is one obstacle that defies
the theorist's

ethical orientation it undoubtedly stems from
Adorno's view
of the culture industry.
The obstacle for Weber was clearly
what he perceived to be the sense of "disenchantment"

indicative of the "iron cage" of modern culture, a condition

whereby the likes of scholarship and politics remain
insulated within their own distinct spheres.
Adorno, however,

According to

the "culture industry" represents a broader

and more formidable obstacle than the "iron cage,"
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especially insofar as it
negates the line between
political
practice and theory.
other words, "the irreconcilable
elements of culture, art and
distraction, are subordinated
to one end and subsumed
under one false formula: the

m

totality of the culture industry."'”
of the critical theorist,

The ethical stance

therefore, manifests itself in
his

or her capacity to undermine
rather than simply establish
dominant perceptions of the
contemporary world- - including
politics.
The theorist cannot expect
to contest the culture
industry's "influence over the
consumers" with an "outright
decree," an influence bolstered by
the pleasurable allure of
"entertainment."
Instead, according to Adorno, the
theorist
must reveal "the hostility inherent
in the principle of

entertainment to what is greater than
itself
Adorno's critical enterprise and public

." 176

Clearly,

act as a theorist

advocates an ethical stance that defines
itself as
oppositional.
though,

The more important facet of this stance,

is not the practical struggle against
the culture

industry, but the critique of thinking that
spurs at least
the possibility of a dialogue of differences.

There is an ethical alternative to Adorno's dour view
of political theory's promise.

m

That option manifests itself

Habermas's "communicative" resistance against bourgeois

society's "self-conscious" philosophical impulse.

The

ethical dimension of Habermas's theoretical project takes
shape, moreover,

in relation to his ultimate ideal,
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in which

society of relatively
autonomous persons who, through
critical dialogues, come to
share understandable ends.
This
IS Habermas's way of
saying that the modern
quest for "selfpreservation ... becomes dependent
on the integrative
accomplishments of subjects who
coordinate their action via
criticizable validity claims," 1 ”
it is an ethical
a

disposition that recognizes the
limits of instrumental
reason and the promise embodied
in the communicative
ambitions of all persons, despite
their differing ideals and
ambitions. As far as Habermas
is
concerned,

it

"reproduces
itself both through the media-controlled
purposive-rational
actions of its members and through
the common will anchored
the communicative practice of
all individuals." 1 ™ His
theoretical task thus represents an
ethical approach

m

to the

world,

not for the purpose of advancing
the struggle of

differing ideas, but for the sake of
advancing the struggle
as a means to the end of a common
understanding.
believe there is another option, however, one
that
diverges from Habermas's idealistic theoretical
I

ambitions.

Indeed Foucault's idea of an ethos of contemporary

theorizing indicates a struggle that moves, not toward
a
community of subjects, but the dissipation of subjectivity
altogether. Perhaps Foucault best articulates the theorist's

ethical disposition in a way that Weber, Habermas and Adorno
could not,

in a way that clearly articulates the critical

perspective of the ethical theorist.
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"Maybe the target

nowadays is not to discover
what we are," he suggests,
"but
to refuse what we are.—
However, this ethical
disposition does not impact the
theorist alone.
Besides
spurring conflict within the
identity of the individual
theorist, it encourages a
prospective tension between
theorists and politicians. Thus,
Foucault
concludes,

"the

political, ethical, social,
philosophical problem of our day
is not to try to liberate the
individual from the state."
Rather, the more urgent task of
the political theorist is
"to liberate us both from the state
and from the type of
individualization which is linked to the
state ." 180
Foucault's ethical stance as theorist,
therefore, reminds us
that contemporary political theory is
not about provoking a
news idea of politics.
It is about provoking new ideas
about the self that result in rethinking how
such selves
approach both political theory and the practice of
politics.

The implication of this ethos of contemporary

theorizing manifests itself,

practice per

se,

I

contend,

not in a political

but in an educational one that unsettles

the practical ambitions of citizens and politicians alike.

This instructive element is indicative of Adorno's critical

project insofar as it challenges political theorists not to
succumb to the simplistic oppositions that constitute the
sparse political practices of the culture industry.

A

similar component can be found in Habermas's work, even
though he departs from Adorno's claims concerning the
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direction of "negative
dialectics."
indeed, if there is a
political consequence
underlying Habermas's
theoretics!
project,

it is not one concerned
with perpetuating a
dialogue of differences
or a "field of tension."
Its

instructional promise reveals,
at best, the theorist's
complicity in the perpetuation
of a political practice
premised on epistemological
order as opposed to
possibility.
For that matter, Foucault's
project instructs theorists
and
others about the "antagonistic
reactions" that are integral
to a contemporary idea
of politics, even a
political
practice that denies the
prospect of differing

reactions.
also believe each theorist
reveals, therefore, an
instructive element that is
integral to Weber's theoretical
enterprise, one that involves his
push for a political
education of the German nation. He
made this point quite
clear at the outset of his academic
and, in many
I

ways,

political career in the Freiburg
address, in which he
advocates a particular type of political
education. At the
end of his Freiburg address, Weber
remarks that "there is no
more serious duty for each of us in
our narrow spheres of
activity than to be aware of this task of
contributing to
the political education of our nation ." 181

But more

importantly, what is central to his instructive
tasks- -both
early
his career and later- -is a notion of education
that

m

transforms people into something other than what
they were

m

the past or are in the present.
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"We shall not succeed in

exorcising the curse that
hangs over us," he
declares
referring to the
"unpolitrcal spirit" of
Wilhelmine Germany,
unless we drscover how
to become something
precursors of an even
greater epoch.
theoretical enterprise seehs

different: the

"*«

Though Weber's

to rnstruct the German
nation,

rt nevertheless
provides insight into a
type of education,

focus of which isq an
j
idea and
practice of politics that
is fundamentally
contingent, contestable, and
open to
multiple interpretations.
t-hs

i

-av-,
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to their different views of "rationality," see John
O'Neill,
"The disciplinarian society: from Weber to Foucault" in The
British—Journal—of Sociology 37 (1986)
42-60.
He contends
that in many ways "certain developments in Foucault's studies
*
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mPl emSnt Weber s formal
analysis of t h^^odern
bureauc
ra^
at
1C
state and economy."
However, O'Neill adds
the two tm ln ^:ers diverge
in light of
"Foucault s different conceDtion jl
ratlonali ty " which
manifests itself in a histor^rJ
opposed to a monolothic abstreet > atrate 9y" of power as
S tnicture ' 42
important to note as 111
It is
„
Weber tends to presuppose that fchthe i° UCaUltla " critique of
a universal totality?'
aS
whlchfs "no ?
essarily the case. On
this problem of Weber's
31
rationality, see Donald N. Levine
^° tion of
"LitiSnl?^
Weber and Beyond" in Socioloci
oai
81)
Cf., David Owen, Maturitv
5-25.
and Mn^ ernit
0
Nietzsche,
y
Weber,
Foucault, ando__rne-j\m
thp ImhtmiLo
o—of
pi vale nee
—Reason (London: Routledgel'
19 9 4
'

i

'

-

i

f1

'

Jh, —

'

.

)

"Theodor Adorno, .Minima Moral ^ t
urans
nn n PE.F.n.
P TT
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Jephcott
London: Verso iyy/)
n
1997
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Essays on the Sociology of Fate 2nd ed. (London^'
Saji 19 %f'
especially chapter 3: Weber and the Frankfurt
School.
Thev
reject "Weber's pessimism," says Turner.
More specificallv
r
eCt the
quati °n 0f 4ns trumental rat^nality witA
ratLna uV
S L " WhlC
is another way of saying that
cf,!
" rational
1 dH
dlsc
° urse cann °t ?
be separated from normative issues
Of
frood
of freedom
and responsibility," 70-71.
Thus, according to
rn
the Frankfurt School repudiate the
"relativisf"
drelativist
direction
of
Weber's notion of purposive
rationality for the sake of maintaining "the
emancipatory
interest which they believe underlies their broader
notion of
rationality, 70-71.
See also Martin Jay, The Dialectical
Imagination (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).
"The
Frankfurt school did not deny the trend towards
bureaucratic
rationality and legal formalism," Jay states, referring
to
e er s
influence on his German intellectual successors.
"What
they did find inadequate was the reduction of
rationality to its formal, instrumental side." Jay goes on to
attribute this difference to the Frankfurt School's attachment
to Hegelian philosophy, as opposed to Weber's more neo-Kantian
.
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lt cal Discourse 3rd
edition (Princeton: Prin~ceton un-lil
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1993 >•
is most important is,
What
b e i f*'
It/
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extent
to
which
Connolly
predicates his approach
nn pl-' ^
baSiS ° f *
"lag between inherited^
terns of d
,
OU3
se
a
nd
changing
constellations of social life"
^ ° h he believes
"contributes both to the conteltabili^/
core concepts and
y
the
inherently
^
creative
tension
of
political
conceptualization " 2 ?n
draw on the philosophical P man y ways Connolly appears to
especially
inasmuch asWolrn Saims thal^no!
political theory exhibits a
twofold complexity
rhpnrl
.theoretical
perspectives
change
in
resnonee
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1S

er
UnS " spect ed
This disclosure
S
is
a Chleved
by looking at
the
facts
differentlv° tb
that 1S
f
from
a
new
theoretical perspective "
qZI Sheldon
ou
See
Wolin, "Political Theory: Trends
and Goals ^ in
III t erna tion al Encyclo e d
ia of the Social s ripnnpc
p
L
S
(NSW York: Macmillan, 1968),'
318-33l'.
Final lv^T1 bh'
t > 1S imPortant to
bink
note that divulging a
lag or a ,?tension" between theory
and politics is not the
chief purpose of political theory. Rather,
like Connolly and
1 coa tend that it is the
creative departure point of
poiiticai theory, one that allows the theorist
"to understand
what is possible." On this point see Bernard
Crick, Political
heory and Practice (New York: Basic Books,
1973), who "would
us deny that there is any valid sense of
political theory
such that to study it in any meaningful way does
not have some
implicetions
intended or unintended, positive or negative,
e t 1 r f ° r P° llc y or for more specific
discussions about
i I?
whether
a particular thing is practicable or likely
to stay
y
practicable," 29.
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This politically barbed aspect of education is central
to the legacy of political theory at least since Socrates.
As
for ats significance in the enterprise of contemporary
political theory, I refer the reader to Sheldon S. Wolin,
P olitics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1960)
This is evident inasmuch as he charges that political theory
ought not to be viewed as a fund of absolute political
wisdom, but rather as a continuously evolving grammar and
vocabulary to facilitate communication and to orient the
understanding."
He never fails to remind others "that the
validity of an idea cannot be divorced from its effectiveness
as a form of communication," 27.
I think another element of
this educative task is apparent in George Kateb, Political
Theory
Its Nature and Uses (New York: St. Martin's Press,
.
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the educative thrust of
political
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t0 T raCy Stron 9' The
Idea of Po litical Th^r(Notre
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me
Univ
ersity of Notre Dame
Press, 1990)
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her
°
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Jurgen Habermas,
9^;
on Value-Freedom and
Objectivity" in Max Webp-r Discussion
n d Soci ology Today
—
ed
Otto
Stammler and trans. Kathleen Morris
(New York: Harper & Row,
1971), 59-66.
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Concerning the distinction between
Foucault and Weber,

see endnote #8."
177 /

°n Porno's appropriation of
Weber see Pnrinnt-o #q
Moreover, insofar Adorno differentiates
himself
Neo-Marxists relative to Weber's theoretical
aVoitlons see
a
S
e Me
nntln
'lienee (London: The Macmillan
j7
lf
Press Ltd° t'97 8^
the im P orcant Point, one with
which I co'ncir that fa
Adorno adoes not indict Weber's notion of
goal rational 'tie
Y
9 an a P° lo 3y for the instrumentality
of callta^tt
capitalist society."
Rather, according to Rose
Adorno
3
dia9n ° SiS ° f Westem rationalization was
orrect
"correct
hi?!' unrealistic,"
but
since
such
a
society
is
al
averse to Weber's own idea of the willful and
rvio^f individual,"
H'
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82-83.
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of community,'"
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innnr^o
11
iCh thS relations betweenfalue
"
spheres
sph^s'allofofh"^
allow other suchh°rebels to act against
politics
For
this reason
Scaff tends to maintain the strict
analytical
boundaries between the sphere, compelling
persons to choose
sentiment

'

f

one sphere or the other
I think there are other
Web r s notion of value-spheres, ways that ways of
allow us
to see them notf as separate and distinct,
but fluid and prone
C nte tat
Cf
Rogers Brubaker,
^°? S fr ° m other spheres.
Tho
f
T
he T°
Limits
of Rationality (London: Allen & Unwin,
contends that though "the value spheres have an 1984) who
existence, conflicts among them can be resolved, for objective
any given
individual, only through purely subjective choice,"
74.
in
other words, as far as Brubaker is concerned, value
spheres
are forever being crossed for a variety of subjective
reasons,
none of which are necessarily subject to or derived from
a
specific rationally-ordered value sphere.
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“Max Weber, "Religious Rejections of the World and Their
Directions" in FMW, 334. The original German version of this
text appears as " Zwis chenbetrachtung" in GAR,
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Ctive
Heel's si^ates^wTber
^egacy
of
Machiavelli, Rousseau
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thinkers, Henms perceives a deep
"liberal" concern for "the
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r
P
S
°^ an unfoldin 9 that appeared
to °be
e possible
p olsilblI not on an individual
basis
but rat-hpr
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ci
ly ultimatel y in the anhent sense
of
ltics. poUtTcs
p
se°p Wilhelm Henms,
See
Essavs in Reconst run nn
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 196
rrfe
lin^^idoigH
tuates Weber within the enterprise of
contemporary
political
theory however, Owen departs from Wolin
in that he locates a
™° re dlstinc,: P r oj ect than prophecy
in Weber's political
66 ^'
1UmpS to 9 ether Weber, Nietzsche and
Foucault'
lt inqnf
nS0fa5 as the ^ " are a11 centrally concerned
with
_
f0rn ° f hlstori oal thinking which
reconstructs
\
fhP
the relationship
between autonomy and its conditions of
realisation
modern culture in order to critically
articulate the conditions of maturity," 214. See
David Owen
M aturity a nd Modernity (London: Routledge,
1994)
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Jiirgen Habermas, "The Idea of the University"
in The New
ed.
and
trans.
Shierry Weber Nicholsen
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990
125. Hereafter referred
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A similar point is made by Rick Roderick, Habermas and
the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: St. Martin's
Press,
who characterizes Habermas's project of
1986),
communicative action as both "overly harmonistic" and
dismissive of "the possibility of internal criticism."
However, I tend to distance myself from Roderick's claims in
370
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that he seeks to remedy
standards" by directing it
class, power and political
entirely convinced that a
criterion necessarily lead
critical thinking capable of

criterion
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Habermas's lack of "critical
toward "a new investigation
of
organisation," 165
I
am not
commitment to such normative
to the prospect of a
form of
scrutinizing the limits of such

6

°^ f ;' Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
Benhabib contends
that Weber is at best inconclusive about the
philosophical
dimensions of Western rationalization, shifting between
a
desire to mark "the legacy of cultural modernity" as
"a
binding one" and "a certain sympathy toward ... defiant acts of
will."
in any case,
she understands that
"Habermas'
fundamental concern in developing a theory of communicative
action and rationality is to warn against the nihilism which
may result. from this ambivalent relation to the legacy of the
moderns," 255-ff.
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s milar to th e one made by
Sheldon Wolin,
and jPractice of Power" in After Foucault
humanistic Knowledge, Postmod e rn Challenges
e d Jonathon Arac
(New Brunswick and
Press
19M) ?
According to Wolin, the source of the problem
concerning Foucault's political project of theory
involves the
conflation of "knowledge and power." Thus, for Wolin,
"it is
i
icult to say whether Foucault's legacy is
primarily a
politics of discourse rather than a discourse about
politics
or whether it is a discourse in which each is
absorbed into
°hher and transformed by it: politics becomes discourse
and discourse politics," 185.
Where Wolin witnesses a
conflation of knowledge and power, Jon Simon sees a fruitful
interchange- -and thus an affirmative interpretation of this
couplet in Foucault's thinking.
See Jon Simon, Foucault and
the Political (London: Routledge, 1995)
He departs from the
Foucault ian presupposition "that thought has material effect
on government."
Hence,
he contends that if political
theorists wish "to uncover all the thought behind the rules
that govern our collective life, we should address the
discourses of knowledge consisting of the human sciences,
which are accounts of the disciplinary techniques according to
which we are governed," 56.
In the meantime, however, Simon
fails to address the complicated nuances of the knowledgepower
nexus,
nor
does
he
question
the
Foucaultian
„

0n

)

lp Theory
H
Th 5
the

•

,

.

:

.

372

^

:

«

1

th
is simply
subservient to or"
1 ° £ aovernment
words, he tends
other
f k
that reveals a steady confront^ aSPeC t ° f Political thinking

to^rL.

ssss,

.

m

te = ;£
„

|

e

Hereafter refer?ed
74

PPC.

75

FR,

38.

76

FR,

38.

77

FR,

42.

78

FR.

42.

79

FR,

43.

80

FR,

42-45.

81

FR.

50.

82

FR.

46.

83

FR.

47.

{LonAaai

95.

On this problem of totalizing the enterprize of
ical theory, particularly in relation to its alleged
perpetuation of a narrow idea of political rationality, see
Sheldon Wolin,
"Theory and Practice of Power" in After
Foucault
Hu manistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges
who
argues that Foucault himself falls prey to the totalizing
tendency for which he rebukes political theory. As Wolin sees
it, Foucault "offers no hope of escape" from the "imprisoning
structures of knowledge and practice ... There is no exit
because Foucault has closed off any possibility of a
privileged theoretical vantage point that would not be
infected by the knowledge/power syndrome and would not itself
be the expression of a Nietzschean will-to-power, " 186. John
Rajchman makes the same point in Michel Foucault: The Freedom
of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985),
when he notes how "Foucault's deep critical analysis not only
P°-l- i-t

—
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does not entail any single
solut ion or alternative but
to
tends
render
existing
proposals
for
change
even
more
problematic," 47
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ancy Fr aser, "Foucault on Modern Power:
Empirical
^
d
rm tlVe Confusions " in Praxis International
3
^-? tAgain, she question's
? 7 ? 287.
1981
272
Foucault's analysis of
power insofar as it fails to draw "careful
between a variety of concepts and instead lumpsdistinctions"
them "under
his catchall concept of power.
As a consequence,
the
potential
for
a
broad range of normative nuances is
surrendered, and the result is a certain normative
onedimensionality " 232.
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Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in Michel
Foucault
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics
eds
and
trans Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1983), 221.
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Michel Foucault,
"Governmentality" in The Foucault
Effect Studies in Governmentality eds. Burchell, Gordon, and
Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 92-93.
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This point is made evident in Seyla
Benhabib Critioue
Ng rm and Utopia
Her basic claim, like many othe^
^orists
who approach the history of the Frankfurt
School,
is Jha?
lie accepting Weber' s diagnosis of the
dynamics of
,

T

.

societal
the West the y criticize this process from
the standpoint of a non- instrumental
paradigm of reason."
ore important, however, Benhabib proceeds to
demonstrate how
the eariy members of the Frankfurt School inevitably
encounter
3
amit in that "this non- instrumental reason can
no longer be
anchored immanently in actuality and assumes an
increasingly

^

1 ° r al; Zat:LC7n
c l
^
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utopian character," 163.

On Adorno's critique of scientific positivism see
Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1984)
who notes that, for Adorno, "positivism failed to
recognize the active, constitutive power of subjectivity in
creating the world. .and thus was complicitous with a passive,
contemplative politics which accepted the world as finished
reality, a 'second nature'," 58.
Given this critique of
positivism, Adorno and his Frankfurt School colleagues sought
to theorize in various ways a countervailing force that might
emancipate modernity from such philosophical strictures. On
this point see David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory:
Horkheimer to Habermas (Berkeley: University of California
Press,
1980)
"In order to sustain their critique of
positivism and positivist philosophy, " notes Held, "the
Frankfurt theorists had to elaborate their own notions of
,

.
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.

'reason',
107

MM.

''objectivity'

and 'truth'," 174.
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the perspective of Max Weber's theory
of
" ideal
eal -tvnas°^
types,
see Gillian Rose,
The Melancholy Science
11 * 11 PreSS Ltd
1978
who charges that
"Adorno cTtes^Weh
U e ° f ldeal -types,
not as mere
methodoloaical devices,
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but as a series of approximate
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Susan
Buck-Morss
The
Origin
of
Ne^ Hvo
Dialectics
"The fact of the matter is," she says
"that
Adorno's talk of the mediation between intellectual
praxis
and
political praxis remained abstract and vague,
with no
explication of. the social medium which might serve
conduit for this mediation, once the role of the Partyas a
was
rejected," 42. For a differing view of this claim concerning
Adorno's detachment from political practice, see Gillian Rose,
The Melancholy Science
Rose's contention is that cries for
social and political action on the part of critical theorists,
especially Adorno, only perpetuates the "social reality of
advanced capitalist society."
The trick for Adorno, notes
Rose, is not to fall prey to a theory which supports such a
society with prescriptions and remedies.
Rather, Adorno's
melancholy
science
is
not
resigned,
quiescent
or
pessimistic .. .His 'morality' is a praxis of thought not a
recipe for social and political action," 148.
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““Concerning the problematic dimensions of Adorno's
critical approach to "totality, " see Fredric Jameson, Late
Marxism (New York: Verso, 1996)
It is Jameson's claim that
Adorno "retains the concept of the system and even makes it,
as target and object of critique, the very center of his own
ant i - systematic thinking.
However, the critical purpose of
postulating this totalizing system of capitalism is to remind
us "of our imprisonment within system, the forgetfulness or
repression of which binds us all the more strongly to it, in
ways reminiscent of the illusions of identity, with which it
is
of
course in one sense virtually synonymous," 27.
According to Jameson, therefore, Adorno destines modernity and
.
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For a disc ussion on the differences
between Foucault's
and Adorno's interpretations of
Enlightenment
see
Honneth
"Foucault's Theory of Society: A
Systems-Thlor^fc
Dissolution^ of the Dialectic of Enlightenment"
in Critimie and
£S|er, ed. Micheal Kelly (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press,
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0n Adorno's
j.^au±un,
bee
Martin Jay, Adorno (Carnbridge MA: Harvard University Press,
1984)
Jay clarifies the philosophical tradition from which
Adorno derives his particular critique, a tradition that
includes departures from the critical theories of Marx and
Lukacs
"Although at times in his own work an apparently
Lukacsian usage did appear, " says Jay, "reification for Adorno
was not equivalent to the alienated objectification of
subjectivity, the reduction of a fluid process into a thing.
Instead, and here Adorno's debt to Nietzsche on the origin of
exchange was particularly evident, reification, when he used
it
in
a
pejorative
sense,
meant
the
suppression of
heterogeneity in the name of identity," 68.
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One source, of these critical "gaps"
and degrees of
istance seems linked to Adorno's rejection
of
Hegel's
reach
9
toward phrlosophica! totality.
On this subject
see
Savid
Heid,, In troduction to Critical
Theory: Horkheim er to Habermas
erkeley: University of California Press,
1980)
"Against
egel s notion of a cognitive process
that unfolds into a
n ty in
a bsolute idea (the complete
identity of subject
^ H H
iorno s understanding suggests only
negativity-1
61106 bStWeen Subject and object
cannot be
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F°r a rich discussion concerning Adorno's desire "to
keep criticism alive" by way of "negative anthropology, " see
Susan Buck-Morss The Origin of Negative Dialectics (New York:
The Free Press, 1977)
Buck-Morss clarifies the degree to
which Adorno understood how the consequence of theorizing
often ran "the risk of reproducing the commodity structure
within consciousness. .The purpose of what in Adorno's case
could be called 'antitheories' was to avoid such conformism at
all costs " 186
,
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Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics trans. E. B.
Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 3-4. Hereafter referred
,

to as ND
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Concerning this point in the work of Adorno and other
early members of the Frankfurt School, see Martin Jay, The
Dialectical Imagination 216-217.
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f
atl ° n lth " strangeness " concludes
Ball, is
"not
ot to make it less strange or different,
but to make it more
comprehensible, " 43
My only reservation about Ball
s project
of
conceptual theory" is that maybe the purpose
of
theory
is
not necessarily comprehension, which
presupposes
a
reach
toward epistemological order, but also
the cultivation of
contingency
which makes all claims prone to difference
contestability, and ultimately a shifting dialogue
on the
meaning of theory and politics.
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What comes to mind is the work of William E. Connolly
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press'
1991)
in particular, I think of Connolly's tenacious
desire
to acknowledge [the paradox of difference] and to
convert it
into a politics of the paradoxical, into a conception of
the
political as the medium through which the interdependent
antinomies of identity and difference can be expressed and
contested."
One ought to pause, however, when Connolly
underscores
the
direction
of
this
"politics
of
the
paradoxical," since he associates it with "liberalism, an
alternative,
militant liberalism both indebted to and
competitive
with
other
liberalisms
and
nonliberalisms
contending for presence in late-modern life," 92-94. For this
reason, we can see his attempt to rethink the monolithic
discourse of liberalism from a different, more decentralized
I dentity\Dif f erence
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complex interplay between political
engendering "the task of political experience and thouaht
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See Sheldon Wolin, "Political Theory
as a
Vocation" in The American Poliric a l Science
Review 6 3 1969
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On this topic see Maurice Merleau-Ponty
Understanding" in Adventures of the Dialectic "The Crisis of
trans Joseph
en (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1973
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0n tha degree to which "the political
failure"' of
GS any sabota ^d the critical
eber s theoretical project, see Lawrence A.components of
"Max
eber s Politics and Political Education" in Scaff
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“With
regard to how Habermas
in
particular and
"communicative ethics" in general spur a challenge to
contemporary politics and philosophy, see Seyla Benhabib,
"Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical
Philosophy" in The Communicative Ethics Controversy
eds
Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
,

Press, 1990), 330-369.
The task of such thinkers, says
Benhabib, "is concerned with the unmasking of such mechanisms
of continuing political ideology and cultural hegemony. .The
emphasis now is less on rational agreement
but more on
sustaining. those normative relationships within which reasoned
agreement as a way of life can flourish and continue, " 340346
Hence the Habermasian communicative approach confronts
the limits of political rationality by infusing society and
politics with "normative" conditions that mandate reason
without succumbing to the amoralism of technical rationality,
which is increasingly the hallmark of advanced liberal
democratic societies.
However, my main point of contention
with this perspective is not the distinction drawn between
.

,

380
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rationality
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reason; rather
it is the necessity of
the Habermasian philosophical
as well as the project of
project
communicative ethics
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formally" in Habermas's work. "Of all
enterprises, philosophy seems especially well discursive
performing this balancing act, since on Habermas'ssuited to
reading
S
° ratlo al reconstruction that it engages
in
tn%slide
^di across ?the boundaries separating formally manages
distinct
spheres of rationality," 178-179.
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Nanc y Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical
Insights and Normative Confusions" in Praxis Internationa
l 3
(1981):
272-287.
Contrary to Fraser^ Lois McNay finds
oucault s theory of power not only easy to categorize but
'essentially positive " in that it rejects modern "unidirectional and repressive" notions of power. "Repression is
not the paradigmatic form of power," she states; "it is only
one in a multiplicity of positive and negative effects
generated through the interplay of power relations " See Lois
McNay, Fo ucault: A Critical Introduction (New York: Continuum,
1994), 90-91.
In addition to this affirmative notion of
power, McNay nevertheless rightfully contends that "Foucault's
work finishes in an unresolved contradiction between a view of
social relations as fragmented and contestable and a vision of
a totally administered society," 111.
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0n the "liberal" element in Foucault's political
thinking, I direct the reader to Jon Simon, Foucault and the
Political tLondon: Routledge, 1995), who questions whether "a
liberal democratic polity is implicit in Foucault's political
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The answer is both yes and no
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condition for the forms of subjection
targeted by Foucaults
opposataonal politics... Its humanist
limits precluS the
subjectivity," 117-118, Cf
Lois
FoucauTt"
Critacal Tntr0(iu C tion (New York: Continuum, McNay,
1994
iih o
who
reH^f
rejects outright the possibility of a
conception of
Fo ucaul t' s theoretical approach to
politics,
"First ““sli”
h
notes,
"Foucault's assertion that power and
freed™ are lnextricab ly mixed differs
fundamentally from the
Inhere?
liberal
view
that
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power
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effect °f power relations rather than as
a 'primitive atom'
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Individuals
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Despite these important
9h
1 a ™ not entirely comfortable
with the equation of
a 't subjects
individual
as "vehicles of power" and the lack of a
liberal impulse in Foucault's political thinking.
Finally
see
Andrew Barry,
Thomas
Osborne,
and
Nikolas
Rose!
ntroduction" in Foucault and Political Reason ed.
Andrew
Barry,
Thomas Osborne,
and Nikolas Rose
(ChicaqoThe
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
They characterize
Foucault's approach to liberalsm "not so much as a
substantive
doctrine or practice of government in itself, but
restless and dissatisfied ethos of recurrent critique of as a
State
reason and politics. .Hence liberalism is not about
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Such provocations are integral to the recent work of
William E. Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1995)
According to Connolly,
the central theoretical project of this text concerns his idea
of a "politics of enactment," which "involves the struggle to
cross both of these boundaries together- -the barrier posed by
the resistance of disrupted identities and that posed by
difficulty- the
movement
faces
in
clearing
sufficient
institutional space to articulate a positive identity, " 183
In other words,
such a politics requires a simultaneous
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same sort of critical
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The Freedom
— of
Philosophy

^

'^

•

-

.

.

172

79.

Cf

Politically

(

Ithaca,

NY:

173

FMW,

145-146; GAW,

174

fmw;

145-146; GAW,

lvs

DoE,

136

.

DoE,

136

.

tca,

398

.

tca,

398

.

bsh,

216

.

bsh.

216

.

176

177

178

179

180

383

181

182

WPW.
WPW.

27-28; GPS

.

24

"

21 - 7 9
.

,

•

GPS.

24

384

CONCLUSION
The chief purpose of this
dissertation has been to
rethink the intricate bond
between morality and politics in
Max Weber s political thinking.
I demonstrate how Weber's
moral ambition of German national
glory constrains his
theory of politics
a way that depletes the
prospect of
the very human struggle which
begets such glory.
i also
confirm the degree to which his
notions of vocational and

m

parliamentary politics transgress the moral
design of the
German nation. Accordingly, this study
underscores an
ethical paradox in Weber's political
thinking,
one that

entraps the politician and the political
theorist within the
ambiguous interchange of political means and
moral end.
In

addition to this ethical tumult,

I

analyze how a contending

moral ambition manifests itself in Max Weber's
theory of
science,

one which compels the scholar toward "clarity."

This becomes evident since "clarity," which necessitates

critical distinctions between human values, technical means
and corresponding consequences, exposes the ethical limits
not only of the politician in Weber's theory of politics,

but of Max Weber himself,
I

the political theorist.

Finally,

conclude with an inquiry into Max Weber's place within the

project of contemporary political theory, claiming that his

political thinking inspires us, not to theorize a type of
politics, but to theorize against all conceptions of

politics -- theoretical or practical.
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Another aim of this project has been
to provide the
vast field of Weber studies with
a differing interpretation
of his political thinking.
This is evident, in
that my

project did not simply establish a moral
unity,
indifference, or ambiguity in Max Weber's
political
thinking, positions which comprise both
traditional and more
contemporary views of his work. Unlike
Mommsen's fix on the
nation, Hennis's reach for the "'central
question'" of

"Menschentum,

"

Owen's detection of a "genealogical"

enterprise or Breiner's perception of the "impartiality"
problematic,

I

have done more than mark a moral quest in

Weber's theoretical project of politics.

Indeed

have

I

turned Weber's varied moral ambitions against each other.
As a consequence,

I

have portrayed Weber not so much as a

nationalist, moralist or even a potential democrat, but as

political theorist whose moral quest for national glory

worked at cross-purposes with his moral aim of scientific
clarity.

Thus,

by turning Weber against himself,

I

have

confirmed how his quest for clarity undercuts his quest for

German glory, revealing the extent to which his scholarly
enterprise' unknowingly perpetuates that which his theory of

politics constrains: the prospect of human struggle.
short,

I

In

have underscored the political promise, not of

Weber's theory of politics, but of his approach to modern
scholarship- -an interpretation that clearly broadens our

approach to Weber's political thinking.
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a

This brings me to the third purpose
of this
dissertation, which has been to augment
the enterprise of
contemporary political theory with a differing
approach to
Weber's political thinking.
I am not interested
in

contesting the Straussian view of Weber as
an instigator of
nihilism, for I charge that Weber's
political thinking
posits the "ethical irrationality" of the modern
world for
the sake of nurturing difference, not
indifference.

Nor has

it been my task to situate Weber within the
Parsonian

concern for the "methodological" value of
value- freedom" or

"

Verstehen,

"

since

I

"'

ideal -types'

"
,

stress primarily the

political importance of Weber's theory of science.

Finally,

it has not been the purpose of this study to place
Weber in

the pantheon of modern "liberal" thinkers, given that

I

underscore, both his relatively anti-liberal idea of politics

and his contestable notion of individual subjectivity that

informs his theory of science.

Rather, my project seeks to

locate Max Weber's political thinking within the legacy of
critical theory,

such that it informs as well as reforms

Habermas's "communicative ethic," Foucault's "critical
ontology" and Adorno's "negative dialectics."
I

As a result,

have maintained that contemporary theory can glean from

Weber's flaws an instructive impulse to turn theory, not
against itself, but against politics.

The limits of Weber's

political thinking aid us in perpetuating a dialogue that

unsettles our differing perceptions of politics.
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Finally,

in a more circuitous way, my
purpose has been

to challenge the field of political
science to rethink both

Max Weber's theoretical contributions
and our contemporary
perceptions of politics.
If we have understood Weber to
be
a scholar trapped by an ethical
paradox, and if we have
perceived him to be one whose immanent tensions
impart a

cautionary approach to the future, then thinkers
of all
stripes have reason to turn toward Weber.
Political
scientists have often turned toward Max Weber, relying
on
his theories of "legitimacy" in comparative
politics,
his

idea of

"

Machtpolitik" in international relations, and his

studies of "bureaucracy" in American politics and public

administration.

Yet,

I

further suggest in this dissertation

that Weber's political thinking can provide us with far more

than structural, methodological, or theoretical avenues by

which to extend our scholarly enterprises.

I

note the

degree to which his political thinking provides us with

a

way of looking at politics relative to our scholarly
ambitions,

a perception that accents the critical divide

between scholarship and political.

I

have not prescribed

this tension in Weber's scholarship as a remedy for the

contemporary ills that plague the academic study of
politics.

At most,

I

have merely hinted that it affords

future scholars insight into the possibility of seeing

politics in a way that is unlike the view we often take for

granted as the theoretical and practical standard.
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